SIMSADUS  :  LONDON 


THE  AMERICAN  NAVY  IN  EUROPE 


BY 


JOHN  LANGDON  LEIGHTON 

Formerly  Ensign  U.  S.  N.  R.  F. 


NEW  YORK 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 

1920 


COPYRIGHT,  1920 

BY 
HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 


TO  MY  MOTHER 

AS  A  MARK,  NOT  A  MEASURE, 
OF  THE  LOVE  OF  A  DEVOTED  SON. 


41S322 


FOREWORD 

HOW  unfit  and  how  unworthy  a  choice  have  I 
made  of  myself  to  undertake  a  work  of  this 
mixture,  mine  own  reason  though  exceeding  weak, 
hath  sufficiently  resolved  me."  Thus  wrote  Sir  Wal- 
ter Raleigh  in  the  preface  to  his  History  of  the 
World.  By  profession  I  am  not  an  author  nor  a 
Naval  Officer,  and  yet  I  have  undertaken  to  write  a 
brief  narrative  of  the  American  Navy  in  Europe  dur- 
ing the  Great  War.  Would  that  the  talents  of  Sir 
Walter  were  at  my  command — but  I  shall  mention 
him  no  further  lest  by  drawing  him  into  the  matter 
I  flatter  myself.  I  can  but  thank  him  for  the  apt 
way  in  which  he  has  expressed  my  sentiments.  In 
these  days  of  limitless  rumors,  twice-told  tales  of 
glory,  startling  revelations,  hitherto  undisclosed  facts, 
and  much  misinformation,  I  hope  this  work  will  find 
a  place.  It  is  not  official,  and  as  sanction  has  not 
been  sought,  it  is  published  without  it. 

One  morning  in  March,  1918,  I  found  myself  a 
member  of  the  Intelligence  Section  of  Admiral  Sims' 
Staff  in  London.  The  work  in  which  I  then  joined 
and  continued  during  the  remainder  of  the  War,  and 
for  several  months  thereafter,  was  so  totally  ab- 


vi  FOREWORD 

sorbing  in  its  interests  that,  upon  my  return  to  this 
country,  I  put  what  I  had  witnessed  into  writing. 
Were  my  powers  of  expression  not  so  limited,  I  know 
the  reader  would  be  as  easily  absorbed  in  learning 
why  and  how  great  things  were  done  as  I  was  in 
watching  their  development  from  day  to  day.  If  you 
are  in  quest  of  the  Romance  of  the  War,  I  recommend 
to  you  the  voluminous  literature  that  has  been  written 
thereon.  In  my  own  experience,  the  romance  of  the 
War  began  on  April  16,  1917,  the  day  on  which  I 
left  Harvard  University,  and  donned  the  uniform  of  a 
sea-man;  it  ceased  the  following  morning  when  I  was 
aroused  from  pleasant  slumbers  at  5  A.  M.  to  wash 
the  deck. 

Those  of  us  who  joined  the  ranks  of  the  Navy  in 
this  War  found  ourselves  playing  a  new  role  in  the 
comedy  or  drama  of  life.  We  left  a  universe  of  free- 
dom and  entered  a  world  in  which  hours  for  smoking, 
shore  leave,  uniforms  to  be  worn,  and  the  adjustment 
of  our  lives  were  prescribed  by  autocratic  law  and 
regulations.  We  chafed  under  our  restrictions  and 
blamed  those  who  enforced  them  in  their  tyranni- 
cal attitude.  We  did  not  realize  that  in  an  Officer's 
orders,  or  the  manner  in  which  we  were  addressed, 
there  was  nothing  of  the  personal;  these  men  were 
but  enforcing  that  splendid  institution,  the  code  of 
discipline.  But  as  I  now  look  back  and  see  before 


FOREWORD  vii 

me  the  characters  of  those  Officers  with  whom  I 
came  in  contact,  I  doubt  whether  any  finer  or  more 
manly  group  of  men  exists.  They  were  educated  and 
trained  to  know  the  true  meaning  of  duty,  responsi- 
bility, and  devotion;  they  were  brisk  in  their  manner, 
quick  to  act,  severe  in  their  judgments,  and,  at 
heart,  human. 

A  word  in  explanation  of  my  title  is  pertinent. 
"Simsadus:  London"  was  the  cable  address  of  the 
American  Navy  in  Europe,  or,  in  other  words  Ad- 
miral Sims'  Headquarters  in  London.  The  word 
"  Simsadus  "  dissected,  means — "  Sims — Admiral — 
U.  S." 

JOHN  LANGDON  LEIGHTON. 
Monadnock  Farms, 

Monadnock,  New  Hampshire. 
September,  1919 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

I.  THE  SITUATION  IN  APRIL,  1917 3 

II.  ADMIRAL  SIMS  IN  LONDON 9 

III.  THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES 23 

Queenstown 24 

Brest 36 

Gibraltar 43 

IV.  PROGRESS 48 

V.  FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS — THE  GRAND  FLEET.  ...  59 

Bantry  Bay 64 

VI.  THE  NORTHERN  MINE  BARRAGE 66 

VII.  OTHER  ACTIVITIES— CHASERS  AT  CORFU 76 

Chasers  at  Plymouth 82 

Submarines  at  Bantry  Bay 


Army  Coal  Trade,  Azores 

Naval  Aviation — Murmansk,  Russia 

The  Naval  Gun  Batteries 


84 


VIII.  SUBMARINES  OFF  THE  AMERICAN  COAST 94 

IX.  A  DISCUSSION  OF  SUBMARINES  AND  THEIR  METHODS     98 

X.  THE  DISTRACTION  OF  SUBMARINES 124 

XI.  WHY  AMERICAN  TROOPSHIPS  WERE  NOT  SUNK 134 

XII.  THE  END  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  CAMPAIGN 141 

XIII.  THE  MAN  ON  THE  BRIDGE  (IN  HOMAGE) 150 

APPENDIX 159 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING 
PAGE 

Frontispiece 

Convoy  Approaching  Its  Haven  of  Safety  ....  20 

The  U.S.S.  Duncan  and  the  H.M.S.  Wizard       .     •  .        .  30 
Crew  of  the  17 .58  Surrendering  to  the  U.S.S.  Fanning  and 

Nicholson 31 

A  Convoy  Entering  Brest 38 

The  H.M.S.  Mauretania  and  U.S.S.  Leviathan  ...  39 

American  Destroyer  Escorting  a  Convoy     ....  40 

German  Submarine  Interned  at  Santandu,  Spain  ...  41 

The  U.S.S.  Shaw  in  Rough  Weather  and  After  Collision     .  50 

Troop  Convoy  Entering  Brest 51 

The  "  Tonnage  Curve  "... 60 

The  6th  Battle  Squadron 61 

A  Floating  Aerodrome 66 

The  American  Mine  Laying  Squadron  .....  67 

A  "  Fleet  "  of  Mines 70 

A  Few  of  the  Mines,  Northern  Mine  Barrage  .        .        .  76 

U.S.  Submarine  Chasers  in  Their  Cove 77 

The  Harbor  at  Ponta  del  Gada 84 

U.S.  Naval  Railway  1 4-inch  Gun  at  Sommesous       .        .  92 
The   "  Tracks "   of   Three    Submarines   off   the  American 

Coast 93 

Chart,  showing  Position  of  Enemy  Submarines  .        .        .104 

Movements  of  Submarines  (Double  Page  Map) 

The  Highest  Development  of  Submarine  Construction       .  105 

German  Submarine  Base  at  Bruges no 

Two  Methods  of  Sinking  Merchant  Tonnage     .  .in 

A  Submarine  as  Seen  from  an  Aeroplane       .        .        .        .118 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING 
PAGE 

Depth-Charge  Launching  Device 128 

The  U.S.S.  Covington,  Torpedoed  July  4,  1918  .  .  .  136 
Map  Showing  Areas  of  American  Operation  .  .  .144 
Chart  Illustrating  "  Unity  of  Command  "  .  .  .  .145 

Allied  Vessels  Sunk  by  Submarines 146 

Group  on  the  U.S.S.  New  York;  Surrender  of  the  German 

Fleet 147 

Admiral  William  Snowden  Sims 152 

Loading  the  "  V  "  Gun 153 


\ 


SIMSADUS  :  LONDON 


I 

THE  GENERAL  SUBMARINE  SITUATION  IN 
APRIL,  1917. 

PERHAPS  some  of  us  will  recall  that  in  the  first 
week  in  May,  1917,  we  were  informed  by  an 
official  statement  of  the  British  Admiralty,  that  dur- 
ing the  previous  month  of  April  875,000  tons  of 
Allied  and  neutral  shipping  had  been  sent  to  the  bot- 
tom of  the  sea  by  German  submarines.  This  in- 
formation was  not  given  to  the  British  people,  for  it 
would  have  been  a  more  staggering  blow  to  them 
than  any  other  "war  truth"  yet  disclosed.  It  might 
have  stunned  us  likewise,  had  we  not  at  that  time 
been  the  possessors  of  optimistic  hopes  and  rallying 
hearts  in  an  adventure  which  seemed  necessarily 
successful  by  our  mere  participation  in  it.  To  a  cer- 
tain extent  our  point  of  view  turned  out  to  be  correct, 
but  at  that  time  it  was  far  from  justified. 

The  submarine  situation  in  April,  1917,  was  briefly 
this.  Germany  had  constructed  213  submarines;  she 
had  lost  55,  leaving  her  a  total  of  158  underwater 
craft,  with  which  in  April  she  sank  875,000  tons  of 
shipping.  She  was  building  an  average  of  six  or  seven 
per  month,  while  her  losses  averaged  but  three  or  four. 
The  total  tonnage  of  the  world  before  the  War  was 
about  32,000,000  tons,  of  which  by  the  end  of  April 
over  7,500,000  tons  had  already  been  sunk.  Losses 

3 


4*v:::    :/./':          SIMSADUS 

at  the  rate  of  1,000,000  tons  per  month,  which  Ger- 
many had  promised  she  would  sink,  and  which  she 
virtually  did  in  April,  meant  that  in  the  course  of  a 
few  months,  the  Allies  would  be  in  a  state  of  star- 
vation. It  was  a  simple  problem  of  arithmetic  to 
calculate  the  conclusion  of  the  War  in  Germany's 
favor. 

England,  the  greatest  shipbuilding  nation  of  the 
world,  was  not  meeting  the  losses  by  new  construc- 
tion. Her  shipyards  were  burdened  with  repair 
work  on  vessels  injured  by  submarine  attacks,  and 
very  much  overcrowded  in  the  construction  of  new 
Naval  craft;  and  the  continuous  demand  for  men  in 
the  Army  caused  a  chronic  shortage  of  labor.  It  was 
a  bad  position  in  which  Great  Britain,  against 
whom  the  brunt  of  the  submarine  campaign  was 
directed,  found  herself,  and  a  disheartening  one 
when  one  considers  that  the  construction  of  a  ship 
takes  many  months  and  its  destruction  by  a  sub- 
marine but  a  few  moments.  The  United  States  was 
launching  a  tremendous  shipbuilding  programme 
which  looked  promising  on  paper,  but  many  realized 
that  a  non-shipbuilding  nation,  however  great  in 
wealth,  man-power,  and  resources,  could  not  be  con- 
verted into  a  great  shipbuilding  nation  in  less  than 
two  or  three  years.  And  the  critical  period  of  the 
War  was  to  come  in  four  or  five  months!  In  view  of 
all  this,  the  leaders  of  Great  Britain  in  May,  1917, 
looked  upon  the  failure  of  the  Allies  through  the 
success  of  German  submarines  as  a  possible  reality. 
What  then  was  to  save  the  cause  of  the  Allies  ?  The 


THE  SUBMARINE  SITUATION  IN  APRIL,  1917    5 

checking  of  the  submarine  successes,  one  may  an- 
swer; but  how  was  this  to  be  done,  and  how  was  the 
submarine  menace  being  met  at  that  time? 

At  a  rough  estimate  the  British  Navy  was  han- 
dling about  80%  of  the  War  against  the  submarine 
in  all  areas  of  submarine  operations,  such  as  the  North 
Sea,  the  English  Channel,  all  waters  west  of  Eng- 
land and  Ireland,  and  the  West  Coast  of  France;  also 
in  the  Mediterranean,  where  the  submarine  campaign 
was  pressed  with  the  same  virulence  as  marked  its 
operations  in  Atlantic  waters.  England  had  at  this 
time  about  200  destroyers  in  commission,  of  which 
100  were  on  duty  with  the  Grand  Fleet  in  the  North 
Sea.  As  long  as  the  German  Fleet  kept  up  its  threat 
of  fight,  the  British  Grand  Fleet  had  to  remain  intact. 
Another  fifty  destroyers  were  in  service  in  the  Eng- 
lish Channel,  across  which  every  British  Tommy, 
his  "  Bully  Beef,"  and  his  ammunition  had  to  pass  to 
get  to  France.  A  few  more  were  employed  in  the 
Mediterranean.  This  left  but  a  meagre  two  dozen 
to  patrol  all  waters  West  of  the  United  Kingdom, 
the  Irish  Sea,  and  to  the  South  and  North  of  Ireland, 
etc.  The  duties  of  all  British  destroyers  were  greater 
than  they  could  really  shoulder,  and  many  of  them, 
after  three  years  of  War,  were  in  urgent  need  of  ex- 
tensive repairs.  These  two  dozen  which  were  sta- 
tioned at  Milford  Haven,  Plymouth,  and  Holyhead 
were  responsible  for  the  efficacious  patrol  of  all  the 
waters  West  of  the  British  Isles.  Their  patrol  sys- 
tem was  briefly  this.  The  waters  were  theoretically 
marked  off  into  large  squares  or  areas,  and  to  each 


6  SIMSADUS 

area  a  destroyer  was  assigned;  with  so  few  destroyers 
the  squares  were  of  course  very  large;  and  yet  they 
were  supposed  to  patrol  their  square  incessantly  to 
keep  the  Submarines  down,  and,  if  possible,  to  attack 
them.  This  put  the  destroyer  in  a  position  of  little 
value,  for  as  the  submarine  could  see  the  destroyer  long 
before  the  destroyer  could  see  the  submarine,  and  as 
submarines  were  looking  for  merchant  ships,  not  for 
destroyers,  the  submarine  could  very  easily  avoid 
the  anti-submarine  vessels.  The  system  worked  out 
disastrously  and  therefore  was  discarded  and  a  new 
plan  adopted.  All  incoming  ships  were  now  directed 
to  come  into  the  Western  British  Ports,  along  any 
one  of  four  or  five  different  and  designated  lanes, 
which  the  destroyers  were  to  keep  as  free  from  sub- 
marines as  possible.  An  incoming  or  outgoing  ship, 
while  passing  along  one  of  these  lanes,  would  be 
picked  up  by  a  destroyer  and  escorted  for  some  dis- 
tance, and  then  left  alone  until  she  was  picked  up 
again.  This  system  was  an  attempt  at  a  Convoy 
system,  but  was  successful  only  in  that  while  one 
escorted  ship  arrived  safely  at  its  port,  probably 
another  two  or  three  were  unescorted,  and  therefore 
open  to  attack.  It  worked  out  better  than  its  prede- 
cessor, but  there  still  was  very  much  to  be  desired. 
The  Naval  Authorities  knew  that  a  Convoy  system 
would  be  better,  for  it  had  been  used  in  the  English 
Channel  since  1914,  and  not  a  British  Tommy  had 
lost  his  life  in  crossing.*  The  Convoy  system  was  a 

*The  Convoy  system  was  a  procedure  in  which  several  merchant 
ships  would  be  assembled  together,  and  then  proceed  under  the  protec- 


THE  SUBMARINE  SITUATION  IN  APRIL,  1917    7 

logical  remedy  to  the  Submarine  menace,  IF — there 
were  a  sufficient  number  of  destroyers  to  serve  as 
escorts. 

It  is  true  that  the  Admiralty  had  pressed  and  was 
pressing  into  service  every  available  self-propelled 
vessel.  These  vessels,  which  were  trawlers,  fishing 
boats,  and  ferry  boats,  did  noble  work,  and  as  Kip- 
ling has  put  it: 

In  Lowestoft  a  boat  was  laid, 

Mark  well  what  I  do  say! 
And  she  was  built  for  the  herring  trade, 

But  she  has  gone  a-rovin',  a-rovin',  a-rovin', 

The  Lord  knows  where! 

They  gave  her  Government  coal  to  burn, 
And  a  Q.  F.  gun  at  bow  and  stern, 
And  sent  her  out  a-rovin',  a-rovin',  a-rovin', 
The  Lord  knows  where! 

Her  skipper  was  mate  of  a  bucko  ship 
Which  always  killed  one  man  per  trip, 
So  he  is  used  to  rovin',  a-rovin',  a-rovin', 
The  Lord  knows  where! 

Her  mate  was  skipper  of  a  chapel  in  Wales, 
And  so  he  fights  in  topper  and  tails — 
Religi-ous  tho'  rovin',  a-rovin',  a-rovin', 
The  Lord  knows  where! 

Her  engineer  is  fifty-eight, 

So  he's  prepared  to  meet  his  fate, 

Which  ain't  unlikely  rovin',  a-rovin',  a-rovin', 

The  Lord  knows  where! 

tion  of  destroyers  towards  their  destination.  The  principle  of  the 
Convoy  dates  back  to  the  age  of  Merchant  Caravans  in  the  Far  East. 


8  SIMSADUS 

Her  leading-stoker's  seventeen, 
So  he  don't  know  what  the  Judgments  mean, 
Unless  he  cops  'em  rovin',  a-rovin',  a-rovin', 
The  Lord  knows  where! 

Her  cook  was -chef  in  the  Lost  Dogs'  Home, 

Mark  well  what  I  do  say! 
And  I'm  sorry  for  Fritz  when  they  all  come 

A-rovin',  a-rovin',  a-roarin'  and  a-rovin', 

Round  the  North  Sea  rovin', 

The  Lord  knows  where! 

But  as  the  Submarine  war  continued  and  the  fair 
weather  and  long  summer  nights  were  approaching, 
the  submarines  moved  further  out  into  deep  waters 
where  trawlers  and  paddle  steamers  could  not  ven- 
ture. Just  how  seriously  the  demand  for  anti-sub- 
marine vessels  was,  at  this  time,  has  never  been  ap- 
preciated, for  the  arrival  of  the  American  Destroy- 
ers in  European  waters  added  the  desired  number 
and  changed  the  whole  aspect  of  the  situation.  With 
the  coming  of  these  vessels  in  April,  and  more  in 
May  and  June,  new  hopes  came  to  those  who  knew 
that  the  sword  of  Damocles,  disguised  as  a  Submar- 
ine, had  been  hanging  over  the  heads  of  France, 
Italy,  Great  Britain,  and  America. 


II 

ADMIRAL  SIMS  IN  LONDON. 

DURING  the  latter  part  of  March,  1917,  Rear 
Admiral  Sims  was  ordered  from  the  U.  S.  Naval 
War  College  in  Newport,  R.  L,  of  which  he  was 
President,  to  Washington.  After  conferences  and 
instructions  from  Secretary  Daniels,  he  and  his 
Aid,  Commander  J.  V.  B.  Babcock,  prior  to  America's 
Declaration  of  War,  proceeded  to  London  in  civilian 
clothes  aboard  the  steamship  "New  York."  They 
arrived  in  Liverpool  on  April  loth,  and  were  met  by 
a  special  train  and  Rear  Admiral  Hope,  R.  N.,  the 
Envoy  of  the  British  Admiralty.  Admiral  Sims  had 
been  sent  to  Europe  to  confer  with  the  British 
Naval  Authorities  as  to  the  best  manner  in  which 
the  American  Navy  might  throw  its  weight  into 
the  anti-submarine  struggle  and  to  command  such 
American  vessels  as  might  be  sent  to  Europe.  As  an 
American  Naval  Officer  of  high  rank,  he  was  well 
received  in  London,  but  there  were  also  other  reasons 
for  the  extremely  warm  reception  extended  to  him. 
Admiral  Sims  was  no  mere  acquaintance  to  the 
British  Navy,  for  he  had  served  in  many  stations 
in  Europe,  and  as  Attache  in  some  of  the  great 
capitals,  during  which  appointments  he  had  made 
many  friends  in  the  Royal  Navy.  The  higher 
Officers  of  the  British  Navy  looked  upon  him  as 


io  SIMSADUS 

America's  greatest  Naval  Officer,  and  they  all  were 
familiar  with  the  story  of  his  statement  to  a  gather- 
ing of  British  Naval  Officers  in  1910,  in  which  he 
said  that  if  the  British  Navy  ever  needed  the  sup- 
port of  the  American  Navy,  that  support  would  be 
extended.  For  this  remark  he  had  been  censured 
by  President  Taft;  but  the  censure  had  been  for- 
gotten, and  the  remark  had  lived.  Here  was  the 
same  American  Officer,  who  years  before  had  ex- 
pressed an  appreciation  of  Great  Britain,  and  made 
a  prophecy  that  the  U.  S.  Navy  would  support  the 
British  Navy  in  time  of  trouble.  The  prophecy  had 
come  true  and  its  author  was  to  be  the  leader  of  the 
American  forces,  at  the  time  when  the  fate  of  Eng- 
land and  the  world  were  in  the  balance. 

A  few  words  here  about  Admiral  Sims  are  pertinent. 
His  career  as  a  Naval  Officer  had  been  brilliant  and 
he  became  a  marked  man  on  three  different  occa- 
sions. In  1905  he  had  set  his  heart  so  firmly  upon  the 
necessity  of  an  improvement  in  the  gunnery  of  the 
American  Navy  that,  when  his  plans  were  refused 
by  the  Navy  Department,  he  took  the  matter  up  with 
President  Roosevelt  himself,  who  immediately  saw 
the  value  of  Lieutenant-Commander  Sims'  schemes, 
and  had  the  whole  gunnery  system  of  the  U.  S.  Navy 
altered.  .  He  became  a  marked  man  again  in  1909, 
when,  with  the  rank  of  Commander,  he  was  ordered 
to  serve  as  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  U.  S.  S. 
"Minnesota."  This  was  the  first  time  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  American  Navy  that  an  Officer  below 
the  rank  of  Captain  had  commanded  a  first  class 


ADMIRAL  SIMS  IN  LONDON  11 

battleship.  And  then  in  1910  he  made  his  famous 
speech  to  the  British  Naval  Officers.  For  these 
reasons,  Admiral  Sims  was  the  American  Naval 
Officer  most  widely  known  to  the  British  Navy. 
He  was  the  most  welcome. 

His  mission  was  to  discuss  with  the  British  Naval 
Authorities  the  plans  by  which  the  efforts  of  the 
American  Navy  would  be  of  the  greatest  value 
against  the  submarines  or  U-boats.  Upon  his  ar- 
rival in  London,  he  had  long  and  pertinent  confer- 
ences with  the  leaders  of  the  Government,  with  the 
Prime  Minister  and  other  Cabinet  Ministers,  and 
the  Lords  of  the  Admiralty.  In  these  conferences 
he  requested  that  no  information  be  withheld  from 
him,  regardless  of  how  secret  or  pessimistic  that  in- 
formation might  be.  The  results  were  interesting. 
Having  made  himself  thoroughly  familiar  with 
existing  conditions,  he  wrote  home  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  emphasizing  two  points.  First,  he 
pointed  out  that  the  Allies  were  in  a  fair  way  to  suc- 
cumb to  Germany's  sea  policy  unless  the  United 
States  could  furnish  merchant  "bottoms"  in  the  near 
future,  and  Military  and  Naval  aid  immediately. 
The  second  point  of  interest  was  the  policy  which  he 
then  and  there  laid  down,  and  from  which  he  never 
deviated,  for  the  American  Navy  in  Europe;  namely, 
that  in  order  to  be  of  the  greatest  use,  the  American 
Warships  which  were  to  come  to  European  waters, 
should  operate  as  a  part  of  the  British  Forces,  and 
their  employment  and  disposition  supplement  the 
weaker  spots  of  the  British  Naval  Organization.  In 


12  SIMSADUS 

this  way  he  sacrificed  fame  for  himself;  for  how 
splendid  it  would  have  been  to  be  the  gallant  "Sea 
Admiral"  of  the  American  Navy,  such  as  Beatty 
was  in  the  British  Navy.  Instead  he  saw  that 
to  have  the  U.  S.  Navy  in  Europe  as  a  distinct 
and  separate  organization  would  only  lead  to  de- 
lays and  complications;  he  saw  that  the  policy  al- 
ready mentioned,  in  which  the  two  Navies  could 
become  merged  into  one,  would  be  better.  Thus  he 
took  his  place  as  the  first  great  Allied  Chief  to  ap- 
preciate the  value  of  unity  of  command. 

He  immediately  established  himself  in  London  that 
his  headquarters  might  eventually  function  as  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  British  Admiralty.  The  scope  of 
the  Naval  War  was  wide,  demanding  that  eiforts  be 
concentrated  and  not  scattered.  Naturally,  London 
offered  facilities  of  easy  contact  with  all  theatres 
of  operation,  particularly  as  regards  communica- 
tion. He  realized  that  his  communication  system 
would  be  a  vital  factor  in  the  efficient  management 
of  the  U.  S.  Naval  Forces,  because  of  the  great  dis- 
tance which  would  separate  him  from  his  bases 
and  from  Washington.  In  May  he  requested  the 
services  of  a  young  Lieutenant-Commander  of  the 
regular  Navy  named  Blakeslee,  who  came  over  from 
Washington  in  August,  and  this  officer  with  a  vision 
of  the  potential  activities  of  the  Forces  to  come  under 
the  Admiral's  command,  established  probably  the 
finest  communication  system  of  any  Allied  belliger- 
ent organization  in  the  War.*  By  means  of  this 

*The  news  of  Lt.  Commander  Blakeslee's  death  in  March,  1919  in 


ADMIRAL  SIMS  IN  LONDON  13 

system,  members  of  Admiral  Sims'  staff  could  com- 
municate in  code  with  any  of  the  bases,  later  estab- 
lished, whether  at  Murmansk,  in  Russia,  or  at  the 
Island  of  Corfu  in  the  Mediterranean,  with  only  a 
few  hours  intervening  between  cables  sent  and  an- 
swers received. 

However,  before  Admiral  Sims  became  worried 
over  the  efficient  management  of  his  forces,  he  de- 
voted all  his  energy  and  experience  and  resources 
towards  the  development  of  their  future  opera- 
tions, i.  e.,  what  were  they  to  do?  where  were  they 
to  do  it?  and  how  should  they  do  it?  In  adopting  the 
policy  that  the  United  States  Navy  should  supple- 
ment the  weaker  spots  of  the  Royal  Navy,  he  had 
made  one  reservation,  that  American  vessels  should 
primarily  be  engaged  in  anti-submarine  warfare  and 
that  any  portions  of  the  British  Navy  not  employed 
in  fighting  submarines,  even  though  employed  in  the 
Naval  situation  as  a  whole,  would  have  to  wait  to 
be  strengthened  by  American  vessels,  until  the 
critical  stage  had  passed.  He  took  this  stand  be- 
cause he  believed  that  the  anti-submarine  forces 
needed  help  more  critically  than  other  units.  He 
believed  that  the  American  people  would  prefer  to 
have  their  forces  in  Europe  primarily  fighting  sub- 
marines because  the  submarine  war  had  been  the 
cause  of  America's  entry  into  the  struggle.  This 
stand  was  readily  understood,  appreciated,  and  ac- 

Paris  was  keenly  felt  by  all  who  knew  him,  and  realized  what  a  great 
service  he  had  rendered.  In  December,  1918,  he  was  ordered  to  Paris 
and  there  established  the  Communication  system  used  by  the  Ameri- 
can delegates  at  the  Peace  Conference. 


14  SIMSADUS 

cepted  by  the  Admiralty.  In  order  properly  to 
understand  the  future  developments  and  ultimate 
activities  of  our  forces,  a  closer  view  of  the  exist- 
ing conditions  and  suggested  remedies  is  interesting. 

The  tactics  in  fighting  the  submarine  at  the  time 
of  America's  entry  into  the  War  have  already  been 
discussed,  and  I  have  shown  that  the  presence  of  de- 
stroyers on  patrol  duty,  here  and  there,  was  really 
of  little  value.  They  could  hardly  expect  to  find 
submarines  resting  quietly  on  the  surface,  and  cer- 
tainly could  not  locate  them  when  submerged.  If 
a  destroyer  happened  to  pick  up  a  ship  and  es- 
cort her  some  distance,  some  good  was  being  done, 
but  while  one  was  being  escorted  safely,  probably 
another  two  were  being  sunk  a  few  miles  away. 
Thus  the  time  and  effort  spent  in  escorting  one  ship 
were  all  out  of  proportion  to  the  value  of  one  ship,  as 
long  as  others  were  being  destroyed  in  great  numbers. 
What  was  wanted  was  a  system  in  which  time, 
effort,  and  energy  could  be  used  to  the  best  advan- 
tage; in  other  words,  concentration  of  the  material 
and  resources  at  hand.  Many  suggestions  for  the 
improvement  of  conditions  were  made,  and  the 
suggestions  were  all  of  value.  In  the  discussion 
which  follows,  however,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that,  with  the  lack  of  sufficient  numbers  of  anti- 
submarine vessels,  and  destroyers  in  particular,  the 
sinkings  could  not  feasably  be  lessened. 

The  first  of  the  many  methods  suggested  was  the 
arming  of  merchant  ships.  This  was  looked  upon 
far  more  favorably  in  this  country  than  in  England, 


ADMIRAL  SIMS  IN  LONDON  15 

where  experience  had  shown  that  the  presence  of  a 
gun  on  a  Merchant  Ship  in  no  way  protected  it  from 
being  sunk.  What  it  did  do  was  to  force  the  sub- 
marine to  use  a  torpedo  in  sinking  a  ship.  This  meant 
that  a  submarine  could  destroy  no  greater  number  of 
ships  than  the  number  of  torpedoes  it  could  carry, 
and  of  course,  such  a  doctrine  carried  with  it  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  virtue,  but  as  a  means  of  protecting 
ships  from  being  sunk  it  was  not  successful. 

Another  method  suggested  was  the  use  of  mines 
and  nets.  This  was  not  a  new  idea;  it  involved  rather 
the  development  of  a  principle  already  in  use,  for 
mines  and  nets  have  been  used  in  all  recent  wars*  to 
hamper  the  movements  of  enemy  ships.  As  subma- 
rines operated  on  the  high  seas,  and  miles  of  open 
water  could  not  be  promiscuously  sown  with  floating 
mines,  their  use  had  been  restricted  to  such  areas  as 
the  Dover  Straits,  the  Eastern  end  of  the  North  Sea, 
along  the  entrances  to  harbors,  and  such  like.  These 
fields  proved  effective  to  a  certain  extent,  but  many 
obstacles  presented  themselves.  In  the  first  place, 
wind  and  storm,  ebb  and  flow,  eventually  would  dis- 
rupt the  mine  field  so  much  that  it  would  often  be- 
come just  as  much  of  a  danger  to  Allied  ships  as 
to  the  enemy.  Also  a  majority  of  U-boats  were 
equipped  with  a  mine  and  net -cutting  device,  which 
consisted  of  a  sharp  saw  tooth  instrument  along  the 
bows,  aft  of  which,  and  along  the  whole  length  of  the 
vessel,  a  strong  steel  wire  above  the  periscope  was 

*  In  1777  a  chain  was  laid  across  the  Hudson  River  south  of  West 
Point,  to  prevent  the  British  vessels  from  going  up  the  River. 


16  SIMSADUS 

stretched.  A  submarine  running  into  a  net  would, 
by  means  of  the  saw  tooth,  cut  one  strand  of  the  net 
open,  and  by  means  of  the  steel  wire  overhead,  force 
its  way  through  the  gap.  A  submarine  Commander 
knowing  of  nets  or  a  mine  field,  could  bring  his  ves- 
sel to  the  surface  or  submerge  to  a  great  depth,  and 
pass  over  or  under  safely.  According  to  theory,  the 
use  of  mines  or  nets  would  seem  such  an  easy  and  suc- 
cessful method  of  checking  submarine  operations,  but 
according  to  results,  this  was  far  from  the  case. 

The  U.  S.  Navy  Department  had  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  War,  fostered  a  great  plan  for  closing  up 
the  North  Sea,  and  upon  America's  entry,  the  Depart- 
ment suggested  the  scheme  to  the  Admiralty  through 
Admiral  Sims.  This  mine  field  was  to  reach  from 
Scotland  to  Norway,  and  was  to  prevent  the  egress 
of  submarines  into  the  high  seas  by  way  of  the  North 
of  Scotland.  The  plan  was  good,  very  good  and  pos- 
sible, and  was  eventually  adopted,  but  in  May,  1917, 
there  were  several  excellent  reasons  for  objecting  to 
its  construction  at  that  time.  When  a  mine  field  is 
laid,  the  mine-laying  ships  have  to  be  protected  from 
enemy  assault,  and  after  the  field  is  laid,  a  constant 
watch  has  to  be  kept  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  raid- 
ing it  and  tearing  it  to  bits  with  drags  and  towed 
nets.  Now  a  mine  barrage,  laid  across  the  North  Sea 
would  have  called  for  a  long  and  constant  patrol, 
which,  unless  the  ships  were  capital  ships — I  mean 
battleships,  cruisers,  or  battle  cruisers — would  have 
been  no  match  for  a  heavy  squadron  of  enemy  ves- 
sels. He  could  have  concentrated  an  attack  on  any 


ADMIRAL  SIMS  IN  LONDON  17 

one  spot  along  a  comparatively  long  and  weak  line  of 
resistance,  and  have  done  the  damage  before  the 
patrol  vessels,  whose  assistance  against  a  heavy 
squadron  would  have  been  of  little  use  anyway,  could 
appear  upon  the  scene.  A  mine  field,  when  once  de- 
stroyed, if  only  in  a  small  spot,  is  of  no  value  until  re- 
paired. On  the  other  hand,  if  the  British  were  to 
employ  capital  ships  as  a  protection  to  the  mine  field, 
these  ships  would  have  been  open  to  torpedo  attack. 
It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  the  laying  of  a  mine  field 
across  the  North  Sea  at  that  time,  would  have  only 
made  further  demands  upon  the  British  naval  ves- 
sels, of  which  there  was  already  an  acute  shortage. 
But  the  chief  objection  raised,  and  Admiral  Sims  was 
right  when  he  raised  it,  was  based  on  the  fact  that  the 
Allies  did  not  have  the  mines  with  which  to  do  it, 
and  their  construction  would  have  taken  months,  at 
a  time  when  the  critical  period  of  the  submarine  war 
was  at  hand!  To  have  pinned  great  faith  on  this 
scheme  at  that  time  would  have  been  folly. 

The  riddance  of  the  submarine  menace  by  mine 
fields  was  temporarily  discarded,  for  after  all  is  said 
and  done,  and  in  this  peculiar  and  critical  situation, 
mine  fields  were  remedies  of  only  a  palliative  sort 
and  of  secondary  importance.  Admiral  Sims  and  the 
Admiralty  authorities  agreed  on  this  point  abso- 
lutely, and  took  their  stand  firmly  that  the  subma- 
rine to  be  defeated  had  to  be  fought  immediately 
where  its  strength  lay. 

The  most  promising  suggestion  offered  was  that  of 
the  Convoy  System.  It  was  by  no  means  a  new  sug- 


1 8  SIMSADUS 

gestion,  for  as  said,  the  British  Navy  had  used  it  dur- 
ing the  two  preceding  years  in  escorting  troop  and 
supply  ships  to  and  from  France.  The  Admiralty 
had  considered  putting  a  similar  system  into  opera- 
tion in  the  waters  West  of  England,  but  realized  that 
this  could  not  be  done  with  the  lack  of  destroyers. 
The  Convoy  would  only  be  an  improvement,  IF — 
there  were  a  sufficient  number  of  destroyers  available 
for  escort  duty.  If  there  were  not,  it  would  be  far 
worse,  for  the  available  destroyers  could  handle  but 
a  small  percentage  of  the  total  merchant  traffic, 
thereby  laying  a  very  large  proportion  open  to  at- 
tack. If  the  submarines  had  gained  the  information 
that  the  few  available  destroyers  were  escorting 
convoys,  and  no  longer  on  patrol,  a  very  free  and 
open  policy  of  still  greater  danger  to  the  Allied  ships 
would  have  followed.  The  mere  fact  that  an  occa- 
sional destroyer  was  out  on  patrol,  tended  to  make 
the  submarine  exert  a  little  caution  at  least;  if  these 
occasional  patrols  had  been  withdrawn,  nothing 
would  have  remained  to  hamper  their  ravages. 
With  the  arrival  of  the  American  destroyers  in  April, 
and  more  to  come  in  May  and  June,  a  portion  of  the 
desired  number  of  destroyers  were  added  to  the  anti- 
submarine forces,  and  more  detailed  plans  were 
drawn  up  for  the  formation  of  a  Convoy  System. 

In  drawing  up  these  plans  the  Officers  of  the  Mer- 
chant Marine  Service  had  to  be  consulted,  and  many 
of  these  old  time  sea-going  men  were  summoned  to 
London  to  confer  with  the  Admiralty  authorities. 
Practically  all  of  them  declared  themselves  opposed 


ADMIRAL  SIMS  IN  LONDON  19 

to  such  a  scheme.  It  must  not  be  thought  that  in  so 
doing  their  intentions  were  anything  but  of  the  best, 
for  the  desire  for  preservation  of  his  ship  is  second 
nature  to  the  Merchant  Marine  Officer;  and  all  of 
them  heartily  wished  to  contribute  to  the  cause  by 
the  prevention  of  tonnage  losses.  Their  objections 
were  based  on  sincere  argument,  but  in  these  they 
underestimated  their  own  genius.  They  were  all  of 
the  opinion  that  in  convoys,  where  great  ships  would 
be  huddled  together  in  close  formation,  the  losses 
through  accidents  would  be  too  great.  They  de- 
plored their  own  abilities,  and  that  of  their  ships, 
to  keep  in  formation  and  not  be  a  nuisance  to  each 
other.  None  of  them  had  ever  had  the  training  of 
station  keeping,  as  had  the  Naval  Officer,  and  so  they 
believed  that  efficient  station  keeping  would  be  be- 
yond their  powers;  they  would  far  rather  have  run 
the  risks  of  submarines  themselves,  protecting  their 
ships  by  various  antics  or  zigzags,  and  other  manoeu- 
vres of  their  own  invention.  Admiral  Sims  and  a  few 
British  Officers  stepped  into  the  breach  of  opinion 
thus  formed,  and  declared  that  the  Merchant  Cap- 
tain had  underrated  his  abilities,  and  said  that  from 
what  they  had  seen  of  the  Merchant  Marine,  the 
average  Captain  was  very  nearly  as  efficient  in  han- 
dling his  ship  as  the  average  Naval  Officer.  In  this 
way  a  compromise  was  reached,  and  it  was  agreed  to 
give  the  Convoy  System  a  tryout.  This  was  done, 
and  British  destroyers  at  a  later  date  proceeded  out 
to  sea  some  150  miles,  where  they  met  some  incom- 
ing ships  from  Gibraltar  and  escorted  these  back  to 


20  SIMSADUS 

Milford  Haven.  At  the  conclusion  of  this  experi- 
ment the  Naval  Officers,  whose  destroyers  had  es- 
corted the  Merchant  ships,  claimed  that  the  station- 
keeping  qualities  of  the  Merchantmen  was  good,  and 
with  a  little  more  practice,  might  be  rendered  ex- 
cellent. That  settled  the  question,  and  definite  plans 
for  the  establishment  of  the  Convoy  System  were  be- 
gun. 

The  values  of  the  scheme  were  many.  In  the 
first  place,  the  submarines  had  been  attacking  and 
sinking  Merchant  ships  without  incurring  any  dan- 
ger to  themselves.  If  the  ship  thus  attacked  was 
not  armed,  the  submarine  could  attack  it  by  gun 
fire,  or  stop  it,  and  then  by  sending  members  of  its 
crew  aboard  the  captive  vessel,  scuttle  it  or  blow  a 
hole  in  its  bottom.  In  convoys,  where  large  numbers 
of  ships  could  be  herded  together  and  protected  by  a 
few  destroyers,  this  procedure  would  not  be  possible; 
the  submarine  would  have  a  fight  for  every  ship 
sunk.  Furthermore,  up  to  this  time,  submarines  had 
roamed  the  open  seas  attacking  Merchant  vessels, 
and  avoiding  destroyers  and  other  anti-submarine 
craft;  but  in  the  Convoy  System,  in  which  the  mer- 
chant ships  and  destroyers  would  proceed  together, 
the  submarines  could  not  attack  the  ships  without 
encountering  protectors.  The  best  locality  in  which 
to  shoot  a  fox  is  near  a  hen  yard;  just  so,  the  Mer- 
chant ship  was  the  submarine's  prey,  and  in  order  to 
get  the  opportunity  of  attacking  submarines,  a  few 
destroyers  merely  had  to  hang  around,  and  the  sub- 
marine would  reveal  itself  sooner  or  later.  This  form 


ADMIRAL  SIMS  IN  LONDON  21 

of  combating  the  submarine  was  really  an  offensive 
campaign  against  it,  and  that  is  what  we  wanted. 

One  of  the  cardinal  principles  of  military  strategy 
has  always  been  that  of  concentration  against  the 
enemy.  The  Convoy  System  would  supply  this  con- 
centration perfectly.  Before  its  adoption  the  anti- 
submarine effort  had  been  scattered;  a  destroyer 
here  and  a  destroyer  there,  and  ships  open  to  at- 
tack all  over  the  place.  The  enemy,  that  is,  the 
German  submarines,  had  the  concentration  on  his 
side  in  this  state  of  Affairs,  while  the  Allied  anti-sub- 
marine efforts  were  at  sixes  and  sevens.  The  Con- 
voy System  turned  the  tables;  for  with  its  adop- 
tion large  numbers  of  ships  protected  by  destroyers 
on  all  sides,  would  proceed  together.  In  other 
words,  the  efforts  of  the  destroyers  were  concen- 
trated in  their  defence  of  shipping,  while  the  efforts 
of  the  submarines,  with  fewer  ships  alone  on  the 
high  seas,  would  have  to  be  more  varied  and  scat- 
tered. The  introduction  of  this  scheme  then,  was 
nothing  more  than  a  recognition  and  application  of 
an  old-time  military  principle. 

There  was  one  more  point  of  great  strength  in 
this  new  system.  It  has  already  been  pointed  out 
how  much  Admiral  Sims  appreciated  the  necessity 
at  this  time  of  doing  something,  and  of  doing  it 
quickly  if  the  U-boat  campaign  was  to  be  defeated; 
and  how  for  that  reason  mining  or  net  operations 
had  been  shelved,  to  be  considered  at  a  later  date. 
In  fact  all  sorts  of  inventions  and  plans  for  unsink- 
able  ships,  and  for  the  destruction  of  submarines  were 


22  SIMSADUS 

being  received  by  the  Admiralty  and  by  the  Navy 
Department,  and  some  of  these  were  excellent  in 
principle.  But  it  was  not  wise  to  take  these  too 
seriously  for  the  present,  because  of  the  time  neces- 
sary for  their  institution.  The  situation  called  for  a 
remedy,  the  necessary  component  parts  of  which 
were  already  in  the  hands  of  the  authorities  and 
available  for  immediate  use;  that  is,  what  the  ad- 
vent of  the  American  destroyers  afforded — the  nec- 
essary number  of  destroyers  for  convoy — and  with 
their  arrival  the  system  could  be  immediately 
established. 


Ill 

THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES. 

IT  has  already  been  said  that  from  June  to  Sep- 
tember, 1917,  would  be  the  critical  period  of  the 
Submarine  War;  there  was  also  a  critical  area,  and 
this  was  in  the  waters  between  the  Southwestern 
coast  of  Ireland  and  Cape  Finisterre,  or  Brest, 
France.  All  ships  from  the  United  States,  Canada, 
South  America,  the  Mediterranean,  and  Africa,  had 
to  pass  through  this  area  to  get  into  the  Southern 
and  Western  ports  of  England,  such  as  Southhamp- 
ton,  Plymouth,  Cardiff,  Holyhead,  or  Liverpool.  A 
considerable  portion  of  shipping  from  the  United 
States  and  Canada,  was  directed  to  pass  to  the 
North  of  Ireland,  to  Glasgow  and  Liverpool,  thereby 
avoiding  the  necessity  of  steaming  into  this  "neck  of 
a  bottle"  formed  by  the  Coast  lines  of  England  and 
France.  But  this  did  not  seriously  relieve  the  con- 
gestion of  traffic;  in  fact,  the  congestion  could  not  be 
relieved.  In  order  to  escort  safely  the  hundreds 
of  vessels  which  passed  through  this  critical  area 
South  of  Ireland,  escorts  to  the  convoys  had  to  be 
provided.  This  meant  that  any  location  suitable 
for  a  base  on  the  South  coast  of  Ireland,  would  be 
very  desirable,  and  Queenstown  was  the  first  local- 
ity chosen  as  an  American  Naval  base.  It  formed 
a  halfway  point  between  the  Western  ports  of  Eng- 

23 


24  SIMSADUS 

land,  and  the  rendezvous*  at  sea  between  which 
the  convoys  would  be  escorted.  The  next  base  to 
be  decided  upon  was  Brest,  the  location  of  which 
afforded  many  of  the  same  advantages  as  those  of 
Queenstown;  both  were  located  at  the  approach  to 
the  chief  European  ports. 

QUEENSTOWN 

The  first  flotilla  of  American  destroyers  ordered  to 
Europe  was  sent  directly  to  Queenstown.  This  de- 
tachment, consisting  of  six  vessels  under  Commander 
Taussig,  U.  S.  N.,  steamed  into  Queenstown  harbor 
at  noon  on  April  26, 1917.  The  British  Naval  person- 
nel at  Queenstown  knew  that  these  vessels  were 
coming,  and  were  expecting  them  some  time  during 
the  day,  but  hardly  expected  that  they  would  arrive 
at  noon,  the  hour  which  Taussig  had  designated  by 
wireless,  because  of  the  delays  and  uncertainties  in- 
volved in  a  trip  across  the  Atlantic.  But  surely 
enough  they  did,  and  at  a  few  minutes  before  noon, 
smoke  was  seen  on  the  Western  horizon,  and  then 
one,  two,  three,  four,  five,  six  little  specks  came  up 
out  of  the  ocean.  Two  mine  sweepers  were  imme- 
diately sent  out  a  few  miles  to  sweep  a  channel  clear 
for  them,  for  who  knew  but  that  a  German  subma- 
rine might  have  laid  mines  at  the  entrance  to  the  har- 
bor during  the  previous  night.  Great  were  the 

*  The  rendezvous  at  sea  was  the  position  at  which  destroyers  would 
meet  a  group  of  merchant  vessels  from  North  and  South  America: 
this  position  was  generally  some  200  or  300  miles  west  of  the  British 
Isles  and  France. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         25 

cheers  from  all  at  the  base,  for  these  vessels  were 
coming  to  help  in  the  War  against  the  submarine  at  a 
time  when  the  need  for  destroyers  was  very  great. 
As  they  steamed  up  the  harbor,  few,  perhaps,  real- 
ized what  the  advent  of  these  American  vessels 
really  meant.  It  meant  that  America  and  England, 
sister  nations,  had  at  last  joined  hands  against 
their  common  enemy.  In  memory  of  this  day,  it 
will  be  for  the  welfare  of  America  to  forget  what  her 
children  are  taught  in  school  books  about  English 
tyranny;  and  it  will  be  for  the  welfare  of  Great 
Britain  to  remember  that,  though  separated  by 
three  thousand  miles  of  water,  she  has  a  friend  who 
helped  her  in  a  great  struggle.  These  thoughts, 
shared  as  they  are  to-day  by  many  Anglo-Saxons, 
were  beautifully  expressed  to  Admiral  Sims  before 
his  departure  from  England  in  a  picture  given  to  him. 
The  picture  is  entitled,  "The  Return  of  the  May- 
flower"; in  the  foreground  is  the  "Mayflower,"  as 
that  vessel  probably  appeared — behind  it  a  full- 
fledged  squadron  of  American  destroyers  as  they 
appeared  that  morning  entering  Queenstown  harbor. 
Previous  to  the  arrival  of  the  American  destroy- 
ers, Admiral  Sims  had  decided  to  commence  his 
policy  of  supplementing  the  weaker  portions  of  the 
British  Navy  by  handing  the  operating  command 
of  these  vessels  over  to  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Lewis 
Bayly,  R.  N.,  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  South- 
west coast  of  Ireland.  In  this  way,  Admiral  Sims 
showed  himself  not  only  the  first  great  Allied  Chief 
to  propose  unity  of  command,  but  also  the  first  to 


26  SIMSADUS 

put  such  doctrines  into  effect.  He  was  still  to  have 
administrative  command  over  these  vessels,  but  as 
far  as  operations  were  concerned,  they  were  to 
serve  with  the  British  forces  under  Admiral  Bayly. 
In  order  to  insure  harmony  between  these  forces  of 
two  different  nations,  Vice-Admiral  Bayly  appointed 
Captain  J.  R.  P.  Pringle,  U.  S.  N.,  who  was 
Admiral  Sims'  Chief  of  Staff  at  Queenstown,  as 
his  first  assistant.  Vice-Admiral  Bayly  sent  these 
vessels  as  they  steamed  up  the  harbor,  the  heart- 
iest welcome  and  congratulations  upon  their  arrival 
in  European  waters;  in  concluding  this  message, 
he  informed  Commander  Taussig  that  all  facilities 
at  his  base  were  at  the  disposal  of  the  American 
•vessels,  and  asked  what  repair  work  was  necessary 
and  how  long  before  the  American  flotilla  would  be 
ready  for  duty.  Commander  Taussig's  reply  was 
prompt,  and  read,  "As  soon  as  we  refuel,  Sir." 
Such  an  answer,  after  a  hard  trip  across  the  Atlantic, 
from  a  destroyer's  officer,  whose  vessels  were  never 
intended  to  cross  the  ocean  except  in  emergencies, 
gave  the  American  vessels  a  wonderful  place — a 
very  extraordinary  place  in  fact — in  the  esteem  of 
the  authorities  of  the  Royal  Navy.  The  tale  of 
Commander  Taussig's  reply  soon  spread  broad- 
cast, and  as  late  as  February,  1919,  it  was  still  being 
told  at  the  English  dinner  table  as  a  remarkable 
accomplishment.  That  is  what  it  was,  and  it  im- 
mediately convinced  the  Officers  of  the  English 
Navy  that  the  types  of  vessels  and  men  aboard 
the  American  vessels  were  of  the  very  highest 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         27 

order.  Whatever  the  accomplishments  of  the  Amer- 
ican Navy  had  been  in  the  past,  all  these  were 
temporarily  eclipsed  by  this  incident.  The  Ameri- 
can crews  were  allowed  four  days'  rest  before  com- 
mencing their  new  tasks  as  a  belligerent  Allied  Navy. 

The  American  destroyers,  in  that  another  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  would  soon  join  them  at  Queenstown, 
were  confronted  with  the  problem  of  enlarging  the 
scope  of  the  facilities  and  requirements  necessary  at 
a  Naval  base.  Queenstown  had  been  used  as  a  base 
by  the  British,  but  the  present  and  future  influx  of 
twenty  or  thirty  more  vessels,  made  vast  expansion 
necessary.  Admiral  Sims  had  already  laid  down  the 
law  that  all  vessels  at  U.  S.  Naval  bases  in  Euro- 
pean waters  should  be  self-maintaining,  which  meant 
in  the  case  of  Queenstown,  that  many  store-houses, 
barracks,  hospitals,  recreation  rooms,  and  repair  facil- 
ities had  to  be  provided.  Work  was  commenced  al- 
most immediately  on  the  construction  of  such  build- 
ings, and  the  growth  of  the  base  was  rapid.  In 
undertakings  of  this  sort,  as  was  the  case  wherever 
the  British  Naval  Authorities  were  encountered,  the 
members  of  the  Royal  Navy  left  no  stone  upturned 
in  offering  every  assistance  possible,  a  courtesy  which 
will  always  be  remembered  by  those  who  served  at 
Queenstown. 

The  most  important  facility  necessary  at  Queens- 
town  was  an  organization  capable  of  executing  rapid 
and  extensive  repairs.  Destroyers  always  have 
needed,  and  always  will  need,  a  great  deal  of  watch- 
ing and  repairing.  The  English  dock  yards  were  al- 


28  SIMSADUS 

ready  so  overcrowded  that  any  repair  work  which 
could  be  done  at  the  base  would  save  time  and 
trouble,  for,  besides  not  being  a  burden  to  the  dock 
yards,  the  efficient  up-keep  of  a  vessel  would  be  of 
value  in  keeping  that  vessel  in  the  running.  To  serve 
this  purpose  two  Mother  ships,  the  U.  S.  S.  "Dixie" 
and  the  U.  S.  S.  "Melville,"  *  to  be  used  as  store  and 
repair  ships,  were  sent  to  Queenstown.  The  record 
which  these  two  ships  established  in  keeping  the  de- 
stroyers in  good  repair,  probably  contributed  more  to 
the  efficient  up-keep  of  the  destroyers  than  any  one 
thing.  Whenever  a  destroyer  returned  to  port  after 
several  days  at  sea  with  Convoys,  she  would  send  a 
message  to  the  "Melville"  stating  what  repairs 
would  be  necessary,  and  by  the  time  that  the  de- 
stroyer had  made  fast  to  her  buoy,  a  working  party 
from  the  "Melville"  would  be  ready  to  commence 
work  at  once.  The  greater  portion  of  repair  work 
was  done  by  the  crew  of  the  "Melville"  rather 
than  by  those  of  the  destroyers,  for  the  duty  at 
sea  was  so  arduous  that  all  time  in  port  was  needed 
for  rest.  There  was  no  task  short  of  a  lost  propeller 
or  a  severely  injured  turbine  that  the  men  from 
the  "Melville  "  could  not  handle.  In  the  general 
scheme"  of  operations  it  was  planned  that  each  de- 
stroyer should  have  four  days'  duty  at  sea  and  two 
days  in  port,  which  meant  that  each  vessel  would  be 
on  duty  67%  of  the  time;  statistics  of  operations 
show  that  the  average  time  at  sea  for  all  destroyers 
was  about  66%.  This  splendid  record  was  largely 

*  Admiral  Sims'  Flagship  in  Europe. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         29 

the  result  of  the  efficient  and  excellent  work  per- 
formed by  the  repair  ships  and  their  crews. 

But  before  the  Americans  felt  themselv.es  fully  es- 
tablished, they  joined  in  the  work  of  the  British. 
Vice-Admiral  Bayly,  R.  N.,  who  was  a  veritable  horse 
for  work,  and  Captain  J.  R.  P.  Pringle,  U.  S.  N., 
Admiral  Sims'  Chief  of  Staff  at  Queens  town,  rightly 
believed  that,  as  long  as  there  was  a  War  in  prog- 
ress, the  idleness  of  any  vessel  was  a  military  crime. 
When  any  occasion  arose  in  which  a  destroyer  was 
ready  for  duty  but  was  awaiting  the  approach  of  a 
convoy  or  a  similar  assignment  of  duty,  that  vessel 
was  not  allowed  to  stay  idle,  but  was  immediately 
sent  out  on  patrol  duty  of  some  sort.  The  actual 
escort  of  a  convoy  was  an  arduous  task.  Four  or 
five  or  more  destroyers  would  leave  Queenstown 
and  proceed  Westward  to  pick  up  a  convoy  about 
200  miles  West  of  Ireland.  They  would  then  es- 
cort this  convoy  to  Liverpool  or  some  other  port, 
and  then  turn  around  and  escort  an  outward-bound 
convoy  to  a  point  some  200  miles  West  of  Ireland. 
Here  they  would  pick  up  another  incoming  convoy 
and  take  it  to  a  Western  English  port,  or,  if  they 
were  lucky,  be  relieved  by  another  detachment  of 
destroyers  as  they  passed  near  Queenstown.  A 
slow  convoy  would  necessitate  many  inconceivable 
forms  of  antics  and  exercises  in  the  execution  of 
proper  vigilance.  A  fast  convoy  would  call  for  the 
same  vigilance,  but  would  be  a  great  deal  more 
severe  on  the  destroyers  and  their  personnel  than 
a  slow  one.  A  few  hours  with  a  2oknot  convoy, 


30  SIMSADUS 

which  meant  that  the  destroyers  must  maintain  a 
speed  of  23  knots  at  least,  or  the  experience  of  two 
or  three  days  of  heavy  storms,  imposed  as  severe  a 
strain  upon  the  human  body^  and  nerve  power  as 
has  been  experienced  in  this  War.  The  strain  upon 
the  ships  themselves  was  often  far  greater  than 
their  designers  expected  them  to  weather. 

If  the  reader  desires  to  learn  of  the  Romance  of 
convoy  duty,  I  can  only  refer  him  to  some  of  the  ex- 
cellent books  of  Lieutenant  Freeman,  R.  N.  on  that 
subject,  or,  better  still,  let  the  reader  himself  in- 
quire into  the  thoughts  of  the  seaman  who  was  or- 
dered aloft  at  two  A.  M.  to  the  lookout  nest  on  the 
forward  mast  of  a  destroyer,  which  was  rolling  forty- 
five  degrees  on  a  dark  and  stormy  night,  and  making 
twenty  knots;  or  ask  the  young  regular  or  reserve  of- 
ficer what  thoughts  went  through  his  mind,  when  he 
was  aroused  from  lifeless  slumbers  to  go  on  watch  for 
four  hours  as  officer  of  the  deck  of  his  destroyer, 
awakened  by  a  touch  from  the  quartermaster  and 
these  cheering  words:  "11.45,  Sir,  and  Mr.  Smith 
says  it  is  cold  and  wet,  Sir;"  and  whatever  there  was 
of  a  romantic  or  human  side  in  this  War,  will  be 
found. 

A  brief  statistical  resume  shows  that  during  the 
ten  and  a  half  months  of  1918  the  Queenstown  de- 
stroyers *  escorted  39%  of  all  the  traffic  passing  in  and 

*  In  May,  1918,  there  were  33  American  destroyers  at  Queenstown. 
Twelve  of  these  the  following  month  were  transferred  to  Brest.  As 
new  destroyers  came  over  they  were  sent  to  Queenstown,  and  a  cor- 
responding number  already  at  Queenstown  were  ordered  to  Brest. 
In  Sept.,  1918,  36  chasers  arrived  at  Queenstown:  they  carried  out 


©   Under-wood    & 


The  U.  S.  S.  Duncan  and  the  H.  M.  S.  Wizard.  Notice 
the  difference  in  construction.  A  dispute  once  arose 
between  Admiral  Sims  and  some  British  officers  as  to 
the  relative  merits  of  English  and  American  destroy- 
ers. An  English  officer  said,  that  the  British  destroy- 
ers were  better  because  they  were  more  manly  and 
sturdy,  and  that  though  American  vessels  were  the 
more  graceful,  they  looked  effeminate.  Admiral  Sims 
replied :  "The  female  is  the  more  deadly  of  the 
species." 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         31 

out  by  way  of  the  South  coast  of  Ireland.  In  July 
and  August  alone  they  escorted  a  total  of  2,340,000 
tons  without  a  single  casualty  to  any  convoy;  in 
other  words,  they  escorted  about  one-sixth  of  the 
shipping  afloat  on  the  high  seas  of  the  world,  with- 
out a  single  loss. 

The  experiences  of  the  American  destroyers  at 
Queenstown  calling  for  the  greatest  interest  are  those 
of  the  sinking  of  a  submarine  by  the  U.  S.  S.  "Fan- 
ning" and  "Nicholson"  on  November  17,  1917,  and 
the  loss  of  the  U.  S.  S.  "Jacob  Jones"  on  November 
5th  of  the  same  year.  The  "Fanning"  and  "Nichol- 
son" were  escorting  a  convoy,  when  a  submarine  was 
sighted.  They  ran  towards  it  at  full  speed  and 
dropped  depth  charges  over  the  spot  beneath  which  it 
had  submerged,  and  then  circled  around  the  vicin- 
ity while  the  submarine  rose  to  the  surface  only  to 
submerge  again  in  a  moment.  Once  more  they 
dropped  depth  charges,  one  of  which  injured  the 
elevation  apparatus,  corresponding  to  a  rudder 
of  the  submarine.  The  submarine  sank  to  a  great 
depth,  after  which  a  Commanding  officer  blew 
his  tanks,  bringing  the  vessel  to  the  surface.  The 
"Fanning"  immediately  opened  fire,  and  a  moment 
later  the  crew  came  up  on  deck  through  the  con- 
ning tower  and  surrendered.  This  was  the  first 
"prize"  of  the  American  Navy  in  Europe,  and,  as  will 
be  remembered,  the  news  was  heralded  with  enthusi- 
asm in  this  country.  The  submarine  was  the  U-s8. 

some  excellent  operations,  but  their  activities  were  cut  short  by  the 
Armistice. 


32  SIMSADUS 

On  November  5,  1917,  the  U.  S.  S.  "Jacob  Jones," 
one  of  our  newest  and  best  destroyers,  was  steaming 
alone  not  far  from  the  Scilly  Islands.  Late  in  the 
afternoon  she  was  struck  by  a  torpedo  from  an  enemy 
submarine  and  sank  in  a  few  minutes,  a  little  over 
half  of  her  crew  being  saved.  The  wireless  of  the 
"Jacob  Jones"  was  put  out  of  commission  by  the 
explosion,  but  later  the  Commander-in-Chief  on 
the  South  coast  of  Ireland,  Admiral  Bayly,  received 
a  wireless  announcing  that  the  "Jacob  Jones"  had 
sunk  at  a  certain  time,  in  a  given  latitude,  and  that 
the  survivors  were  in  the  boats  and  on  rafts;  help 
was  requested.  This  was  a  curious  situation,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  officers  stationed 
at  Queenstown  but  that  wireless  was  sent  by  the 
German  submarine. 

Among  the  requisites  of  a  Naval  Base  are  rec- 
reation centres.  There  are  no  greater  believers 
in  the  value  of  suitable  rest  and  recreation  for  crews 
than  Admiral  Sims  and  his  associates,  who  were  de- 
termined that  the  Queenstown  Forces  should  enjoy 
their  moments  ashore,  and  saw  to  it  that  they  did. 
A  "Men's  Club,"  in  which  almost  nightly  little 
amateur  theatricals,  dances,  or  "movies"  were  given 
by  the  crews  of  the  vessels  in  port,  was  the  centre  of 
these  attractions.  The  necessity  for  this  sort  of 
thing  was  more  clearly  realized  after  a  few  unfor- 
tunate disturbances  between  the  sailors  and  the 
Irish  at  Cork.  The  Southern  Irishman  did  not  seem 
an  easy  person  with  whom  to  get  along,  and  no 
doubt  the  apparent  prosperity  of  the  American 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         33 

sailors  rubbed  him  a  bit  the  wrong  way.  This, 
coupled  with  the  attitude  of  many  of  the  Irish  to- 
wards the  War,  probably  established  the  grounds 
for  bad  feeling.  In  other  words  these  affairs  re- 
sulted from  a  misunderstanding  between  the  sailors 
and  the  Irishmen,  the  latter  of  whom  are  suffer- 
ing because  the  force  which  comtrols  them — and 
this  force  is  not  the  British  government — does  not 
offer  them  the  benefits  of  education,  at  least  in 
our  American  sense.  Their  reoccurrence  was  pre- 
vented when  all  shore  leave  to  Cork  was  denied  the 
American  sailors,  and  from  then  on,  the  "Men's 
Club"  and  other  recreation  centres  were  of  great 
value. 

The  leaders  of  the  various  Armies  and  Navies  in 
this  War  were  concerned  over  the  matter  of  coopera- 
tion, the  success  or  failure  of  which  rested  on  their 
shoulders.  However,  the  attainment  of  understand- 
ing between  the  rank  and  file  of  the  different  forces 
was  also  to  be  considered,  and  this  was  a  delicate 
problem  to  handle.  In  looking  over  the  unwritten 
history  of  Queenstown  and  in  talks  with  American 
Officers  and  men  who  served  there,  the  impression 
is  gathered  immediately  that  the  best  of  feeling 
existed  between  the  personnel  of  the  American  and 
British  Navies.  This  unity  of  sentiment  and  effort 
began  with  Admiral  Bayly  and  Admiral  Sims  and 
was  disseminated  right  down  through  the  Officers  of 
lesser  rank  and  the  enlisted  men.  A  good  example 
of  it  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  when  British  and  Ameri- 
can destroyers  were  at  sea  together,  either  a  British 


34  SIMSADUS 

or  an  American  would  be  the  senior  officer  present; 
sometimes  an  American  Officer  would  command  the 
unit  and  at  other  times  a  British  Officer.  But  in 
spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  Officers,  arguments,  re- 
lieved by  brawls,  arose  between  the  enlisted  men. 
This  was  really  only  natural,  for  an  Englishman  is 
a  "Limy"  *  and  an  American  is  a  "Yank"  and  there 
is  enough  of  a  difference  to  keep  time  from  hanging 
too  heavy.  From  my  own  experience  as  a  "gob"  in 
England,  I  know  that  these  occasional  disturbances 
were  not  the  result  of  any  deep  feeling.  The  Eng- 
lishman is  a  very  conservative  person,  who  too  often 
gives  the  impression  that  he  is  holding  aloof;  the 
American,  on  the  other  hand,  is  very  frank  and 
talkative  and  apparently  wishes  to  shake  hands 
with  the  world  when  he  is  out  of  his  own  country. 
When  this  indifference  of  the  Englishman,  which 
was  often  taken  for  conceit,  came  into  contact 
with  the  enthusiasm  of  his  cousin  from  over  the 
water,  who  often  was  vivacious  in  relating  "how  we 
do  things  in  America,"  action  followed.  Thus  one 
hears  the  statement  that  the  Americans  fought  with 
the  British  more  than  with  the  Frenchman,  an  ex- 
planation of  which  is  simple.  The  American  is  differ- 
ent from  both  the  Britisher  and  the  Frenchman;  he 
cannot  argue  with  the  Frenchman  but  he  can  argue 
with  the  Englishmen;  and  an  argument  was  usually 
the  training  camp  for  a  good  old  fashioned  fight. 

*  For  some  unknown  reason,  the  British  during  this  War,  and  in 
the  past,  have  been  called  "  Limies,"  which  is  short  for  "  Lime- 
juicers."  I  do  not  know  what  the  origin  of  the  term  is,  but  it  might 
well  be  reversed  now. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         35 

In  order  to  show  how  little  gaps  of  sentiment  aris- 
ing from  these  disturbances  were  bridged  over,  I 
mention  here  a  periodical  of  satire  and  humor  which 
would  occasionally  appear  for  sale  at  the  Base.  This 
little  paper  went  a  long  way  towards  keeping  down 
the  differences  which  arose  as  a  result  of  the  conflict- 
ing nationalities  and  from  allowing  the  men  to  take 
such  matters  too  seriously.  As  an  illustration  of  its 
contents,  I  am  giving  a  resume  of  one  of  the  articles; 
it  may  not  be  correct  in  detail,  but  the  ideas  ex- 
pressed in  it  are  to  the  point. 

The  article  recorded  the  preliminary  proceedings 
of  an  imaginary  board  of  investigation  held  to  in- 
quire into  the  complaints  of  a  British  destroyer 
Officer,  that  the  Commanding  Officer  of  an  American 
destroyer  had  "messed"  fifteen  minutes  earlier  on 
his  vessel  than  the  British  Officer  on  his.  The 
chairman  of  the  board  was  purported  as  being  Cap- 
tain Pringle,  the  American  Chief  of  Staff.  The  in- 
vestigation opened  with  each  officer  explaining  his 
case;  in  a  few  minutes  the  argument  became  heated; 
and  the  conflicting  use  of  American  and  British 
slang  was  prominent.  Captain  Pringle  arose  and 
requested  that  the  English  Officers  speak  in  the  Eng- 
lish language;  this  remark  immediately  called  an 
Englishman  to  his  feet,  who  claimed  that  the  Eng- 
lish language  originated  in  England;  this  statement 
in  turn  produced  another  argument  as  to  who  knew 
the  most  about  the  English  language,  the  Americans 
or  the  Englishmen.  This  continued  for  some  min- 
utes, until  a  British  Officer  told  an  American  to  close 


36  SIMSADUS 

his  "blinking  trap."  Captain  Pringle  immediately 
jumped  to  his  feet  and  said  the  meeting  should  pro- 
ceed no  further  until  the  meaning  of  the  term 
"blinking  trap"  had  been  explained.  Dictionaries, 
naval  regulations,  convoy  orders,  almanacks,  and 
similar  stores  of  information  were  all  consulted,  but 
no  enlightenment  was  offered  upon  the  term  "blink- 
ing trap."  After  an  hour  of  this  important  research 
work,  Captain  Pringle  said  he  was  going  to  have 
some  lunch,  whereupon  a  Britisher  objected,  saying 
that  such  discourtesy,  as  that  exhibited  by  Captain 
Pringle,  was  unprecedented  in  the  history  of  his — 
the  British  Officer's — family.  The  meeting  ad- 
journed by  Captain  Pringle  expressing  himself 
strongly  in  doubt  as  to  whether  the  British  Officer 
ever  had  a  family. 

But  other  than  occasional  brawls,  the  general  feel- 
ing between  the  crews  of  the  vessels  of  the  two  na- 
tions was  excellent,  and  I  have  no  hesitancy  in  say- 
ing that  I  know  that  those  Americans  and  Britishers 
who  took  pains  to  learn  the  other  fellow's  point  of 
view  came  out  of  this  war — and  certainly  home  from 
Queenstown — with  admiration  for  the  people,  the 
ideals  and  accomplishments  of  the  other  fellow's 
nation. 

BREST 

During  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century 
and  in  the  preceding  century,  Brest  had  been  a  sea- 
port and  Naval  centre  of  great  importance;  in  the 
first  three  years  of  this  war  it  had  played  but  a  small 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         37 

part.  In  June,  1917,  a  Fleet  of  American  yachts, 
transformed  into  warships,  left  this  country,  and, 
stopping  at  the  Bermudas  and  Azores,  arrived  at 
Brest  at  the  end  of  the  month.  These  ships  were 
dispatched  to  Europe  in  answer  to  Admiral  Sims' 
urgent  call  for  anti-submarine  craft,  a  fuller  dis- 
cussion of  which  follows  later.  They  were  to  a 
large  extent  manned  by  young  Naval  reserve  volun- 
teers, most  of  whose  sea  experiences  had  been  limited 
to  the  bathing  beach;  nevertheless  they  were  the 
first  American  war  vessels  to  reach  the  coast  of 
France.  Their  crews  were  an  eager  and  very  en- 
thusiastic aggregation,  many  of  them  college  men; 
one  of  the  vessels,  the  U.  S.  S.  "Harvard,"  was  al- 
most completely  manned  by  undergraduates  of  Har- 
vard— the  classes  of  1918  and  1919.  It  seems  cu- 
rious, that  after  the  American  Navy  had  been  train- 
ing some  80,000  men  for  years  and  years,  with  the 
advent  of  War,  the  Navy  Department  should  have 
sent  the  recruits  of  the  Reserve  Force  among  the 
first  to  Europe.  Perhaps  the  Department  realized 
how  excellent  their  services  would  be  in  spite  of 
their  lack  of  training,  and  the  least  that  can  be  said 
of  them  is  that  their  services  were  excellent,  for  no 
crew  of  greater  "land  lubbers"  ever  set  sail — still 
less  to  go  to  War — aboard  any  ship;  and  yet  no 
crews  ever  acquitted  themselves  more  creditably. 

The  yachts  commenced  their  duties  shortly  after 
their  arrival.  At  Queenstown  there  already  was  a 
Naval  base;  at  Brest  there  was  a  French  Naval 
base,  but  as  France  was  not  a  first-class  Naval 


38  SIMSADUS 

power,  many  of  those  facilities  and  necessities 
which  go  to  make  up  an  efficient  base,  were  lacking. 
This  was  partly  the  result  of  the  decadence  of  Brest 
as  a  Naval  port  of  first  importance,  and  partly  due 
to  the  fact  that  in  1914,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  War, 
Great  Britain  had  informed  France  that  she  her- 
self would  try  to  handle  whatever  Naval  situations 
might  arise.  This  left  France  free  to  devote  her 
entire  energy  to  the  development  of  her  Army,  and 
relieved  her  of  the  necessity  of  expanding  her  Navy, 
the  greater  part  of  which,  because  of  the  easy  pro- 
tection of  the  French  Coasts  by  the  British  Navy, 
had  been  transferred  to  the  Mediterranean.  Thus, 
when  the  American  yachts  arrived  at  Brest,  they 
found  their  new  home  lacking  the  design  of  the 
Brooklyn  Navy  Yard.  For  three  months  the  yachts, 
under  Captain  Fletcher,  U.  S.  N.,  were  the  only  Amer- 
ican Warships  at  Brest,  during  which  time  the  work 
of  preparing  the  base  to  serve  as  a  port  of  debarka- 
tion for  American  troops  and  supplies  and  as  a  home 
for  American  warships  in  the  future  was  carried  on. 
The  yachts  were  employed  in  convoy  duty;  the  larger 
and  faster  ones,  such  as  the  "Noma,"  were  used  in 
deep-sea  escorts,  while  the  others  were  dispatched  up 
and  down  the  coast  from  Brest  to  Bordeaux  and  in- 
termediate ports.  During  this  period  of  evolution, 
for  that  is  what  it  was,  the  U.  S.  S.  "Alcedo"  was 
torpedoed  and  sunk;  its  loss  was  the  first  serious 
casualty  to  the  American  Navy  in  Europe. 

Admiral  Sims  always  realized  that  the  Western 
coast    of    France    would    eventually    be    the    chief 


U.  S.  S.  Leviathan 


The  H.  M.  S.  Mauretania  and  U.  S.  S.  Leviathan,  two  transports 
which  carried  eight  or  nine  thousand  troops  to  France  per  trip. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         39 

area  of  activity  of  the  American  Navy;  therefore  as 
more  destroyers  came  over,  they  were  ordered  to 
Brest.  Later  as  the  influx  of  American  troops 
and  supplies  grew  he  designated  Lorient,  St.  Nazaire, 
Rochefort,  and  Bordeaux  as  bases,  and  assigned  ves- 
sels to  them.  In  October  1917,  he  ordered  Rear- 
Admiral  Wilson,  who  had  been  in  command  of  the 
U.  S.  Naval  Forces  at  Gibraltar,  to  Brest  and  ap- 
pointed him  Commander  of  our  Naval  Forces  in 
France.  Admiral  Wilson  was  in  command  of  his  Forces 
from  both  an  operative  and  administrative  point  of 
view:  in  both  he  was  directly  responsible  to  Admiral 
Sims  in  London. 

When  Brest  first  began  to  function  as  a  real  base, 
the  duty  of  the  yachts,  as  has  already  been  men- 
tioned, was  that  of  escorting  coastal  convoys.  As 
the  influx  of  American  troops  grew,  it  became  very 
evident  that  anti-submarine  vessels  with  a  greater 
cruising  radius  and  higher  speed  were  needed.  The 
remark  was  once  made  that  these  yachts  were  fast 
enough  on  a  downhill  stretch,  but  not  on  the  level. 
They  could  handle  the  coastal  convoys  up  and  down 
the  coast  but  could  not  escort  them  200  miles  out 
in  the  Atlantic;  until  the  Fall  of  1917  the  British 
destroyers  at  Plymouth  and  the  American  de- 
stroyers at  Queenstown  had  shouldered  this  duty. 
As  the  volume  of  traffic  increased  it  became  too 
much  for  them;  consequently  the  additional  de- 
stroyers were  stationed  at  Brest.  After  their  arrival 
two  sorts  of  convoy  duty  were  adopted :  the  deep-sea 
convoy  duty  and  the  coastal  convoys.  In  the  for- 


40  SIMSADUS 

mer,  the  destroyers  would  proceed  to  sea,  pick  up  an 
incoming  convoy,  escort  it  to  the  coast,  and  there 
be  met  by  the  yachts  and  gun  boats,  which  in  turn 
would  escort  the  various  vessels  to  their  port  of 
destination.  After  January,  1918,  the  base  and  its 
duties  grew  rapidly,  and  we  find  that  during  the 
months  of  1918  these  Forces  escorted  91%  of  all  the 
convoys  in  and  out  of  France,  or  about  1,700,000 
tons  per  month.  In  November,  1918,  78  vessels  and 
12,000  men  were  stationed  at  Brest.* 

The  Forces  at  Brest  made  their  "first  kill"  on 
May  21,  1919.  The  "Christabel,"  a  former  yacht, 
was  escorting  the  Merchant  ship  "Deanae,"  when  a 
periscope  was  sighted  between  the  yacht  and  the 
ship.  The  "Christabel"  stood  in  towards  the  es- 
timated position  of  the  submarine,  dropped  a  depth 
charge;  and  a  few  minutes  later  another.  After  the 
second  one  had  exploded,  a  third  explosion,  under 
water,  followed.  The  second  depth  charge  had 
injured  the  submarine,  which  was  of  the  mine- 
laying  type,  and  this  had  caused  the  third  explo- 
sion. This  boat  was  the  UC-s6.  The  following 
morning  it  put  into  Santander,  on  the  North  coast 
of  Spain,  and  because  of  injuries  received,  was  forced 
to  intern. 

On  August  8,  1918,  the  U.  S.  S.  "Tucker,"  one  of 
our  best  destroyers,  sighted  a  submarine  while  150 
miles  Southwest  of  Brest.  The  submarine  was  first 

*  These  figures  include  the  crews  of  those  ships  and  the  men 
stationed  along  the  Western  coast  of  France,  at  Lorient,  St.  Nazaire, 
Rochefort,  and  Bordeaux,  and  at  the  Naval  Aviation  bases. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         41 

seen  when  it  suddenly  came  to  the  surface  within 
200  yards  of  the  "Tucker."  The  "Tucker"  immedi- 
ately opened  fire  with  her  forward  gun,  and  at  full 
speed,  ran  towards  it  to  attack  it  with  depth  charges. 
The  submarine  immediately  submerged.  The  de- 
stroyer then  passed  over  to  the  spot  where  the  sub- 
marine had  submerged,  dropped  several  depth  charges, 
and  described  a  circle  in  order  to  pass  over  the 
same  spot  again.  While  the  "Tucker"  was  thus 
manoeuvering,  the  submarine  came  to  the  surface 
again  and  the  "Tucker"  opened  fire,  one  of  the 
shells  apparently  hitting  it.  Again,  the  submarine 
submerged  and  the  "Tucker"  passed  over  the  spot 
dropping  depth  charges.  A  few  moments  later  the 
bow  of  the  submarine  appeared  above  the  waves,  at  an 
angle  which  indicated  that  all  was  not  well  on  board, 
and  then  slowly  sank.  The  Commanding  Officer,  in 
handing  in  his  report  of  this  encounter,  felt  convinced 
that  a  submarine  had  been  destroyed.  In  consulting 
the  charts  of  submarine  movements,  which  I  shall  fully 
discuss  later,  it  would  appear  that  there  was  no  sub- 
marine within  100  miles  of  the  locality  in  which  the 
attack  took  place.  It  remains  unknown  to  this  day 
whether  this  submarine  was  sunk  or  not,  for  no  fur- 
ther evidences  of  her  operations  were  noted,  and  no 
previous  evidence  of  her  presence  had  been  observed.* 

*  It  is  difficult  to  say  there  was  no  submarine  present,  for  all  hands 
claimed  to  have  seen  it.  On  the  other  hand,  every  submarine  in  ex- 
istence could  be  accounted  for,  and  this  one  seen  by  the  "  Tucker  " 
was  not  included  in  current  intelligence.  The  matter  is  still  unsolved, 
and  probably  will  remain  so,  though  official  credit  for  its  destruction 
was  given  to  the  "  Tucker." 


42  SIMSADUS 

Keen  rivalry  soon  grew  up  between  the  Queens- 
town  and  the  Brest  destroyers,  and  it  was  expressed 
in  many  ways.  The  chief  "bone"  of  contention  was 
as  to  which  base  was  doing  the  hardest  work,  that  is, 
handling  the  greatest  volume  of  traffic  in  propor- 
tion to  the  number  of  destroyers  available.  Statis- 
tics show  that  the  Queenstown  boats  had  a  little  the 
better  of  the  argument.  The  Queenstown  Officer  used 
to  tell,  and  will  tell  to-day,  the  tale  that  whenever 
his  ship  put  into  Brest,  most  of  the  Brest  destroyers 
were  in  the  harbor;  on  the  other  hand,  the  Brest  offi- 
cers will  tell  that  the  Queenstown  vessels  were  al- 
ways going  to  Liverpool  so  that  the  officers  and 
crew  could  get  a  couple  of  days'  leave  to  London. 
This  rivalry,  of  course,  was  a  splendid  thing  and  it 
made  for  esprit  de  corps,  a  necessity  to  all  great  un- 
dertakings. And  that  is  what  these  operations  were. 
The  figures  I  have  quoted,  showing  the  volume  of 
traffic  escorted,  do  not  really  convey  the  right  im- 
pression as  to  the  amount  of  work  accomplished  and 
the  hardships  endured.  Life  on  a  destroyer,  at  best, 
is  not  pleasant,  and  if  we  consider  that  all  of  these 
destroyers  were  out  in  all  sorts  of  weather  for  four 
days  out  of  every  six,  a  better  idea  of  the  service 
they  rendered  will  be  gained. 

The  manner  in  which  Admiral  Wilson  cooperated 
with  the  French  was  most  commendable.  Capt. 
R.  H.  Jackson,  U.  S.  N.,  was  ordered  to  Paris  where 
he  was  given  a  position  in  the  French  Ministry  of 
Marine.  Brest,  with  its  historic  background  and 
picturesque  surroundings,  as  the  chief  city  of  quaint 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         43 

old  Brittany,  was  the  subject  of  much  interest,  and 
later  many  literary  efforts  of  our  men.  The  geniality 
of  the  French  aristocrat,  or  peasant,  will  undoubt- 
edly always  be  remembered  by  those  who  learned  to 
know  and  appreciate  the  pleasures  and  comforts 
of  the  "old  world"  civilization. 

GIBRALTAR 

It  has  already  been  said  that  Queenstown  and 
Brest  were  chosen  as  suitable  locations  for  American 
Naval  bases  because  they  were  situated  at  the  gate- 
way to  the  British  Isles  and  France;  there  was  one 
other  gateway  to  European  waters,  and  that  was 
Gibraltar.  Here  Admiral  Sims  established  a  third 
base.  On  August  18, 1918,  theU.  S.  S.  "Birmingham," 
a  scout  cruiser  and  the  flag  ship  of  the  patrol  force 
of  the  U.  S.  Atlantic  fleet,  steamed  into  Gibraltar. 
On  August  20,  Admiral  Sims  sent  Admiral  Wilson,  * 
whose  flag  the  "Birmingham"  was  flying,  a  cable  in- 
structing him  to  cooperate  in  every  way  with  the 
British  Forces  at  Gibraltar.  Admiral  Wilson  showed 
his  comprehension  of  this  policy  by  dispatching 
the  U.  S.  S.  "Sacramento"  as  escort  to  an  English 
convoy  on  August  22.  On  the  other  hand,  Rear- 
Admiral  Grant,  R.  N.,  showed  his  willingness  to 
help  the  United  States  Naval  Forces  by  offering 
them  the  use  of  their  supplies  of  all  kinds :  food,  fuel, 
coal,  and  repair  facilities.  Thus  began  the  activities 
of  the  United  States  Navy  in  the  Mediterranean  in 
August,  1917. 

*  Ordered  to  command  Forces  at  Brest  in  October,  1917. 


44  SIMSADUS 

The  duties  of  the  American  vessels  varied  greatly, 
mainly  because  of  the  variety  of  the  types  of  vessels. 
These  consisted  of  cruisers,  destroyers,  gunboats, 
coastguard  cutters,  and  yachts  converted  into  war- 
ships. The  larger  vessels,  cruisers,  destroyers  and 
coastguard  cutters,  were  continually  on  duty  at  sea 
with  convoys  between  Gibraltar  and  England,  or 
between  many  points  in  the  Mediterranean.  They 
also  escorted  large  merchant  convoys  bound  to  and 
from  the  United  States  or  South  American  ports.  In 
this  duty,  it  was  not  unusual  for  a  vessel  to  be  absent 
at  sea  for  ten  days  or  two  weeks  and  then  to  return 
to  port,  only  to  be  dispatched  again  in  three  or  four 
days  on  similar  duty.  The  smaller  craft,  that  is, 
gunboats  and  yachts,  came  in  for  their  share  of  hard 
work,  by  serving  as  escorts  to  many  local  Mediter- 
ranean convoys  and  to  those  bound  for  the  Azores. 
Their  task  was  perhaps  more  difficult  than  that  of  the 
larger  vessels,  in  that  they  were  less  seaworthy,  while 
the  yachts  were  never  designed  to  serve  as  war  ves- 
sels. Patrol  duty  formed  no  small  part  of  their  cur- 
riculum, as  a  constant  watch  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Mediterranean  was  always  kept.  Their  work  was 
at  all  times  satisfactory  and  they  fulfilled  the  de- 
mands made  upon  them,  a  result  rendered  possible 
only  by  their  efficient  upkeep. 

The  volume  of  work  actually  done  by  the  Ameri- 
can vessels  at  Gibraltar  is  shown  by  a  few  figures. 
During  July  and  August,  1918,  for  instance,  the  av- 
erage time  at  sea  for  all  the  vessels  was  57%.  This 
means  roughly  that  each  ship  was  at  sea  six  days  out 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES         45 

of  ten;  of  the  four  days  in  port,  at  least  two,  or  per- 
haps three,  were  essential  for  repairs,  refueling,  taking 
on  provisions,  etc.  During  these  two  months  they 
steamed  170,000  miles,  or  six  times  around  the  world, 
and  were  at  sea  about  17,000  hours.  They  furnished 
25%  of  the  escorts  for  local  Mediterranean  convoys, 
and  over  75%  of  the  escorts  for  the  ocean  and  deep- 
sea  convoys. 

In  the  offensive  war  against  the  submarine,  they 
played  their  part  and  suffered  their  losses.  The 
action  of  the  U.  S.  S.  "Lydonia,"  a  yacht  which 
had  assumed  a  belligerent  aspect,  stands  out  con- 
spicuously. On  May  II,  while  she  was  proceeding 
as  an  escort,  along  with  British  warships,  to  a  con- 
voy of  merchant  vessels  in  the  Mediterranean,  a 
submarine  was  sighted.  It  appeared  that  the  sub- 
marine was  manoeuvering  to  get  into  position  to 
fire  a  torpedo,  but  by  the  skilful  cooperation  of  H.  M. 
S.  "Basilisk"  and  the  U.  S.  S.  "Lydonia,"  a  network 
of  depth  charges  was  laid  around  the  submarine.  The 
submarine  was  not  seen  again;  three  months  later 
it  was  discovered  she  had  been  sunk. 

The  loss  of  the  U.  S.  S.  "Tampa,"  a  former  coast- 
guard vessel,  is  one  of  the  greatest  tragedies  and 
mysteries  of  the  sea  in  the  history  of  the  War.  On 
September  26,  she  was  proceeding  with  an  English 
convoy  from  Gibraltar  to  Milford  Haven.  When  in 
sight  of  the  English  coast,  she  detached  herself  from 
the  convoy  and  stood  in  towards  the  coast.  She  was 
sighted  from  some  of  the  shore  stations  for  a  few  mo- 
ments; a  slight  mist  then  descended  and  hid  her 


46  SIMSADUS 

from  view.  A  loud  explosion  was  heard,  and  the 
"Tampa"  was  never  seen  again.  American  de- 
stroyers searched  the  area  for  two  days  in  the  hope 
of  finding  some  survivors,  but  the  only  traces  found 
were  the  floating  body  of  an  American  sailor  and 
some  wreckage  marked  "Tampa." 

The  incident  which  perhaps  stands  out  above  all 
other  experiences  of  the  United  States  Navy  in 
European  Waters  is  that  of  the  U.  S.  S.  "Senaca," 
another  coastguard  ship  based  at  Gibraltar.  On 
September  16,  1918,  she  was  proceeding  from  Eng- 
land to  Gibraltar  with  a  convoy  when  the  British 
ship  "Wellington"  was  struck  by  a  torpedo.  The 
"Senaca,"  under  Lieutenant-Commander  Wheeler, 
dropped  enough  depth  charges  in  the  direction 
whence  the  torpedo  came  to  prevent  the  submarine 
from  attempting  more  damage.  .  Shortly  after  the 
"Wellington"  was  torpedoed,  her  merchant  crew 
deserted  her  and  came  alongside  the  "Senaca"  in 
their  boats.  The  master  of  the  "Wellington"  told 
Commander  Wheeler  that  with  the  help  of  about 
thirty  men,  he  thought  the  "Wellington"  could  be 
kept  afloat  until  she  reached  port.  Ten  of  the 
"Wellington's"  crew  volunteered  to  go  back  to  try 
to  save  the  ship;  about  35  refused.  Lieutenant 
Brown  of  the  "Senaca"  asked  permission  to  go  with 

*  The  cause  of  the  destruction  of  the  "  Tampa  "  is  unknown.  There 
was  no  evidence  to  show  that  a  submarine  was  the  cause  of  the  disaster, 
for  no  submarine  was  in  the  vicinity.  It  is  possible  that  she  struck  a 
floating  mine,  but  more  probable,  that  an  internal  explosion  took  place. 
That  something  had  gone  wrong  on  board  can  be  surmised  by  the  man- 
ner in  which  she  detached  herself  from  the  convoy  without  orders  to 
do  so. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  BASES          47 

the  Master  of  the  "Wellington"  and  picked  16  of  the 
crew  to  help  him.  The  "  Senaca,"  in  the  meantime, 
was  ordered  to  proceed  with  the  remainder  of  the 
convoy  and  so  left  her  seventeen  volunteers  to  be  of 
what  service  they  could.  It  seemed  that  they  would 
be  able  to  keep  the  "  Wellington"  afloat,  but  a  heavy 
wind  and  sea  made  their  task  impossible.  An  S.  O. 
S.  call  was  sent  out  and  answered  by  the  U.  S.  S. 
"Warrington,"  a  destroyer  based  at  Brest.  The 
"Warrington"  came  to  the  rescue  at  full  speed  and 
arrived  at  the  scene  a  few  minutes  before  the  "Well- 
ington" sank.  In  the  heavy  seas  and  the  unusually 
dark  night  the  task  of  rescuing  the  men  was  difficult. 
Eight  of  the  "Senaca's"  crew  and  Lt.  Brown  were 
rescued,  but  ten  went  down  with  the  ship  they  had 
volunteered  to  save. 

The  cooperation  which  existed  between  the  Ameri- 
cans and  British  was  not  so  noticeable  among  the 
French  and  Italians.  Later  it  was  established,  but 
for  several  months  Convoys  were  escorted  by  the 
vessels  of  two  or  three  nations,  and  the  misunder- 
standings which  thereby  arose  were  sometimes  dis- 
astrous and  occasionally  humorous.  I  remember  that 
the  captain  of  one  of  our  vessels  who  apparently  had  a 
grudge  against  somebody  once  sent  in  a  report  like  this 

"A *  destroyer  then  got  excited  and  opened  fire 

in  various  directions.  The  first  shot  missed  my  bows 
by  a  few  feet,  the  second  one  carried  away  a  stack 

of  a *  destroyer;  the  third  sank  a  cargo  ship  loaded 

with  rum.    I  think  greater  cooperation  is  necessary." 

*  Nationality  of  the  destroyer  here  omitted  for  obvious  reasons. 


IV 
PROGRESS 

AFTER  the  American  Naval  Bases  at  Queens- 
town,  Brest,  and  Gibraltar  had  been  established, 
each  one  of  which  was  located  along  a  gateway  to 
Allied  European  ports,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
American  Navy  was  effectively  participating  in  the 
War.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  establish- 
ment of  Queenstown  as  a  base  and  the  full  growth  of 
Brest  as  a  base  were  separated  by  six  months'  time; 
thus  one  must  not  become  confused  and  think  that  the 
matter  already  dealt  with  has  been  discussed  in  mere 
chronological  order. 

By  August  and  September,  1917,  the  convoy  had 
been  introduced  and  put  into  operation.  What  an 
enormous  piece  of  work  this  entailed  and  what  mi- 
nute detail  the  execution  of  such  a  system  required  is 
too  long  a  story  to  deal  with  here.  Its  effective 
organization  was  the  result  of  the  wholehearted  co- 
operation between  the  different  shipping  organiza- 
tions and  the  British  and  American  Navies,  the 
American  end  of  which  was  <so  ably  organized  by 
Commander  Babcock,  U.  S.  N.,  and  later  handled  by 
Captain  Byron  A.  Long,  U.  S.  N.  at  Admiral  Sims' 
headquarters.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  in  order  to 
make  the  convoy  system  practical  and  successful, 
every  Allied  ship  afloat  had  to  be  provided  with  co- 

48 


PROGRESS  49 

pious  instructions  and  convoy  orders,  many  codes, 
and  a  great  volume  of  other  information  such  as 
sailing  orders,  shipping  routes,  etc. 

The  actual  working  of  a  convoy  is  an  interesting 
study.  Twenty  or  thirty  ships  would  meet  together 
off  the  American  coast  and  proceed  Eastward  un- 
der the  escort  of  a  cruiser.*  When  about  200  miles 
from  the  Coasts  of  Ireland  or  France,  at  a  given  date, 
hour,  or  position,  these  ships  would  be  met  by  a  va- 
riable number  of  destroyers,  and  ensemble  the  great 
procession  Eastward  would  continue.  A  zigzag 
course  was  usually  commenced  at  dawn  and  contin- 
ued throughout  the  day  unless  foggy  or  stormy. 
It  was  not  usually  employed  at  night  because 
the  darkness  made  its  use  unnecessary,  though 
such  ships  as  the  "Leviathan,"  "Aquitania,"  "Olym- 
pic," whose  enormous  hulls  above  the  water  were 
visible  even  at  night,  usually  continued  their  zigzag 
at  all  times.  The  virtue  of  a  zigzag  course  lay  in  the 
fact  that  a  submarine  would  experience  great  diffi- 
culty in  determining  the  course  and  speed  of  a  ship 
or  convoy  whose  course  was  irregular.  A  torpedo, 
to  be  accurate,  practically  had  to  be  fired  from  a 
distance  of  under  1000  yards;  when  a  ship  or  con- 
voy was  steering  a  zigzag  course  it  was  very  diffi- 
cult for  the  submarine  to  estimate  the  ships'  prob- 
able position  a  few  moments  later.  An  interest- 
ing example  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  zigzag  is  seen 

*  A  cruiser  was  dispatched  with  the  convoys  as  a  protective  unit 
against  enemy  commerce  raiders;  against  a  submarine  they  were  not 
capable  of  assuming  an  offensive  r61e,  such  as  destroyers. 


50  SIMSADUS 

in  the  case  of  the  "Olympic,"  on  May  12,  1918.  The 
"Olympic,"  loaded  with  American  troops,  was  pro- 
ceeding Eastward,  about  150  miles  off  Brest,  es- 
corted by  American  destroyers.  An  enemy  sub- 
marine, the  U-IO3,  at  dawn  saw  her  approaching  and 
manoeuvered  to  get  into  position  to  fire  a  torpedo. 
The  submarine  attempted  to  estimate  the  course  and 
speed  of  the  "Olympic,"  which  was  steering  a  zig- 
zag course,  and  submerged  to  approach  closer  to  her 
prey.  A  few  moments  later  the  Commanding 
Officer  and  the  crew  of  the  submarine  were  surprised 
by  a  terrific  crash  against  the  hull  of  their  vessel; 
water  began  to  pour  in.  One  of  the  "Olympic's "  pro- 
pellers had  crashed  through  the  hull.  The  tanks  of 
the  submarine  were  blown,*  thereby  bringing  it  to 
the  surface,  and  the  entire  crew  called  for  help  as 
they  deserted  the  sinking  boat.  The  survivors  were 
rescued  by  the  U.  S.  S.  "Davis."  The  calculations 
of  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  submarine  had 
been  upset  by  the  "Olympic's"  vicious  zigzag  and 
speed,  and  he  paid  for  his  mistake  by  the  loss  of  his 
vessel. 

To  return  to  the  study  of  the  convoy.  Imagine 
thirty  great  ships  all  huddled  together  changing  their 
courses  every  few  minutes,  and  then  imagine  what 
havoc  might  be  wrought  if  one  ship  made  a  mistake. 
Mistakes  were  made  and  havoc  was  wrought,  but  as 
time  went  on,  the  mistakes  grew  less,  but  were  al- 
ways to  be  guarded  against.f  In  the  meantime,  de- 

*  "  Tanks  blown  "  means  buoyancy  tanks  emptied  of  water. 
fOn  October  9, 1918,  the  U.  S.  S.  "Shaw,"  a  Queenstown  destroyer, 


Underwood   &    Underwood 


The  U.  S.  S.  Shaw  in  rough  weather,  and  the  same 

ship    after     her    collision    with    the     Aquitania     in 

October,  1918. 


PROGRESS  51 

stroyers  would  proceed  at  a  speed  slightly  greater 
than  that  of  the  convoy  in  order  to  search  the  area 
through  which  the  convoy  was  passing.  Two  destroy- 
ers, three  or  four  miles  ahead  of  the  main  body  of  the 
convoy,  would  steam  back  and  forth  across  the  path  of 
the  approaching  vessels,  eagerly  searching  for  any  signs 
of  a  lurking  enemy.  A  destroyer  on  each  flank  would 
run  in  towards  the  convoy  and  then  out  a  mile  or  so 
from  it  and  then  perhaps  fall  back  a  bit  to  cover  the 
port  or  starboard  quarter,  or,  unless  there  were  another 
destroyer  covering  the  rear,  fall  behind  the  convoy  and 
protect  it  from  a  submarine  which  might  be  following 
the  procession.  Suddenly  one  destroyer  might  see 
some  disturbance  in  the  water.  Up  would  go  the 
submarine  warning  signal,  the  convoy  would  turn 
sharply  to  left  or  right,  as  ordered,  and  the  destroyers 
would  drop  depth  charges  and  hang  around  for  an 

was  proceeding  towards  Southampton  accompanying  the  H.  M.  S. 
"Aquitania,"  which  was  carrying  American  troops;  both  vessels  were 
maintaining  a  speed  of  23  knots.  The  "Shaw"  was  about  250  yards 
away  from  the  big  vessel  and  running  parallel  to  her  when  her  rudder 
"  jammed  "  and  she  turned  towards  the  "Aquitania."  Her  Command- 
ing Officer  appreciated  the  situation  in  a  moment  and  realized  that  if 
he  reversed  his  engines  and  tried  to  stop  his  vessel  the  sharp  bows  of 
the  "Shaw"  would  pierce  the  hull  of  the  "Aquitania"  and  perhaps 
sink  it,  and  that  if  he  continued  in  the  course  forced  upon  him  by  the 
jamming  of  his  rudder,  the  "Aquitania"  would  ram  him  as  he  crossed 
her  bows.  Not  wishing  to  sink  six  thousand  troops,  he  took  the  latter 
course  and  allowed  the  "Aquitania"  to  run  into  him.  In  this  collision 
the  "Aquitania"  practically  cut  the  "Shaw"  in  half,  and  several  of  the 
crew  and  officers  were  drowned.  For  this  action  Commander  Wil- 
liam Glassford  of  the  "Shaw'Vas  very  highly  commended  by  Admiral 
Sims  and  the  British  Admiralty;  for  though  he  wrecked  his  own  vessel, 
he  did  it  in  such  a  way  that  six  thusand  lives  were  made  safe,  at  the 
risk  of  his  own. 


52  SIMSADUS 

hour  or  so  to  see  if  the  submarine  might  reappear. 
When  a  ship  was  torpedoed  in  a  convoy,  under  no 
circumstances  were  the  other  ships  of  the  convoy 
allowed  to  stop  and  offer  assistance;  to  do  so  would 
only  invite  further  mischief  from  the  submarine.  The 
one  or  two  destroyers  would  offer  all  the  assist- 
ance necessary,  while  the  convoy  fled  from  the  loca- 
tion of  the  disaster.  Also,  when  a  submarine  was 
sighted,  the  merchant  ships  or  troop  transports  un- 
der escort  of  destroyers  were  never  allowed  to  take 
part  in  the  attack  upon  the  submarine.  The  de- 
stroyers were  the  offensive  and  defensive  weapons 
of  a  convoy,  while  a  transport's  or  merchant  ship's 
guns  were  for  protection  only  in  an  attack  in  which 
no  escorts  were  present.  On  one  occasion,  the  "Le- 
viathan," May  31,  1918,  when  off  Brest,  sighted 
what  her  officers  believed  to  be  a  submarine,  and 
this  great  ship,  with  her  eight  six-inch  guns,  imme- 
diately opened  fire,  thereby  rendering  the  protec- 
tion which  the  destroyers  afforded  absolutely  use- 
less. In  this  case,  the  officers  of  the  destroyers 
from  Brest  recognized  the  disturbance  as  a  well- 
known  tide-rip  and  hence  were  not  really  hampered; 
but,  if  a  submarine  had  been  the  cause  of  the  dis- 
turbance in  the  water,  the  "Leviathan"  would  have 
been  open  to  attack.  How  could  the  destroyers 
have  dropped  depth  charges  over  the  disturbance  in 
the  water  if  the  "Leviathan"  was  firing  at  that 
spot? 

The  convoy  system  during  these  first  few  months 
of  trial  proved  successful,  that  is,  its  introduction  re- 


PROGRESS  53 

duced  the  sinkings  by  more  than  50%;  but  very 
nearly  400,000  tons  per  month  were  still  being  de- 
stroyed. These  losses  outweighed  by  far  the  new 
construction.  As  long  as  this  condition  existed,  the 
Allies  were  on  the  losing  end  of  the  game;  and  further 
efforts  were  necessary  to  improve  matters.  It  was 
realized  that  this  would  be  a  very  long  and  hard 
task  and  that  the  results  from  any  improvements 
would  not  happen  overnight.  There  were  two  ways 
of  improving  the  situation;  first,  by  centralizing  the 
control  of  the  management  and  routing  and  ship- 
ping, and  secondly,  by  increasing  the  number  of 
anti-submarine  vessels. 

Soon  after  the  introduction  of  the  convoy  system, 
the  necessity  of  cooperation  and  speed  in  the  han- 
dling of  shipping  became  very  apparent.  If  twenty 
ships  were  to  sail  from  Hampton  Roads,  it  was  of 
vital  importance  to  have  everyone  of  those  ships 
ready  to  sail  on  time,  and  thereby  avoid  delay.  The 
time  in  which  an  average  cargo  ship  made  a  "turn- 
around," that  is,  left  one  port,  crossed  the  ocean,  dis- 
charged her  cargo,  returned,  and  was  ready  to  leave 
again,  was  about  two  months.  This  meant  that  such 
a  ship  could  make  six  round  trips  a  year,  barring 
time  lost  in  repairs.  If  the  time  for  loading  and  un- 
loading, and  the  trips  at  sea,  could  all  be  reduced  so 
as  to  make  it  possible  for  the  ship  to  make  a  "turn- 
around" in  six  weeks,  twelve  weeks  a  year,  or  three 
months,  would  be  saved;  and  twelve  weeks  saved 
would  mean  two  extra  trips  a  year,  or  an  increase 
°f  33%  %m  tne  cargo  ship  carrying  capacity  of  the 


54  SIMSADUS 

Allies.  Of  course  to  liven  things  up  in  this  way  was 
a  very  difficult  task,  but  any  effort  in  that  direction 
would  be  of  value.  The  Naval  Overseas  Transporta- 
tion Service  in  this  country  eventually  did  splendid 
work  along  this  line;  but  there  was  no  such  organiza- 
tion as  that  in  July,  1917.  There  was  no  central  ship- 
ping base  and  no  efficient  means  of  preventing  loss 
of  time  and  cargo  space. 

One  very  flagrant  case  of  this  was  that  of  the  S.  S. 
"Celtic,"  which  left  this  country  with  supplies  for 
Queenstown.  No  word  was  sent  to  Admiral  Sims 
that  this  ship  was  bound  for  Europe  until  she  was 
almost  there,  and  accordingly  no  provision  for  her 
safe  escort  into  Queenstown  had  been  made;  but  be- 
cause of  her  valuable  cargo  of  food,  it  was  necessary 
that  she  have  an  escort  of  destroyers,  even  if  those 
destroyers  had  already  been  assigned  to  the  escort  of 
other  vessels.  When  the  "Celtic"  arrived  at  Queens- 
town  it  was  found  that  she  had  on  board  a  cold  stor- 
age cargo,  which  at  that  time  was  not  particularly 
needed  and  for  which  adequate  storage  space  had  not 
been  provided.  Storage  houses  were  being  erected, 
and  if  the  "Celtic"  had  arrived  two  or  three  weeks 
later,  her  cargo  could  have  been  unloaded  at  Queens- 
town,  but  as  it  was,  only  a  small  part  was  removed. 
The  vessel  was  then  ordered  to  Brest  to  discharge  as 
much  of  her  cargo  there  as  was  wanted,  and  then  re- 
turned to  Queenstown  to  await  the  completion  of  store- 
houses. This  meant  that  the  ship  had  to  be  escorted 
to  Brest  and  back  again,  when  the  destroyers  might 
have  been  otherwise  employed  in  escorting  ships  whose 


PROGRESS  55 

cargoes  were  more  urgently  needed  than  that  of  the 
"Celtic." 

This  is  just  one  of  the  many  cases  in  which  lack  of 
centralization  caused  trouble,  delay,  and  even  un- 
necessary losses  at  sea.  In  this  case,  if  those  in 
charge  of  the  Navy  Department  had  sent  word 
earlier  that  she  was  coming,  time  and  effort  would 
have  been  saved;  but  better  still,  if  they  had  gone  a 
little  deeper  into  the  matter  and  made  a  practice  of 
paying  more  attention  to  Admiral  Sims'  advice  and 
requests  they  would  have  found  out  that  it  would 
be  better  to  send  the  "  Celtic"  to  Europe  with  a  cargo 
for  which  there  was  a  more  immediate  need.  As  it 
was,  they  sent  over  a  ship  whose  cargo  was  not 
needed  and  whose  unheralded  arrival  in  Europe 
resulted  in  the  assignment  of  destroyers  to  her 
as  a  protection,  when  these  destroyers  might  have 
been  protecting  other  ships.  What  was  needed  was 
some  sort  of  a  central  shipping  office  from  which 
all  shipping  and  cargoes  could  be  routed  and  from 
which  the  authorities  in  Europe  could  learn  a  little 
in  advance  what  ships  and  cargoes  were  to  be 
expected. 

The  final  solution  of  the  matter  was  a  Naval  Over- 
seas Transportation  Service,  the  shipping  Board,  and 
the  British  Admiralty,  all  of  which  eventually  came 
to  an  understanding  and  thereafter  worked  in  uni- 
son. Their  work  aided  the  convoy  system  and  pre- 
vented ships  from  wandering  along  the  coasts  of 
Europe  looking  for  a  harbor  in  which  to  discharge 
their  cargoes. 


56  SIMSADUS 

The  second  manner  in  which  the  convoy  system 
could  be  improved  was  by  increasing  the  number  of 
anti-submarine  craft  in  European  waters.  The  British 
were  turning  out  five  or  six  new  destroyers  monthly; 
the  Navy  Department  had  placed  orders  for  four 
hundred  new  destroyers,  but  of  course  these  would 
not  be  finished  for  many  months.  Other  destroyers, 
still  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  were  being  sent  over 
every  month,  and  by  August  about  thirty-five  of 
them  were  operating  in  Europe.  But  more  were 
wanted,  for  half  of  the  ships  leaving  and  entering 
British  ports  did  so  unescorted.  In  July,  Admiral 
Sims  urgently  recommended  that  every  available 
ship  capable  of  maintaining  a  speed  of  fourteen  or 
fifteen  knots  and  of  weathering  the  seas  be  sent  to 
Europe.  He  rightly  believed  that  the  submarine 
sinkings  would  decrease  in  proportion  to  the  number 
of  anti-submarine  vessels  employed  in  Europe. 

There  were  many  patrol  boats  operating  along  the 
Eastern  American  coast,  very  few  of  which  were 
necessary  and  many  of  which  could  be  of  far  greater 
•use  in  European  waters.  No  submarines  were 
^operating  in  American  waters,  but  a  great  many 
were  operating  in  European  waters.  There  was 
little  likelihood  that  submarines  would  be  sent  to  the 
American  coasts  until  their  mission  in  Europe  had 
failed,  for  the  time  consumed  in  transit  to  and  from 
America — a  submarine  can  only  make  120  miles  a 
day  on  a  long  cruise — could  be  more  profitably 
spent  in  English  waters.  Also,  the  sending  of 
submarines  to  American  waters,  where  shipping 


PROGRESS  57 

was  very  scattered,  would  be  less  productive  from 
the  submarines  point  of  view,  than  keeping  them 
around  England,  where  the  shipping  was  very  con- 
gested. Admiral  Sims  maintained  that  the  critical 
area  of  the  submarine  war  was  the  location  in  which 
the  submarine  had  to  be  fought  and  the  area  in  which 
it  would  either  fail  or  succeed.  In  June  and  July  it 
was  not  failing;  in  fact  it  was  still  succeeding,  be- 
cause the  Allies  did  not  have  a  sufficient  number  of 
anti-submarine  craft  with  which  to  combat  it. 

Of  course,  if  the  majority  of  the  patrol  boats  on 
the  Eastern  American  coast  were  sent  to  Europe 
the  coast  would  be  unprotected  while  America  was 
in  a  state  of  war,  and  to  this  condition  of  affairs  the 
American  people  might  have  objected.  But  at  that 
time,  as  no  submarine  had  been  sent  to  the  American 
coast  and  as  there  was  not  much  likelihood  of  one 
being  sent  over  for  at  least  several  months,  the  hun- 
dreds of  patrol  vessels  on  our  coasts  were  really 
doing  no  good  at  all. 

This  request  from  Admiral  Sims  in  Europe  was 
met  by  plans  for  the  construction  of  more  chasers 
and  the  conversion  of  more  yachts  into  war  vessels; 
some  of  which  were  being  sent  over.  These  all 
helped  out  and  all  played  an  important  role,  locally. 
But,  Admiral  Sims7  requests  and  recommendations 
not  always  met  with  approval  in  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment, and  many  more  should  have  been  dispatched 
than  were.  The  chasers  and  destroyers  were  of  the 
most  value;  the  destroyers  were  ordered  to  Brest, 
Queenstown,  and  Gibraltar,  and  the  chasers  to  the 


58  SIMSADUS 

Island  of  Corfu  in  the  Mediterranean  and  to  Plym- 
outh, England.  The  destroyers  took  up  their  work 
with  their  colleagues  which  had  arrived  before  them, 
while  the  chasers  became  involved  in  a  new  form  of 
anti-submarine  tactics. 


FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS 

BY  the  Fall  of  1917  the  critical  period  of  the  sub- 
marine War  was  passing.  In  April  it  had  ap- 
peared that  the  Germans,  by  sinking  a  million  tons 
per  month,  might  win  the  War;  in  fact  if  Germany 
had  continued  to  sink  this  amount  of  tonnage,  vic- 
tory would  have  been  hers;  but  the  sinkings  rapidly 
decreased  after  the  introduction  of  the  Convoy  sys- 
tem, which  was  made  possible  by  the  addition  of  the 
American  destroyers  to  the  existing  anti-submarine 
forces.  By  November  the  sinkings  amounted  to 
only  30%  of  their  total  in  April.  The  situation  was 
in  hand,  and  the  submarine  campaign  had  been 
sufficiently  checked  to  relieve  the  Naval  Authorities 
of  that  keen  worry  which  they  had  experienced  in 
the  Spring,  and  called  only  for  a  vigorous  pursuit 
of  the  then  existing  policies  and  activities  to  wipe 
the  submarine  off  the  slate  of  War  as  a  cause  for 
Allied  defeat.  Attention  now  turned  toward  strength- 
ening the  Allied  Naval  situation  as  a  whole. 

In  discussing  this  problem,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  though  little  has  been  said  about  the  Ger- 
man Fleet,  its  restriction  from  the  High  Seas  was  of 
primary  importance.  Thus,  there  were  two  phases 
to  the  Naval  War;  the  submarine  campaign  and  the 
blockade  of  "the  German  Fleet,  which  was  bottled 

59 


60  SIMSADUS 

up  at  Kiel  and  other  German  ports.  If  the  subma- 
rine war  could  be  held  in  check,  or  the  sinkings  still 
further  reduced,  and  the  German  Fleet  kept  in  its 
place  of  hiding,  eventual  victory  for  the  Allies 
would  be  assured. 

It  had  been  recognized  for  some  time  that  though 
the  presence  of  American  dreadnoughts  in  the 
North  Sea  would  be  of  material  help  to  the  British 
Grand  Fleet,  they  would  need  supplies;  and  accord- 
ingly the  discussion  of  their  coming  to  Europe  had 
been  postponed  until  the  critical  phase  of  the  sub- 
marine had  passed  and  the  shortage  of  shipping  had 
become  less  acute.  While  the  submarine  war  had 
seemed  so  critical,  it  had  been  felt  that  the  British 
Navy  could  guard  the  German  High  Fleet,  as  it  had 
done  in  the  past;  however,  with  the  dwindling  of  the 
seriousness  of  the  U-boat  campaign,  it  was  possible 
to  strengthen  the  British  Fleet  with  American  dread- 
naughts  without  making  the  demands  on  shipping 
excessive.  In  October,  1917,  Admiral  Sims  informed 
the  Navy  Department  to  this  effect.*  In  selecting 
these  dreadnaughts  it  was  necessary  to  send  over 
only  those  which  used  coal  as  fuel,  for  oil  burners 
would  have  demanded  the  service  of  tank  steamers, 
at  a  time  when  gasoline  was  already  scarce  enough 
in  England  and  France.  Five  of  the  latest  and  largest 
American  coal-burning  vessels,  under  the  command 
of  Rear-Admiral  Rodman,  U.  S.  N.,  were  ordered  to 

*  He  had  in  July  requested  the  services  of  four  dreadnaughts  to  be 
stationed  on  the  western  coast  of  England  or  Ireland,  as  protective 
units  against  German  commerce  raiders.  The  request  was  not  ap- 
proved by  the  Department. 


1917 


1918 


900,000 
800,000 

C    700,000 

o 

H    600,000 
•~    500,000 
2o    400,000 

CO 

2    300,000 
200,000 
100,000 
0 

/ 

\ 

/ 

\ 

/ 

\ 

/ 

\ 

x 

\ 

. 

\ 

/ 

\ 

\ 

7 

\ 

/ 

^\ 

—  1 

J 

.  —  —  - 

"^ 

_  • 

—  -—  -1 

\ 

\ 

• 

\ 

This  curve,  known  as  the  "Tonnage  Curve,"  shows  the  progressive 
success  of  the  convoy  system.  Its  success,  during  the  first  few 
months  of  its  institution,  was  marked,  and  thereafter  slow  but 
steady.  Thus  this  apparently  insignificant  curve  tells  the  history  of 
Allied  Victory  and  German  defeat,  in  a  very  comprehensible  man- 
ner. It  was  the  author's  pleasure  to  keep  this  chart  up  to  date 

each  month. 


:   o 


FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS  61 

Europe  by  the  Navy  Department  in  November,  1917, 
and  on  December  sixth  joined  the  British  Grand 
Fleet  as  the  6th  Battle  Squadron  under  Admiral 
Beatty  in  the  North  Sea.  The  British  Grand  Fleet 
had  been  on  duty  in  the  North  Sea  since  the  out- 
break of  the  War.  It  had  been  a  fortunate  coinci- 
dence that  in  July,  1914,  the  entire  Fleet  had  been 
assembled  for  its  annual  manoeuvres;  since  that  time  it 
had  remained  intact  in  the  North  Sea.  Incidentally, 
Germany  often  claimed  that  this  was  proof  of  Eng- 
land's desire  for  War.  Occasionally,  scouting  ves- 
sels of  the  two  nations  had  encountered  each  other 
and  short,  running  fights  had  ensued;  the  only  com- 
bat of  any  importance  had  been  the  Battle  of  Jut- 
land, which  took  place  on  June  1st,  1916. 

On  that  day  the  British  Grand  Fleet  was  at  sea  in 
one  of  those  sweeping  cruises  periodically  under- 
taken for  practice,  manoeuvering,  and  general  exer- 
cise of  the  various  units.  In  the  afternoon,  when 
about  100  miles  from  Heligoland,  a  portion  of  the 
British  Fleet  met  squadrons  of  the  enemy  and  an  all 
night  fight  ensued.  The  meeting  of  the  two  fleets 
was  proven  to  be  purely  accidental,  for  neither  fleet 
knew  that  the  enemy  was  abroad.  After  the  battle, 
in  which  the  losses  in  capital  ships  were  nearly  equally 
divided,  but  in  which  Germany's  losses  in  smaller 
vessels  was  far  greater  than  those  of  the  British,  both 
fleets  claimed  the  laurels  of  the  conqueror.  Germany, 
according  to  her  custom,  did  a  good  deal  more  shout- 
ing than  England  after  this  encounter,  for  whereas 
the  British  authorities  had  hoped  that  the  engage- 


62  SIMSADUS 

ment  would  prove  decisive  in  their  favor,  it  did  not; 
they  had  to  content  themselves  with  learning  later 
that  the  German  Fleet  had  retired  to  its  base,  never 
to  attempt  another  exodus. 

Before  and  after  the  Battle  of  Jutland,  the  duties 
and  policies  of  the  British  Grand  Fleet  had  always 
been  one  of  "watchful  waiting."  It  was  very  careful 
watching,  but  very  dull  waiting.  In  the  words  of 
an  old  English  tar,  who  had  apparently  spent  most 
of  his  life  in  the  British  Navy,  "Floatin'  around  that 
blinkin'  Nor'  Sea,  waitin'  till  those  bloddy  'uns  get 
grit  h 'enough  to  fight,  and  yet  always  'oping  that 
they  will  fight  some  di,  'tis'nt  the  kind  of  life  for  an 
h 'ambitious  or  warlike  chap  the  likes  of  me."  Am- 
bition or  no  ambition,  life  was  pretty  dull  in  that 
fleet.  Day  in  and  day  out,  flotillas  of  destroyers  and 
squadrons  of  cruisers  would  wander  forth,  hoping  for 
a  chance  of  action  with  the  enemy.  Day  in  and  day 
out,  the  tremendous  battle  cruisers  and  dreadnaughts 
would  lie  at  anchor,  ready  to  proceed  to  sea  at  two 
hours'  notice.  "Monotonous  and  boring"  describes 
it  best;  but  "watchful  waiting"  was  necessary. 
While  the  British  Fleet,  whose  location  was  usually 
about  Scapa  Flow,  stood  in  readiness  to  smash  a 
German  exodus,  England  commanded  the  surface 
of  the  sea.  Whether  she  had  command  of  what 
went  on  beneath  the  sea  a  few  months  before  was 
another  matter,  but  the  command  of  the  surface 
of  the  sea,  which  meant  no  German  ships  on  the 
high  seas  of  the  world,  was  of  vital  importance  if 
the  Allies  were  to  win  the  War. 


FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS  63 

At  last  it  seemed  that  the  men  of  the  Fleet  were  to 
be  rewarded.  During  the  first  few  days  in  Novem- 
ber, 1918,  the  Admiralty  Intelligence  Service  gained 
the  information  that  the  German  High  Seas  Fleet  had 
been  ordered  to  sea.  Excitement  in  all  Naval  and 
Official  circles  was  rampant.  After  four  years  of 
waiting,  "Der  Tag"  had  come!  Squadrons  of  de- 
stroyers and  crusiers  were  immediately  dispatched 
to  meet  the  enemy.  For  days  these  vessels  searched, 
in  hopes  and  in  vain,  for  no  enemy  ship  was  seen. 
Finally  the  Armistice  was  signed,  and  the  victorious 
units  were  recalled — victorious  without  having  fired 
a  shell.  "Der  Tag"  had  come  and  gone! 

Two  weeks  later  the  German  Fleet  surrendered. 
The  entire  British  Fleet  in  battle  formation  went 
out  to  meet  it  and  between  the  lines  of  the  combined 
American  and  British  Squadrons,  the  Germans 
were  escorted  back  to  Scapa  Flow.  A  very  promi- 
nent British  Naval  official,  now  retired,  expressed 
the  opinion  that  the  surrender  of  the  German  Fleet 
without  a  shot  was  a  disgrace  to  the  Naval  Profes- 
sion. "In  no  previous  case  in  history,"  he  said, 
"has  a  Naval  Command  surrendered  in  cold  blood, 
without  even  putting  up  a  bluff  at  a  fight.  An  act 
of  cowardice  such  as  this,  degrades  the  Naval  Pro- 
fession." 

The  American  Squadron  formed  only  one-eighth 
of  the  forty-seven  first-line  dreadnaughts  assembled 
in  the  British  Grand  Fleet.  This  is  a  comparatively 
small  proportion,  but  these  five  vessels  were  of 
great  material  and  moral  help  to  the  British  Navy. 


64  SIMSADUS 

Their  arrival  in  the  long  dark  winter  months  was  a 
source  of  cheer  to  our  Allies,  the  English,  and,  to  a 
certain  extent,  a  novelty;  and  anything  that  was 
novel  was  welcomed  in  Scapa  Flow.  In  looking 
over  the  records,  one  cannot  help  but  be  impressed 
with  the  commendations  received  from  the  British 
Admiralty  for  the  efficient  up-keep  of  our  vessels. 
During  the  year  that  they  were  in  the  North  Sea 
they  were  the  source  of  very  little  trouble  to  the 
British  Dock  Yards. 

BANTRY  BAY 

Admiral  Sims  stationed  another  three  U.  S.  dread- 
naughts  at  Berehaven  in  Bantry  Bay,  the  most 
Southern  point  of  Ireland.  These  vessels  were  or- 
dered to  Europe  in  August,  1918,  under  Rear-Ad- 
miral Rogers,  U.  S.  N.,  to  be  used  in  the  pursuit 
of  an  enemy  raiding  vessel  should  one  escape  the 
North  Sea  patrol.  In  1915  and  1916,  two  enemy 
raiders  had  escaped,  the  "Seeadler"  and  the  "Wolf," 
and  had  done  a  great  deal  of  damage  to  shipping. 
The  "Wolf,"  during  her  cruise,  in  which  she  covered 
the  greater  part  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans, 
destroyed  over  100,000  tons  of  shipping,  and  then 
managed  to  get  back  into  Germany.  In  the  Summer 
of  1918,  it  was  thought  probable  that  with  the  com- 
ing of  the  long  and  dark  winter  months,  another 
attempt  to  send  raiders  out  would  be  made.  A  ship 
with  no  lights  and  a  little  luck,  could  sneak  past  the 
North  Sea  patrol  during  the  long  hours  of  darkness, 
regardless  of  how  efficient  that  patrol  might  be. 


FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS  65 

Let  the  reader  try  to  find  another  person  moving 
about  a  pitch  black  room,  and  he  will  appreciate 
the  impossibility  of  preventing  the  egress  of  a 
raider  in  the  North  Sea.  For  this  reason,  it  was  good 
strategy  to  have  fast  ships  with  a  powerful  arma- 
ment stationed  at  a  point,  such  as  Berehaven,  from 
which  the  high  seas  and  broad  Atlantic  are  very  ac- 
cessible. A  raider  in  escaping  would  naturally,  after 
passing  the  North  of  Scotland,  turn  South,  and  pro- 
ceed Eastward  between  Iceland  and  the  British 
Isles;  Berehaven,  therefore,  was  the  logical  situation 
for  these  dreadnaughts.  It  may  be  thought  that 
cruisers  would  have  been  more  serviceable  in  the 
pursuit  of  raiders,  and  probably  in  hunting  down 
a  merchant  ship  converted  into  a  raider  they  would 
have  been;  but,  in  that  raiders  had  escaped  before, 
it  was  believed  not  unlikely  that  in  the  coming 
winter  enemy  battle  cruisers  or  other  heavily  armed 
vessels  might  undertake  to  play  the  role  of  raiders. 
The  armament  of  such  vessels  would  be  as  powerful 
or  more  powerful  than  that  of  cruisers,  and  therefore 
dreadnaughts  with  their  big  guns  would  be  of  greater 
service  in  hunting  them  down.  Unfortunately  the 
armistice  cut  short  the  possibility  of  these  ships 
being  of  use. 


VI 

THE  NORTHERN  MINE  BARRAGE 

IT  will  be  recalled  that  in  May,  1917,  when  the 
situation  had  looked  so  bad,  the  use  of  mines  on 
a  large  scale  was  not  considered  wise  because  such 
mines  did  not  exist  and  their  construction  would 
have  taken  too  long  to  warrant  their  adoption  as 
the  primary  method  of  fighting  submarines  at  a 
time  when  anti-submarine  methods  had  to  be  put 
into  effect  immediately.  In  November,  1917,  the 
submarine  War  had  assumed  the  aspect  of  a  thorn 
in  the  side  of  the  Allied  Naval  position  rather  than 
as  a  cause  for  defeat.  The  sinkings  were  steadily 
getting  less  and  were  soon  to  be  replaced  by  new 
construction.  However,  these  losses,  and  the  efforts 
necessary  to  prevent  greater  losses,  were  becoming 
more  and  more  expensive  to  the  Allies  in  man- 
power and  resources.  Much  time,  many  men,  and 
enormous  expenditures  could  be  saved,  if  the  sub- 
marine was  checked  still  further.  But  how  could 
this  be  done?  Every  available  self-propelling  ship 
in  England  was  already  employed  in  fighting  it. 
Similar  vessels  were  being  sent  over  from  America 
in  as  great  numbers  as  the  Navy  Department  deemed 
practical.  What  new  tactics  would  be  of  further 
avail?  The  Naval  Authorities  came  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  end  desired  could  be  obtained  by 

66 


<U    ;> 

^ 
0,0 


ca  oj 


°.S 

«5     ., 

rt  "Jn 
^^ 


THE  NORTHERN  MINE  BARRAGE    67 

bottling  up  the  submarines  in  the  North  Sea;  this  to 
be  accomplished  by  laying  a  barrage  of  mines  across 
from  Scotland  to  Norway. 

The  history  of  mine  laying  in  the  War  up  to  this 
time  had  been  interesting.  When  the  submarine 
campaign  began,  many  a  man  in  drawing-room  or 
bar-room  could  tell  the  Naval  Authorities  that  the 
way  to  remove  the  submarine  from  the  ocean  was  by 
bottling  them  up  with  mines  laid  in  front  of  their 
ports  of  exit.  This  was  good  sense,  for  the  prover- 
bial school-boy  has  always  laid  tacks  in  front  of  the 
instructor's  door  when  the  prank-playing  youths 
wished  to  hamper  his  exit.  But  perhaps  many  a 
master,  on  discovering  the  tacks,  has  taken  a  broom 
and  swept  them  all  aside.  Now  this  was  practically 
the  same  experience  with  the  Allies  in  attempting  to 
bottle  up  the  German  submarines  in  their  own  ports. 
An  English  mine-layer  would  sneak  fairly  close  to  a 
German  submarine  base  and,  under  cover  of  dark- 
ness, lay  mines  along  the  route  of  exit.  One  German 
submarine  might  come  to  grief  ori  these  mines,  but 
thereafter  all  entrances  to  all  submarines  bases 
would  be  swept  by  mine-sweepers  daily.  The  same  is 
true  about  the  German  submarines  laying  mines  off 
British  ports.  The  submarines  would  lay  mines 
during  the  night  off  some  harbor  and  the  following 
morning  they  would  all  be  swept  up  by  British 
sweepers.  Mine  fields,  to  be  successful,  must  be 
laid  in  regions  where  the  enemy  is  not  free  to  sweep 
them  up.  Attempts  to  bottle  up  submarines  in  their 
own  harbors  proved  useless. 


68  SIMSADUS 

New  locations  for  mines  were  then  sought.  As  we 
look  at  the  map  of  Great  Britain,  we  immediately 
see  that  the  Dover  Straits  afford  excellent  natural 
advantages  for  the  laying  of  a  mine-field.  Mines 
had  been  laid  early  in  the  War  to  prevent  an  exodus 
of  German  raiders  through  this  short  route  to  the 
high  seas;  mines  and  nets,  it  was  decided,  would 
also  be  instrumental  in  keeping  submarines  out  of 
the  English  Channel,  across  which  every  British 
Tommy  had  to  travel  to  get  to  France.  In  this 
operation,  nature  favored  the  Germans,  for  it  was 
soon  discovered  that  no  anchor  or  cable,  however 
great,  could  withstand  for  any  length  of  time  the 
swift  current  through  the  Straits.  Cables  and  an- 
chors might  hold  for  a  short  time,  but  with  the 
swift  tides  changing  direction  every  six  hours,  one  or 
the  other,  or  both,  eventually  would  let  go.  In  the 
meantime  submarines  continued  to  use  the  Dover 
Straits  almost  at  will.  A  submarine  would  get  home 
through  the  Straits  after  a  cruise,  and  her  Command- 
ing Officer  would  immediately  tell  his  fellow  officers 
just  how  he  did  it,  thereby  allowing  others  to  pass 
through  in  the  same  way.  Finally  under  the  com- 
mand of  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Roger  Keys,  R.  N.,  in  the 
first  half  of  1918,  a  movable  barrage  was  laid  across 
the  Straits.  This  barrage,  or  rather  the  locations  of 
series  of  mine  fields,  could  be  occasionally  changed, 
thereby  eliminating  the  possibility  of  German  sub- 
marine commanders  discovering  the  leaky  passages 
(which  will  occur  in  all  mine  fields).  Some  of  these 
mines  were  laid  in  strings  and  connected  by  wires; 


THE  NORTHERN  MINE  BARRAGE    69 

when  a  submarine  was  known  to  be  trying  to  pass 
through  the  field,  the  mines  would  be  exploded  from 
the  shore  by  an  electric  current.  By  August,  1918, 
the  Dover  Straits  were  practically  closed  to  German 
submarines,  thereby  forcing  them  to  proceed  to 
their  respective  theatres  of  operations  via  the  North 
of  Scotland. 

There  were  many  British  mine  areas  other  than 
those  of  the  Dover  Straits.  The  entrances  to  prac- 
tically all  the  ports  of  England  were  very  thickly 
sown  with  mines,  to  prevent  submarines  interfer- 
ing with  departing  and  entering  ships.  The  Chan- 
nel in  particular  was  thickly  sown.  I  had  the 
unpleasant  experience  to  be  on  board  the  U.  S.  S. 
"Piqua,"  a  yacht  based  at  Brest,  when  that  vessel 
broke  down  along  the  edge  of  an  enormous  mine 
field  a  few  miles  East  of  Plymouth.  The  heavy 
wind  blew  us  into  the  thick  of  it,  and  we  were 
immediately  informed  by  the  shouts  of  the  men  on 
trawlers  that  we  were  in  danger,  a  fact  which  we 
already  knew  too  well.  Incidentally,  I  remember 
trying  to.  determine  .whereabouts  on  the  ship  I 
would  be  in  least  danger  should  we  come  to  grief. 
I  came  to  no  conclusions,  for  before  I  had  found 
such  a  place,  we  were  safely  out  on  the  other  side. 

Mine-fields  of  this  kind  accounted  for  many  sub- 
marines during  the  course  of  the  War.  They  were, 
of  course,  not  removable  by  the  Germans,  as  they 
were  in  waters  controlled  by  the  British,  just  as 
the  German  mine-fields  in  the  Skagerrak,  North  of 
Denmark,  were  unremovable  by  the  British.  The 


70  SIMSADUS 

enemy  usually  discovered  the  location  of  the  Brit- 
ish fields,  but  this  did  not  help  him  much,  for  a  sub- 
marine commander,  once  cognizant  of  a  mine-field 
in  the  vicinity,  was  sure  to  be  very  careful.  Other 
mine-fields  were  sown  in  the  North  Sea  in  large 
quantities,  but  these,  though  they  did  prove  effec- 
tive, did  not  prevent  submarines  from  passing  out 
into  the  high  sea.  And  this  is  what  the  Naval  Au- 
thorities finally  decided  the  barrage  from  Scotland  to 
Norway  would  accomplish. 

All  the  mines  used  up  to  this  time  had  been  of  the 
"contact"  type,  which  means  that  the  mine  ex- 
ploded when  struck  by  a  ship.  On  the  outside  of  the 
mine  there  were  four  or  five  pins  about  eight  inches 
long;  when  one  of  these  was  struck,  as  by  the  side  of 
a  ship,  it  was  driven  into  the  interior,  the  mine 
exploded.  There  were  other  types  of  "contact" 
mines,  the  detonating  apparatus  of  which  was  of  the 
same  principle  but  differently  carried  out,  in  that  in 
the  place  of  pins,  a  bar  on  the  top  of  the  mine,  would 
cause  the  explosion.  Mines  of  this  type  would  not  be 
really  satisfactory  in  the  proposed  scheme,  for  too 
many  would  have  to  be  laid.  There  were  also  those 
types  which  could  be  exploded  from  the  shore  by 
electricity,  but  these  also  would  not  answer  the 
purpose  in  such  a  broad  area.  What  was  wanted 
was  a  mine  whose  effective  radius,  or  radius  of  dan- 
ger, would  be  comparatively  large. 

When  America  declared  War  on  Germany,  many 
inventions  to  be  used  against  the  submarine  began 
to  pour  into  the  Navy  Department.  Among  these 


~c  r"  "^  *i 
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THE  NORTHERN  MINE  BARRAGE    71 

was  the  handiwork  of  one  Mr.  Ralph  C.  Brown,  of 
Winchester,  Mass.;  his  invention  was  exactly  the 
sort  of  mine  which  was  wanted  for  this  Northern 
Mine  Barrage.  The  principle  was  this:  Attached 
to  the  mine  were  four  or  five  very  fine  wires  about 
50  yards  long;  these  wires  were  light  enough  and  had 
sufficient  buoyancy  to  keep  them  from  sinking  and 
so  remained  extended  beneath  the  water,  stretch- 
ing with  the  current  or  in  all  directions  at  the  same 
depth  at  which  the  mine  was  placed.  Any  large 
steel  object,  such  as  a  ship,  coming  in  contact  with 
these  wires,  through  the  agency  of  an  electric  bat- 
tery in  the  mine,  would  set  an  electric  current 
in  motion,  which  would  explode  the  mine.  Too 
much  credit  can  never  be  given  Mr.  Brown  for  this 
invention,  for  it  made  the  Northern  Mine  Barrage 
possible. 

When  the  idea  of  laying  a  barrage  of  mines  from 
Scotland  to  Norway  was  taken  up  seriously  in  Novem- 
ber, 1917,  it  was  opposed  in  various  circles,  for  some 
regarded  it  not  unlike  a  Jules  Verne  yarn.  It  was  also 
argued  that  it  would  entail  terrific  expense  and  that 
perhaps  the  "game  would  not  be  worth  the  candle," 
or  that  it  would  be  almost  impossible;  Admiral 
Beatty,  himself,  opposed  it  on  the  grounds  that  it 
might  hamper  the  operations  of  the  Grand  Fleet, 
But  Admiral  Sims  and  those  who  believed  in  it,  by 
sticking  to  their  point  and  showing  the  possibilities 
of  the  scheme  and  its  potential  results,  won  out,  and 
plans  for  laying  the  largest  field  of  mines  of  which 
man  has  ever  dreamed  were  begun.  In  the  develop- 


72  SIMSADUS 

ment  of  the  plans,  a  discussion  arose  over  the  ex- 
act location  of  the  barrage.  Practically  all  agreed 
that  it  should  be  laid  between  the  most  Northern- 
point  of  Scotland  and  the  Norwegian  Coast,  but 
many  were  in  favor  of  leaving  an  open  passage 
of  30  miles  near  the  Scottish  Coast.  Admiral  Sims 
opposed  this  strongly,  for  he  argued  that  there 
would  be  no  object  in  spending  millions  of  pounds  or 
dollars  in  the  construction  of  a  mine-field  240  miles 
long,  and  then  in  that  mine-field  leaving  an  opening 
of  thirty  miles,  when  it  had  been  found  almost  impos- 
sible to  close  an  opening  twenty-one  miles  long,  such  as 
the  Dover  Straits.  He  said  that  if  patrol  vessels  with 
the  help  of  mines  could  not  shut  the  Dover  Straits 
to  enemy  submarines,  certainly  patrol  vessels  with- 
out the  help  of  mines,  could  not  close  this  thirty 
mile  gap.  This  point  became  a  matter  of  great 
discussion,  but  Admiral  Sims  forcibly  held  to  his  ideas 
and  won.  The  barrage  was  made  complete,  save  for 
an  opening  a  mile  wide,  near  the  Scotch  coast. 

It  may  be  recalled  that  in  February,  1918,  Rear- 
Admiral  Earle,  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  in 
the  Navy  Department,  refused  to  state  before  a 
Congressional  Committee  the  cause  for  millions 
of  dollars  worth  of  expenditures,  on  the  grounds  that 
such  information  was  of  too  secret  a  nature.  Ad- 
miral Earle  was  referring  to  the  expenditures  on  the 
construction  of  the  mines  for  the  Northern  Mine 
Barrage.  The  mines  were  constructed  in  this  coun- 
try for  the  simple  reason  that,  with  the  extreme 
shortage  of  labor  in  England,  America  could  turn 


THE  NORTHERN  MINE  BARRAGE    73 

them  out  much  faster.  Over  100,000  were  made  and 
shipped  to  Scotland,  where  they  were  dumped  along 
the  rocky  shores  of  Inverness  and  Invergordon,  two 
little  towns  on  the  Western  coast  of  Scotland, 
which  were  to  become  the  United  States  Naval 
Mine  Force  Bases  in  the  North  Sea.  Eleven  old 
coastwise  vessels  in  this  country  were  converted 
into  the  latest  types  of  mine-laying  vessels,  and 
sent  to  Europe;  upon  their  arrival  in  the  North  Sea, 
they  were  placed  under  the  command  of  Rear- 
Admiral  Strauss,  U.  S.  N. 

Great  interest  was  manifested  in  all  Naval  circles 
concerning  this  barrage.  Would  it  bottle  up  the 
submarine,  and  if  it  did,  would  it  make  the  sub- 
marine warfare  a  thing  of  the  past  for  the  remainder 
of  this  war?  This  question  was  never  answered,  for 
the  Armistice  cut  short  the  mine-laying  operations 
before  any  definite  conclusions  could  be  reached  but 
it  was  productive  of  good  results,  as  is  shown  by  the 
final  count  of  submarines  sunk  and  injured  in  their 
endeavors  to  pass  its  mesh.  Six  were  destroyed  in 
it,  perhaps  more,  and  another  seventeen  were  turned 
back  because  injured. 

One  phase  of  this  great  operation,  which  must  not 
be  forgotten,  is  the  size  of  the  task  and  the  hero- 
ism of  the  men  who  laid  the  barrage  and  of  those 
who  swept  it  up.  The  American  and  British  mine- 
laying  vessels  used  to  proceed  to  sea  in  these  mine- 
laying  excursions  under  cover  of  one  or  two  squad- 
rons of  the  Grand  Fleet  as  a  protection  against 
enemy  assault.  The  various  parts  of  the  mines  were 


74  SIMSADUS 

assembled  at  the  base  and  when  placed  on  board 
the  mine-laying  vessels  were  ready  for  deposit  in 
the  sea.  The  actual  laying  of  a  string  of  5000  mines 
only  require  a  few  hours.  Operations  were  com- 
menced on  June  8,  1918,  and  thereafter  fourteen  ex- 
cursions had  taken  place,  the  last  occurring  on  Oc- 
tober 25.  The  total  number  of  mines  laid  up  to 
November  ist,  was  a  little  over  70,000  of  which 
56,000  or  80%  had  been  laid  by  our  Forces,  and  the 
remainder  by  the  British. 

As  to  the  heroism  of  the  men  who  laid  this  bar- 
rage, too  much  cannot  be  said.  Commander  Bab- 
cock,  U.  S.  N.,  Admiral  Sims'  Aide,  used  to  say, 
"  Those  fellows  up  there  in  Scotland  are  living  on 
the  edge  of  eternity,"  and  the  statement  was  true, 
for  if  anything  had  ever  exploded  one  of  these  mines, 
and  there  were  thousands  of  them  scattered  along 
the  shore,  probably  the  whole  Northern  end  of 
Scotland  would  have  been  destroyed;  the  explosion 
at  Halifax  in  the  Winter  of  1918  would  not  have 
been  in  the  same  category  at  all.  Or  if  one  mine 
:  inside  a  ship  had  exploded,  and  each  ship  carried 
tseven  or  eight  hundred  of  them,  the  vessel  would 
probably  have  disappeared  in  fifteen  seconds.  How- 
ever, the  human  mind  becomes  accustomed  to  fear 
very  rapidly  and  calloused  to  all  thoughts  of  dan- 
ger. One  officer  said  that  when  the  task  of  laying 
this  barrage  commenced,  an  unnecessary  cough 
from  any  of  the  Navy  personnel  was  almost  a 
court-martial  offence,  but  that  after  a  few  months, 
the  striking  of  a  match  on  the  side  of  one  of  these 


THE  NORTHERN  MINE  BARRAGE    75 

mines  was  an  everyday  occurrence.  No  loss  of 
life  occurred  in  this  operation  through  premature 
explosions;  one  ship  which  was  carrying  mines  from 
America  to  Scotland,  the  "Lakemoor,"  was  detroyed. 
The  degree  of  success*  of  this  barrage  will  always 
be  open  to  argument,  for  it  cannot  be  said  that  the 
barrage  entirely  closed  the  North  Sea  as  an  exit  for 
German  submarines  to  the  Atlantic,  because  in  all 
mine  fields,  and  particularly  one  of  this  size,  holes 
and  leaky  passages  will  always  occur;  but  it  can  be 
said  that  the  moral  and  material  results  of  the  few 
months'  trial  gave  every  promise  of  success.  It  was 
a  powerful  weapon  in  the  hands  of  the  Allies,  not 
as  the  chief  means  of  defeating  the  submarine,  but 
as  an  instrument  to  that  end. 

*  It  proved  sufficiently  successful  in  the  eyes  of  the  authorities  to 
warrant  the  construction  of  a  similar  barrage  between  Sicily  and  the 
coast  of  Africa,  plans  for  which  were  being  made  at  the  time  of  the 
Armistice. 


VII 
OTHER  ACTIVITIES 

LITTLE  has  been  said  so  far  about  the  submar- 
ine in  the  Mediterranean,  where  the  U-boat 
campaign  was  carried  on  just  as  persistently  as  in 
the  Atlantic  and  North  Sea.  The  submarine  bases 
in  the  Mediterranean  were  at  Pola  and  Cattaro,  on 
the  Eastern  shores  of  the  Adriatic;  both  German  and 
Austrian  submarines  were  based  here.  The  Ger- 
man boats  were  usually  brought  into  the  Mediter- 
ranean by  way  of  the  Atlantic  and  the  Straits  of 
Gibraltar,  but  in  a  few  ca&es  submarines  had  been 
dismantled  at  a  German  North  Sea  base,  and  trans- 
ported by  rail  through  Germany  and  Austria.  The 
submarines  in  their  operations  were  favored  by  the 
physiography  of  the  Mediterranean,  which,  because 
of  its  limited  size  presented  many  different  areas  in 
which  traffic  was  congested.  The  ^Egean  Sea,  the 
waters  between  the  South  Coast  of  Spain  and  Africa, 
East  of  Gibraltar,  and  between  Cap  Bon — the 
Southwestern  point  of  Sicily — and  Tunis,  are  exam- 
ples of  such  areas.  Trade  routes  were  well  es- 
tablished and  difficult  to  alter  without  lengthening 
considerably  the  voyages  of  the  convoys.  But  though 
these  facts  favored  the  enemy,  the  Allies  had  one 
great  advantage  on  their  side.  Every  submarine, 
to  gain  access  to  or  from  the  Mediterranean,  had  to 

76 


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OTHER  ACTIVITIES  77 

pass  through  the  narrow  Straits  of  Otranto,  be- 
tween the  heel  of  Italy  and  the  Island  of  Corfu. 
These  Straits  were  very  narrow,  and  presented  the 
same  anti-submarine  tactical  opportunities  as  the 
Dover  Straits. 

The  anti-submarine  campaign  in  1917  in  the  Med- 
iterranean was  being  handled  by  the  Navies  of  four 
nations;  England,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan.  The 
arrival  of  the  U.  S.  ships  at  Gibraltar  introduced  a 
fifth  combatant.  The  American  vessels  worked  in 
unison  with  the  British  vessels  at  Gibraltar,  but 
other  than  this  there  was  little  cooperation.  The 
Allied  Naval  Council  eventually  placed  the  British 
Admiral  at  Malta  in  command  of  all  operations, 
after  much  effort  and  success  had  been  lost  through 
the  lack  of  unity  of  command.  As  soon  as  coopera- 
tion was  thus  established,  earnest  attempts  were 
made  to  close  the  Otranto  Straits  to  submarines. 
Heretofore,  Naval  vessels  of  France  and  Italy  and 
Great  Britain  had  been  stationed  on  the  Italian 
coast,  working  along  the  barrage  of  nets  and  mines. 
After  the  establishment  of  unity  of  command,  all 
nations  were  asked  to  send  more  ships  to  the  Straits; 
England  immediately  sent  down  one  hundred  drift- 
ers, vessels  equipped  with  listening  devices,*  but  not 
capable  of  rapid  manoeuvering,  and  France  sent  a 
few  destroyers;  Italy  claimed  that  her  smaller  vessels 
were  needed  with  her  Fleet.  The  French  and  Brit- 
ish vessels  did  excellent  work,  but  the  need  of  high- 
powered  small  ships,  equipped  with  listening  gear,*  was 

*  A  development  of  the  principle  of  the  old  submarine  Bell,  which  at 


78  SIMSADUS 

keenly  felt.  Admiral  Sims  was  one  of  the  first  to  ap- 
preciate this,  and  so  made  arrangements  to  send  the 
first  detachment  of  submarine  chasers,  to  arrive  from 
America,  to  the  Straits  of  Otranto.  Thirty-nine  of 
these  little  vessels  under  the  command  of  Captain 
C.  P.  Nelson,  U.  S.  N.,  along  with  their  Mother  ship, 
arrived  at  the  Island  of  Corfu  in  the  Straits  of  Ot- 
ranto, in  May,  1918. 

The  submarine  chaser  was  a  very  vicious-looking 
little  war  vessel  for  its  size.  Forward,  there  was 
mounted  a  three-inch  gun,  and  aft,  the  necessary  and 
elaborate  paraphernalia  for  launching  depth  charges; 
a  small  pilot  house  stood  just  forward  of  amid- 
ships, and  behind  this  the  mast,  at  the  top  of  which 
was  a  look-out's  nest;  a  wireless  was  also  rigged  from 
the  mast.  With  the  help  of  three  high-powered  gaso- 
line engines,  the  chaser  had  more  speed  at  its  dis- 
posal than  it  could  often  use.  It  was  manned  by 
two  officers  and  twenty-two  men. 

As  the  Island  of  Corfu  had  never  been  occupied  as 
a  Naval  base  before,  the  Americans  were  confronted 
with  the  task  of  converting  a  barren  and  uncivilized 
cove  into  a  modern  Naval  base.  This  work  was  ac- 
complished by  the  1000  officers  and  men  of  the  crews 
in  a  remarkably  short  time.  Shacks  for  Staff  offices, 
repair  ships,  barracks,  and  a  hospital,  all  had  to  be 
erected,  but  before  the  end  of  June  the  job  was 
completed,  and  the  Forces  were  ready  for  opera- 
tions. 

one  time  was  used  on  all  ships;  a  U-boat  running  submerged  could  be 
heard  with  these  instruments. 


OTHER  ACTIVITIES  79 

The  tactical  employment  of  the  submarine  chaser 
was  hunting  submarines  in  limited  areas,  with  hy- 
drophones and  listening  devices,  and  by  means  of 
these  ascertaining  the  submarine's  course,  speed, 
and  position.  When  it  was  definitely  located,  it  was 
attacked  with  depth  charges  according  to  certain 
doctrines.  The  mere  method  of  hunting  presented 
many  difficulties.  Listening  for  a  submarine,  a  new 
development  in  Naval  tactics,  required  a  trained  ear 
on  the  part  of  the  listener;  he  had  to  be  able  to  dis- 
tinguish the  peculiar  sound  of  a  "submarine  beat"* 
from  that  of  surface  craft,  and  learn  how  to  ascer- 
tain its  speed,  course,  etc.  Moreover,  one  chaser 
alone  could  not  accurately  fix  the  position  of  a  sub- 
marine; to  do  this  it  was  necessary  to  have  cross- 
bearings  from  other  chasers.  Accordingly,  the  train- 
ing of  the  personnel  in  their  particular  duties,  was 
one  of  the  first  tasks  to  be  accomplished.  It  can 
easily  be  seen  that  close  cooperation  between  the 
various  chasers  or  units  was  imperative;  they  had  to 
learn  to  listen  together  and  to  report  or  communi- 
cate the  results  of  their  listening  to  each  other  and 
thereby  establish  the  information  to  govern  their  at- 
tack. While  chasers  were  hunting,  it  was  also  neces- 
sary that  their  listeners  should  not  be  hampered  by 
other  craft  in  the  vicinity,  and  hence  listening  periods 
of  five  minutes  every  hour  were  established,  during 
which,  all  vessels  in  the  vicinity  stopped  their  engines 
to  give  the  chasers  a  chance  to  listen  for  the  enemy. 
In  order  to  prevent  the  submarine  from  learning  the 

*  The  noise  of  the  submarine  engine  and  propeller  turning  over. 


8o  SIMSADUS 

time  set  for  these  periods,  during  which  its  engines 
could  be  stopped,  and  between  which  they  could  be 
run,  these  periods  were  different  every  day.  As  long 
as  the  submarine  was  ignorant  of  the  exact  five  min- 
utes of  the  hour  designated  for  listening,  it  would 
continue  to  run,  and  be  the  only  noise  heard,  and 
hence  traceable  by  the  chasers.  In  fact  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  sub-chasers  had  a  great  deal  to  learn, 
but  they  took  to  their  work  enthusiastically  and 
soon  attained  great  efficiency. 

The  first  "hunt"  at  the  Island  of  Corfu  took  place 
in  the  latter  part  of  June,  1918,  and  from  then  until 
the  Armistice,  at  least  three  units,  usually  four  or  five 
(three  vessels  in  a  unit)  were  out  hunting  day  and 
night.  A  hunt  ordinarily  lasted  from  four  to  six  days, 
during  which  time  the  chances  of  at  least  hearing  a 
submarine,  or  of  perhaps  getting  one,  were  always 
good.  These  chasers  carried  out  more  than  32  "hunts" 
and  had  some  very  favorable  results.  In  other  words, 
from  the  middle  of  June  until  hostilities  ceased,  by 
means  of  the  smallest  war  craft  in  modern  use  oper- 
ating 4000  miles  from  their  home  waters,  these 
chasers  maintained  a  constant  and  tireless  watch  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Adriatic,  by  which  all  enemy  sub- 
marines sought  access  to  the  Mediterranean.  They 
were  rewarded  in  their  work;  one  submarine  was 
"sunk,"  while  others  were  probably  shaken  up  or 
sufficiently  damaged  to  make  the  submarine  com- 
manders abhor  the  passage  in  and  out  of  the  Ad- 
riatic. 

The  most  spectacular  operation  of  the  chasers  was 


OTHER  ACTIVITIES  8t 

the  attack  on  Durazzo  *  in  which  British  and  Ital- 
ian warships  and  American  chasers  took  part.  The 
purpose  of  the  attack  was  to  destroy  the  enemy  prop- 
erty at  Durazzo  and  thereby  make  the  place  untenable 
as  an  Austrian  base.  At  noon  on  October  2nd,  1918, 
the  sub-chasers  got  under  way  to  join  the  Brit- 
ish and  Italian  Forces,  whence  they  proceeded  en- 
semble to  the  point  of  attack.  The  eleven  chasers, 
under  command  of  Captain  C.  P.  Nelson,  U.  S.  N., 
were  to  act  as  fringes  to  the  main  attacking  party. 
On  nearing  the  enemy's  coast,  all  ships  came  under 
the  fire  of  the  coastal  batteries,  and  several  of  the 
big  vessels  were  hit;  but  the  chasers,  by  means  of 
skilful  zigzagging  and  by  keeping  first  inside,  and 
then  beyond  the  range  of  the  enemy's  guns,  escaped 
without  casualties.  While  this  was  enough  excite- 
ment for  any  of  the  young  crews,  none  of  whom  had 
ever  been  under  fire  before,  a  submarine  with  its 
periscope  showing,  added  the  choice  bit.  Chaser  No. 
215  opened  fire  at  once,  and  by  good  shooting  forced 
the  submarine  to  submerge.  Chasers  No.  215  and 
No.  128  then  joined  in  the  attack,  dropped  their 
depth  charges  right  above  the  spot  where  the  U- 
boat  was  seen  to  submerge.  A  moment  later,  sub- 
chaser No.  129  sighted  another  submarine  contem- 
plating malice.  This  U-boat  submerged  at  once, 
but  then  reappeared  a  short  distance  away  from 
sub-chaser  No.  129,  which  ran  towards  it.  She 
dropped  two  depth  charges  in  a  position  right  over 
the  submarine,  but  without  success,  for  a  few  mo- 

*  On  the  Eastern  coast  of  the  Adriatic. 


82  SIMSADUS 

ments  later  the  periscope  reappeared  and  then  sub- 
merged slowly.  Chaser  No.  1 29  again  ran  straight  for 
it  and  when  directly  over  it,  let  go  one  depth  charge 
and  then  two  more. 

In  the  meantime  the  engagement  continued.  The 
encounters  with  the  submarines  were  over,  and  there 
was  more  work  to  be  done.  At  the  entrance  to  the 
harbor,  Chaser  No.  130  sighted  two  floating  mines, 
one  of  which  she  destroyed  by  gun-fire;  the  other 
she  approached  just  ahead  of  English  destroyers 
which  were  following  her  at  thirty  knots,  causing 
them  to  sheer  off  to  the  right  and  pass  out  of  harm's 
way. 

The  success  of  the  engagement  is  well  known.  All 
the  enemy  boats  in  the  harbor  were  either  sunk  or 
crippled,  and  the  base  rendered  useless  for  Naval 
or  military  purposes  to  the  enemy. 

AT  PLYMOUTH 

Soon  after  the  arrival  of  the  chasers  at  Corfu,  an- 
other detachment  arrived  at  Plymouth.  Their  work 
was  to  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  Corfu  chasers,  the 
actual  detail  of  which  has  already  been  described. 
In  this  new  form  of  anti-submarine  warfare,  in  which 
submarines  were  hunted  by  means  of  listening  gear, 
a  great  deal  of  experiment  and  development  was 
necessary.  The  principle  behind  it  was  based  on  the 
fact  that  beneath  the  water,  noises  are  audible  in 
the  form  of  vibrations;  thus  with  an  electric  appara- 
tus, not  unlike  the  principle  of  the  wireless,  the  noise 


OTHER  ACTIVITIES  83 

or  vibration  of  a  submarine's  propeller  against  the 
water  can  be  heard;  and  by  means  of  another  sensi- 
tive instrument,  a  direction  finder,  which  would  show 
the  direction  whence  the  noise  came,  the  submarine 
could  be  followed,  located,  and  attacked  with  depth 
charges. 

Admiral  Sims  in  June  ordered  Captain  Leigh,  U. 
S.  N.,  from  his  headquarters  in  London  to  Plymouth 
to  help  in  the  vast  experimental  work  on  listening 
devices  which  the  British  were  carrying  on.  There 
were  several  different  forms  of  these  devices,  none  of 
which  were  perfectly  satisfactory,  but  one  of  which 
it  was  hoped  could  be  developed  to  a  state  of  reliance. 
This  work  was  carried  on  all  during  the  Spring  and 
Summer  of  1918,  and  though  in  this  time  the  effi- 
ciency and  the  reliability  of  listening  devices  were 
improved,  there  was  still  much  to  be  desired.  Cap- 
tain Leigh's  services  were  of  great  value  in  this 
work.  In  July  two  American  destroyers,  the  U.  S.  S. 
"Aylwyn"  and  the  U.  S.  S.  "Parker"  were  ordered 
to  Plymouth  and  Queenstown,  to  serve  as  the  flag- 
ships of  the  units  when  hunting.  Commander  Gotten, 
U.  S.  N.,  was  in  charge  of  the  operations. 

As  to  the  work  of  the  chasers  at  Plymouth,  a  few 
items  of  interest  show  what  fine  work  they  really 
accomplished.  In  the  course  of  their  attacks  they 
damaged  three  submarines,  one  of  which  was  the 
famous  U-53,  which,  it  will  be  remembered,  in  the 
Summer  of  1916  put  into  Newport;  when  it  pro- 
ceeded to  sea  again,  it  sank  several  English  vessels  a 
few  miles  off  our  coast.  But  the  offensive  strength 


84  SIMSADUS 

of  these  hunting  units  was  not  their  only  tactical 
value;  they  also  had  protective  strength,  for  the 
mere  presence  of  vessels  equipped  with  listening  gear 
tended  to  keep  the  submarines  away.  Submarines 
were  also  equipped  with  listening  gear,  and  though 
they  could  hear  and  follow  the  movements  of  sur- 
face vessels,  they  preferred  not  to  become  too  famil- 
iar with  such  units.  Plymouth  and  its  vicinity 
were  favorite  areas  for  submarines,  for  five  sub- 
marines per  month  would  usually  visit  this  region. 
In  May,  before  the  chasers  began  to  operate,  there 
were  sixty-five  sightings  of,  sinkings  by,  and  attacks  by, 
submarines  within  100  miles  of  Plymouth.  In  July, 
after  they  had  been  operating  for  two  months,  there 
were  only  forty-five  sightings  of,  sinkings  by,  and  at- 
tacks by,  submarines  within  the  same  distance  of 
Plymouth.  This  shows  that  the  presence  of  these 
hunting  units  in  certain  areas  tended  to  keep  the  sub- 
marines away.  As  the  months  went  by,  submarine 
activity  in  the  Channel  became  less  and  less. 

OTHER  ACTIVITIES 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Admiral  Sims  had 
given  help  to  the  Allied  Navies  in  two  ways:  first, 
by  fighting  the  submarine,  and  then  by  strength- 
ening the  Allied  Naval  position  as  a  whole.  In 
the  execution  of  the  former  he  had  placed  Ameri- 
can destroyers  at  Queenstown,  Brest,  and  Gibraltar, 
and  submarine  chasers  at  Corfu  and  Plymouth;  he 
also  was  having  the  American  Mine  Forces  lay  80% 
of  the  Northern  mine  barrage.  In  the  execution  of 


23 
o 


QJ 

en   i- 
u,    O 


OTHER  ACTIVITIES  85 

the  latter  he  despatched  dreadnaughts  to  the  Brit- 
ish Grand  Fleet  in  the  North  Sea,  and  stationed 
three  more  at  Bantry  Bay  as  a  protection  against 
raiders.  There  were  other  ways  in  which  he  directed 
the  activities  of  our  Forces  in  Europe  to  the  great- 
est advantage;  he  established  a  base  at  the  Azores 
and  placed  submarines  at  Bantry  Bay.  In  the 
Spring  of  1918  he  dispatched  a  cruiser  to  Murmansk, 
Russia;  during  the  summer  he  operated  seventy-four 
cargo  carriers  which  carried  coal  from  Cardiff  to 
France  for  the  Army,  and  finally,  he  developed  a  series 
of  Naval  Aviation  bases  in  France,  England,  Ireland, 
and  Italy. 

In  the  Fall  of  1917,  four  submarines  and  a  few 
yachts  and  mine  sweepers  were  ordered  to  the  Azore 
Islands  under  Rear-Admiral  Dunn,  U.  S.  N.,  and  a 
base  was  established  at  Ponta  del  Gada.  The  Azore 
Islands,  situated  as  they  are  almost  in  the  centre  of 
the  Atlantic  Ocean,  offered  a  most  desirable  local- 
ity for  an  Allied  Naval  base.  Ships,  in  transit  from 
America  to  Europe,  in  need  of  more  fuel  or  minor 
repairs  could  put  in  to  Ponta  del  Gada  and  there  re- 
ceive whatever  attention  was  necessary.  The  Azores 
are  among  the  scattered  possessions  of  Portugal, 
and  though  Portugal  had  joined  in  the  War  on  the 
side  of  the  Allies,  up  to  the  time  of  our  participa- 
tion, no  attempts  had  been  made  to  establish  a  base 
there.  It  was  not  probable,  but  possible,  that  if  the 
Allies  did  not  have  a  base  at  the  Azores,  the  Germans 
would  want  one  there  for  raiders;  it  was  further- 
more possible  that  Germany's  large  cruiser  sub- 


86  SIMSADUS 

marines  might  attempt  to  use  the  Islands  as  a  rest- 
ing place.  To  prevent  this,  Admiral  Sims  ordered 
four  American  submarines  of  the  K-type  and  some 
yachts  and  mine-sweepers  to  Ponta  del  Gada.  Their 
duty  was  chiefly  that  of  patrol,  which  often  became 
very  irksome  for  only  one  submarine  would  visit 
this  region  each  month  and  then  only  for  a  few  days. 
A  great  deal  of  the  shipping  bound  from  America  to 
Gibraltar,  or  vice-versa,  in  passing  the  Azores  oc- 
casionally would  ask  for  an  escort,  which  of  course 
was  always  provided.  The  chief  value  of  this  base, 
however,  was  as  an  aid  to  Allied  shipping  rather 
than  as  a  means  of  fighting  the  submarine;  many 
American  destroyers,  the  submarine  chasers,  yachts, 
mine-sweepers,  and  sea-going  tugs,  which  came  to 
Europe,  found  the  facilities  extended  to  the  Azores 
of  great  value. 

In  the  Spring  of  1918,  Admiral  Sims  ordered  the 
U.  S.  S.  "Olympia,"  an  old  cruiser  and  veteran  of 
Spanish  War  days,  to  Murmansk,  Russia.  Mur- 
mansk is  situated  on  the  Archangel  Coast,  facing 
the  White  Sea.  This  vessel  was  to  help  the  various 
British  vessels  in  that  region  in  their  patrol  of  the 
White  Sea,  through  which  all  Allied  shipping  des- 
tined to  aid  the  anti-Bolshevik  Forces  had  to  pass. 
Upon  the  arrival  of  the  "Olympia,"  her  Command- 
ing Officer,  Captain  McCully  U.  S.  N.,  in  company 
with  the  British,  took  over  the  control  of  two  or 
three  Russian  destroyers,  which  were  lying  there 
idle,  and  of  no  use  to  anybody.  Guard  duty  was 
the  "Olympiads"  chief  task  though  on  one  or  two 


OTHER  ACTIVITIES  87 

occasions  her  crew  was  sent  ashore  to  quiet  or  pre- 
vent local  Bolshevik  risings. 

In  the  Fall  of  1917  seven  American  submarines 
were  ordered  to  Europe  and  stationed  at  Bantry 
Bay,  Ireland.  British  submarines  had  been  used 
against  German  submarines  and  their  services  had 
been  of  great  value.  Admiral  Sims  saw  that  a 
flotilla  of  American  submarines  would  be  of  value 
at  Bantry  Bay,  the  Southwestern  point  of  Ireland, 
past  which,  German  submarines  inward  or  outward 
bound  by  way  of  the  North  of  Scotland  to  the 
coast  of  France,  had  to  pass.  In  order  to  prevent 
Allied  ships  attacking  Allied  submarines,  systems  of 
recognition  signals  were  established,  by  means  of 
which,  the  Allied  submarine  could  immediately 
make  its  nationality  known.  The  destroyers  were 
kept  informed  of  the  patrol  areas  of  these  sub- 
marines, and  whenever  a  submarine  was  sighted 
in  such  an  area,  the  destroyer's  Officer  was  careful 
before  he  attacked.  On  one  occasion,  two  American 
destroyers  attacked,  and  very  badly  damaged,  the 
British  submarine  L-2,  though  no  loss  of  life  occurred. 

The  most  interesting  encounter  with  the  enemy 
experienced  by  these  American  boats,  was  the  case 
of  the  U.  S.  AL-4  on  July  10,  1918.  The  AL-4, 
under  Lt.  Commander  Forster,  was  patrolling  the 
waters  off  Bantry  Bay,  when  a  submarine  was 
sighted  ahead  and  a  little  to  the  left.  The  AL-4 
submerged,  proceeded  towards  the  enemy  submar- 
ine, and  while  thus  engaged,  heard,  by  means  of 
listening  devices,  another  German  submarine  to 


88  SIMSADUS 

starboard.  Lieutenant  Commander  Forster  turned 
his  periscope  towards  the  origin  of  the  sound  of  the 
second  submarine,  but  could  see  nothing:  a  moment 
later  a  loud  explosion  took  place  where  the  first 
submarine  had  been  sighted.  Nothing  more  was 
seen  or  heard.  For  a  month  or  so  after  this  in- 
cident, nothing  could  be  learned  of  the  cause  of  the 
explosion;  later  it  was  discovered  that  the  sec- 
ond German  submarine  had  fired  a  torpedo  at  the 
AL-4,  and  this,  missing  its  mark,  had  continued  on 
its  course,  striking  the  first  German  submarine  and 
sinking  it.  This  is  one  of  the  few  occasions  in  the 
whole  submarine  war  in  which  two  German  sub- 
marines were  seen  together,  and  on  this  occasion 
the  presence  of  these  two  was  accidental,  for  one 
was  bound  south  and  the  other  north.  It  was  not 
-their  custom  to  operate  in  pairs. 

The  task  of  our  submarines  was  very  difficult, 
particularly  so,  because  of  their  age;  but  they  stuck 
to  their  tasks  despite  machinery  troubles,  and  forced 
;the  German  submarines,  when  passing  the  South- 
-western point  of  Ireland,  to  keep  a  good  distance  out 
io  sea,  away  from  congested  areas. 

.Another  seat  of  United  States  Naval  operations  in 
Europe  was  Cardiff,  Wales.  In  January,  1918,  Com- 
mander J.  N.  Jeffers,  U.  S.  N.,  was  detached  from  the 
U.  S.  S.  "Leviathan,"  of  which  he  was  Executive 
Officer,  and  ordered  to  Cardiff,  a  sea  coast  town  in 
the  coal  mine  region  of  Wales.  His  mission  was  to 
organize  a  Naval  base  from  which  coal  could  be 
transported  to  France.  Many  British  vessels  were 


OTHER  ACTIVTIES  89 

based  at  Cardiff,  but  as  the  demands  for  coal  grew, 
occasioned  by  the  influx  of  the  American  Army, 
more  vessels  were  needed.  Admiral  Sims  answered 
General  Pershing's  request  for  more  coal  by  estab- 
lishing this  base  at  Cardiff,  and  cargo  ships  con- 
structed in  America  were  sent  there  and  employed  in 
what  was  known  as  the  Army  Coal  Trade.  The 
Officers  and  men  of  these  vessels  were  all  of  the 
Naval  Reserve  Force.  In  September,  1918,  though 
Commander  Jeffers  had  been  made  a  Captain,  the 
duties  and  work  of  the  base  had  expanded  so  greatly 
that  it  was  necessary  to  place  an  Admiral  in  com- 
mand; Rear-Admiral  Andrews,  U.  S.  N.,  was  selected 
for  this  position.  At  the  time  of  the  Armistice,  74 
vessels  were  in  service  at  Cardiff  and  were  employed 
regularly  in  carrying  coal  to  Havre,  Cherbourg,  Brest, 
and  the  Western  French  Ports. 

An  American  Naval  Aviation  Unit  was  the  first 
American  Aviation  Unit  to  land  in  Europe.  The 
principal  United  States  Naval  Aviation  Bases  later 
established  were  at  Killingholme,  England;  Wexford, 
Lough  Foyle,  and  Queenstown,  Ireland;  and  Dun- 
kirk and  Brest,  France.  There  were  also  many  other 
Stations  along  the  West  Coast  of  France,  but  these 
were  generally  smaller,  and  many  of  them  were  fly- 
ing schools.*  The  two  most  interesting  bases  to 
study  were  those  of  Killingholme  and  Dunkirk. 

Killingholme,  on  the  East  coast  of  England,  a  few 

*  Captain  H.  I.  Cone  was  in  command  of  our  Naval  Aviation 
Units  in  Europe;  Lieutenant  Commander  Atley  Edwards  was  Ad- 
miral Sims  Aid  for  Aviation.  I  have  but  touched  lightly  upon  Naval 
Aviation,  because  I  had  very  little  contact  with  it. 


90  SIMSADUS 

miles  from  Hull,  was  the  largest  of  any  of  our  Sta- 
tions. Its  work  was  wholly  that  of  aerial  patrol  in  the 
North  Sea,  in  seaplanes  and  blimps.  Aerial  escort 
duties  formed  no  small  part  in  helping  the  han- 
dling of  convoys  within  25  miles  of  land,  for  a  sub- 
marine beneath  the  water  could  be  seen  by  an  aero- 
plane long  before  any  destroyers  would  know  of  its 
presence.  On  one  occasion,  on  August  10,  1918, 
Ensign  Schieffelin,  while  reconnoitering  above  the 
waters  to  be  traversed  by  a  convoy,  sighted  a  dark 
object  beneath  the  surface  of  the  sea.  He  signalled 
to  destroyers  and  then  dropped  bombs  very  close  to 
the  submarine.  The  destroyers  came  up  and, 
though  they  could  not  see  it,  attacked  it  and  in- 
jured it.  Eight  hours  later,  this  injured  submarine, 
which  found  manoeuvering  extremely  difficult,  was 
attacked  again  by  destroyers  and  sunk.  This  is  one 
of  the  many  illustrations  in  which  the  aeroplane  or 
sea  plane  has  been  of  infinite  value  in  convoy  duty. 
The  value  of  the  aerial  escort  lay  in  detecting  the 
submarine's  presence  rather  than  as  a  weapon  by 
which  it  might  be  sunk.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  the  American  Naval  Aviators  at  Killingholme 
cooperated  as  one  organization  with  the  British. 

At  Dunkirk,  France,  there  were  located  the  head- 
quarters of  what  was  known  as  the  Northern  Bomb- 
ing Squadron.  This  unit  was  composed  of  Ameri- 
can Naval  Aviators  who  were  detailed  as  a  unit  of 
the  Royal  Air  Force  at  the  Front.  Their  work 
was  hampered  in  one  way  or  another  by  the  non- 
delivery of  planes,  or  such  similar  incidents,  but 


OTHER  ACTIVITIES  91 

Captain  Hanrahan,  U.  S.  N.,  who  was  in  command 
of  the  unit,  realizing  this  fact,  lost  no  time  in  ex- 
tending the  services  of  his  young  aviators  to  the 
Royal  Air  Force.  As  a  part  of  that  greatest  Air 
Force  in  the  War  they  carried  out  some  excellent 
bombing  expeditions  into  the  enemy's  territory.  In 
September,  1918,  the  Northern  Bombing  Squadron, 
upon  the  receipt  of  a  sufficient  number  of  machines, 
began  to  operate  as  a  distinct  unit.  By  this  time 
the  British  Army  was  forcing  the  German  retreat 
through  Flanders  and  bombing  expeditions  lost  much 
of  their  strategical  value;  but,  on  the  night  of  October 
I,  the  squadron  bombed  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend,  as  the 
Germans  were  evacuating  these  towns.  Unfortu- 
nately, the  work  of  the  Northern  Bombing  Squadron, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  mine  barrage  and  the  chasers  at 
Queenstown,  Ireland,  was  cut  short  by  the  Armistice 
before  operations  were  really  developed  on  a  large 
scale.  In  fact  the  Armistice  upset  a  great  many 
plans  and  spoiled  many  enterprises. 

THE  NAVAL  GUN  BATTERIES 

In  December,  1917,  the  Navy  Department  in- 
formed the  British  War  Office  that  the  Naval  Bureau 
of  Ordnance  could  supply  fourteen-inch  guns  for  use  in 
the  British  Army.  The  War  Office,  in  that  it  had  guns 
of  a  large  calibre  in  use  behind  the  British  front,  de- 
clined the  offer  and  said  that  they  could  be  used  more 
profitably  in  some  other  sector.  The  Department 
then  offered  them  to  General  Pershing.  He  immedi- 
ately accepted  them  and  asked  that  they  be  prepared 


92  SIMSADUS 

and  shipped  to  France  at  the  earliest  possible  mo- 
ment. These  guns  were  to  be  mounted  on  railway 
trucks,  and  each  gun  was  to  be  a  self-sustaining  unit, 
consisting  of  eight  cars  and  a  locomotive.  The  guns 
had  been  made  for  the  American  battle  cruisers,  but 
as  construction  on  these  vessels  had  not  yet  com- 
menced, it  was  thought  best  that  these  enormous 
fourteen-inch  50  calibre  guns  be  made  to  serve  some 
purpose  in  the  War.  Contracts  were  placed  with  the 
Baldwin  Locomotive  Works  and  the  Standard  Steel 
Car  Company  for  the  construction  of  the  train,  and 
by  April,  one  complete  unit  was  ready  for  testing.  In 
the  meantime  the  Navy  Department  had  issued  orders 
to  all  large  Naval  Training  Stations  to  select  a  certain 
number  of  picked  men  to  serve  on  a  mission  of  special 
importance  and  desirability.  The  selection  of  these 
men  was  one  of  the  most  interesting  features  of  the 
development  of  the  batteries.  Each  battery  train  was 
to  have  a  complement  of  forty-one  men,  who,  in  order 
to  be  of  the  most  use,  had  to  be  "  jacks-of-all-trades." 
On  May  15,  General  Pershing  was  informed  that 
the  railway  batteries  were  completed  and  they  were 
shipped  to  St.  Nazaire;  by  the  middle  of  August 
they  were  in  use  at  the  Front.  Their  first  duty 
was  to  fire  at  the  famous  German  long-range  gun, 
which  had  been  shelling  Paris,  but  the  long-range 
gun  moved  its  position  shortly  before  operations 
could  be  begun.  Nevertheless,  they  served  at  the 
Front  during  the  remaining  months  of  hostilities  and 
fired  a  total  of  646  rounds.  The  extreme  range  of 
these  guns  was  a  little  over  42,500  yards,  or  about 


eu    en    en      • 


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OTHER  ACTIVITIES  93 

twenty-eight  miles.  The  last  round  was  fired  on  No- 
vember n,  at  10:59  A.  M.,  one  minute  before  the 
cessation  of  hostilities.  After  the  Armistice,  Admiral 
Plunkett,  U.  S.  N.,  who  had  commanded  the  batteries, 
investigated  some  of  the  targets  at  which  the  guns 
had  fired  and  it  was  discovered  that  the  accuracy  at- 
tained was  equal  to  any  attained  during  the  War. 


VIII 

THE  SUBMARINES  OFF  THE  AMERICAN 
COAST 

ON  May  2,  1918,  Admiral  Sims  sent  a  cable  to  the 
Navy  Department  with  the  information  that  the 
U-I5I  was  en  route  to  America  and  might  be  ex- 
pected to  reach  the  Coast  about  May  24.  It  will 
be  recalled,  that  in  a  previous  discussion,  as  to 
the  advisability  of  sending  the  majority  of  patrol 
boats  on  the  American  Coast  to  Europe  in  the  Sum- 
mer of  1917,  it  was  pointed  out  that  there  was  no 
likelihood  that  submarines  would  attempt  a  trip  to 
the  American  Coast  for  some  time  to  come.  This 
statement  was  based  on  the  argument  that  it  was 
much  more  profitable  for  submarines  to  operate 
around  the  British  Isles  where  shipping  was  congested, 
than  along  an  extensive  coastline,  such  as  that  be- 
tween Newfoundland  and  Florida.  In  the  latter  part 
of  April,  Admiral  von  Capelle,  Chief  of  the  Ger- 
man Admiralty,  apparently  decided  to  send  sub- 
marines to  the  American  Coast.  The  significance  of 
this  new  submarine  policy  will  be  discussed  at  the 
end  of  the  chapter. 

On  May  15  the  U-I5I  was  in  34°  oo'  North,  and  56° 
oo'  West,*  and  ten  days  later  the  news  was  spread 
broadcast  throughout  the  United  States  that  a  sub- 

*About  900  miles  from  Cape  Cod. 
94 


SUBMARINES  OFF  THE  AMERICAN  COAST      95 

marine  was  off  the  Eastern  Coast,  and  so  it  was. 
From  then  on  until  September  1st,  submarines  were 
operating  off  our  Coast.  There  were  four  of  them  in 
all;  the  UK-is6  arrived  on  July  1st,  the  U-I4O  was 
the  third,  arriving  on  July  26,  and  the  U-II7  arrived 
on  August  8. 

The  UK-I56  first  revealed  itself  not  far  from  Nan- 
tucket  Light,  and  on  the  night  of  July  3d  off  Long 
Island,  laid  mines  which  sank  the  U.  S.  S.  "San 
Diego"  the  following  day.  It  then  proceeded  North 
by  way  of  Chatham  and  Cape  Cod  to  the  shores  of 
Nova  Scotia;  from  here  it  turned  South,  and  then 
turned  North  again  towards  Newfoundland  and 
started  for  home  July  31. 

The  UK-I4O  arrived  on  July  26,  and  spent  exactly 
one  month  in  American  waters.  It  cruised  up  and 
down  the  Coast  twice,  from  the  Delaware  Capes  to 
Chatham,  about  300  miles  from  shore,  but  was  dis- 
tinctly unfortunate  and  unsuccessful  in  its  "kills." 

The  U-II7,  a  large  mine-layer,  arrived  on  August  8 
off  Chatham,  laid  mines  off  New  York,  proceeded 
South  to  Barnegat,  where  it  laid  more,  and  then  con- 
tinued South  to  the  mouth  of  Chesapeake  Bay  and 
there  deposited  the  rest  of  its  mines.  The  total 
complement  of  mines  carried  by  the  U-ny  was  36, 
all  of  which  were  eventually  swept  up.  On  Septem- 
ber 2,  it  was  400  miles  out  to  sea,  homeward  bound. 

During  the  period  that  these  submarines  were  off 
our  Coast,  there  was  apparently  considerable  ex- 
citement over  spies,  involving  the  flashing  of  lights 
from  the  shore,  mysterious  boats  seen  at  sea,  and 


96  SIMSADUS 

the  danger  of  a  raid  from  aeroplanes.  There  is 
no  evidence  that  any  of  these  submarines  wished 
to  have,  or  ever  did  have,  any  communication 
with  the  shore,  and  still  less  was  there  ever  any 
chance  that  aeroplanes  could  have  been  launched 
from  the  submarines  and  have  raided  New  York 
City.  Just  how  the  fear  of  such  an  event  ever  got 
started  I  do  not  know,  for  why  should  aeroplanes 
have  been  launched  from  submarines  to  raid  the 
American  Coast,  when  they  had  never  been  launched 
from  submarines  to  raid  the  European  Coast?  It 
would  have  been  absolutely  impossible  for  these  sub- 
marines to  carry  on  board  an  aeroplane,  for  such 
an  article  would  have  required  too  much  room  inside 
the  submarine;  and  even  if  a  submarine  had  been 
made  expressly  for  this  purpose,  in  order  to  launch  it, 
it  would  have  been  necessary  to  completely  assemble 
it  on  the  high  seas. 

The  success  of  the  cruises  of  these  submarines  is 
undisputed.  During  July  and  August  they  sank  off 
the  American  Coast  about  20%  of  the  total  tonnage 
sunk  in  the  two  months.  However,  the  mere  fact 
that  they  ventured  over  here  was  an  admission  of 
failure  on  the  part  of  the  German  Naval  Authorities, 
for  it  meant  that  they  knew  that  their  U-boats  could 
not  keep  the  sinkings  up  to  a  high  mark  by  operating 
in  the  Eastern  Atlantic  alone.  In  other  words,  it 
showed  that  the  convoy  system  in  Europe  had  been 
successful,  for  these  submarines  could  have  spent  the 
amount  of  time  lost  in  transit  to  and  from  America, 
five  weeks  each  way,  far  more  profitably  in  the  waters 


SUBMARINES  OFF  THE  AMERICAN  COAST      97 

about  Great  Britain,  had  not  the  convoy  system 
protected  the  shipping  so  well.  One  reason,  perhaps, 
for  these  submarines  coming  to  America  was  to  sat- 
isfy the  German  people,  or  more  probably  give  the 
authorities  the  chance  to  inform  the  German  people 
that  German  submarines,  in  their  might  and  prow- 
ess, were  still  winning  the  War,  as  could  be  proved 
by  their  operations  on  the  American  Coast.  Never- 
theless, whatever  the  German  Authorities  may  have 
claimed,  the  sending  of  submarines  to  America 
was  an  admission  of  failure. 


IX 

SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS 

THERE  probably  has  been  no  more  misunder- 
stood phase  of  the  past  conflict  than  that  of 
submarine  operations.  A  submarine  campaign,  such 
as  Germany  carried  on,  was  a  new  departure  in 
Naval  Warfare,  and  the  citizen  had  nothing  but  im- 
agination upon  which  to  draw  in  his  version  of  its 
execution.  I  do  not  by  this  mean  to  imply  that  the 
submarine  war  was  less  cruel  than  commonly  sup- 
posed, for  that  would  not  be  a  fair  statement.  What 
I  do  mean,  however,  is  that  with  no  history  upon 
which  to  base  a  comprehension  of  the  U-boat  war, 
one's  only  sources  of  information  were  the  tales  of 
those  who  came  in  contact  with  it.  Stories  of  those 
crossing  to  France,  relating  how  their  ship  was  at- 
tacked by  seven  submarines  and  missed  by  four  tor- 
pedoes, how  four  of  the  submarines  were  sunk  and 
the  remainder  put  to  flight,  were  common.  From 
such  accounts  one  gathered  that  hundreds  of  submar- 
ines were  at  sea  at  one  time,  and  their  deportment 
not  unlike  that  of  porpoises.  Now  all  such  tales  were 
grossly  exaggerated,  and  I  can  say  with  assurance 
that  very  few  of  our  soldiers  ever  saw  a  submarine. 
A  short  study  of  submarine  operations  is  interesting, 
and  should  dispel  all  doubt  or  misconceptions  as  to  the 
true  facts.  Let  us  take  for  example  the  situation  on 

98 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  99 

August  i,  1918.  This  of  course  was  more  than  a  year 
after  we  had  come  into  the  War,  but  the  fundamentals 
of  operation  and  statistics  were  practically  the  same. 

On  August  I,  1918,  Germany  had  constructed  335 
submarines,  of  which  171  had  been  sunk;  164  were 
still  operating.*  There  were  four  different  types  of 
submarines,  and  each  was  particularly  adapted  to 
certain  services.  Of  the  164  f  remaining  for  service, 
nine  were  of  the  large  UK-type,  fifty  were  of  the 
U-type,  sixty-five  of  the  UB-type,  and  20  of  the  UC- 
type;  another  twenty  were  used  as  school  ships;  twenty 
of  these  German  boats  and  twenty-seven  Austrian 
were  based  in  the  Adriatic.  Deducting  the  twenty 
submarines  which  were  in  the  Mediterranean,  Ger- 
many had  a  total  of  144  submarines  J  available  for 
service  in  the  Atlantic. 

The  largest  German  submarines  constructed  were 
those  of  the  UK-type,  and  these  in  size  were  sur- 
passed only  by  the  British  K-class,  which  were 
driven  by  steam.  All  German  submarines  were 
driven  by  Diesel  engines  on  the  surface,  and  by  elec- 
tric batteries  and  motors  when  submerged.  These 
UK-boats  were  360  feet  in  length,  36  feet  from  keel 
to  conning  tower,  and  had  a  displacement  of  four 
thousand  tons  when  submerged.  A  fairly  good  idea 

*  Admiral  Von  Capelle  recently  said  that  Germany  constructed  817 
submarines  during  the  War.  His  statement  is  not  true. 

t  Exclusive  of  the  school  ships. 

J  The  origin  of  the  term  U-boat  is  from  the  German  "Unterseeboot." 
Thus  the  U-type  was  the  first  constructed.  The  later  types  were  called 
UB  and  UC,  and  UK,  the  "B"  and  the  "C"  and  "  K  "  being  merely 
the  designation  of  type. 


ioo  SIMSADUS 

of  their  size  can  be  gained  by  comparing  them  with  a 
cargo  ship,  the  average  displacement  of  which  is 
about  five  thousand  tons.  The  armament  consisted 
of  twenty  torpedoes,  thirty-six  mines,  eight  torpedo 
tubes,  and  a  six-inch  gun  fore  and  aft.  On  the  surface 
they  could  make  speed  of  fourteen  knots  and  when 
submerged  only  seven  or  eight.  Their  complement  of 
personnel  was  twelve  officers  and  eighty-eight  men. 
This  type  was  designed  and  used  for  long  cruises  in 
the  Atlantic  (two  of  them  visited  the  American  coast) ; 
they  could  stay  at  sea,  if  a  slow  speed  was  maintained, 
for  three  or  four  months. 

The  U-class  was  similar  to  but  smaller  than  the  UK- 
class;  boats  of  this  class  varied  in  size  according  to 
date  of  construction.  The  early  U-types  were  only 
of  800  tons  displacement,  the  later  were  of  1200  tons. 
The  speed  of  both  was  about  eleven  knots  on  the 
surface  and  six  knots  submerged.  The  smaller  boats 
carried  only  eight  torpedoes,  the  larger  twelve,  the 
armament  of  both  was  a  three  or  four-inch  gun  fore  and 
aft.  The  complement  of  these  vessels  was  thirty-two 
or  thirty-seven  officers  and  men.  Both  types  had  a 
cruising  radius  of  about  six  thousand  miles,  and  were 
usually  employed  in  the  waters  West  of  England  and 
of  France.  The  U-58,  which  was  sunk  by  the  U.  S.  S. 
"Fanning"  and  "Nicholson,"  was  one  of  the  smaller 
types  of  the  U-class. 

The  UB-boats  were  smaller  than  the  U-boats,  and 
had  a  displacement  varying  from  500  to  750  tons. 
They  were  armed  with  a  thirty-two-pounder  forward 
of  the  conning  tower,  and  carried  four  to  ten  torpedoes. 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  161 

Their  cruising  radius  varied  between  four  thousand 
and  six  thousand  miles;  they  were  usually  employed 
in  the  waters  about  Great  Britain,  and  were  not  de- 
signed or  constructed  for  deep-sea  duty.  The  third 
type,  the  UC-boats,  were  mine-layers,  and  of  less 
displacement  than  the  UB-type.  They  were  armed 
with  a  twenty-two-pounder  forward  of  the  conning 
tower,  and  carried  eighteen  mines,  which  they  would 
usually  lay  in  the  entrance  of  some  harbor  and  then 
return  to  their  base. 

The  average  number  of  submarines  in  the  waters 
about  Great  Britain  and  France,  per  day  during 
1917  and  1918,  was  about  twenty-one  or  twenty-two, 
though  this  average  sometimes  reached  as  high  as 
twenty-eight  and  other  times  as  low  as  sixteen.  It 
would  seem  that  twenty-two  submarines,  operating 
with  a  total  of  144  in  commission,  was  a  very  low  per- 
centage but  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  not.  The  wear 
and  strain  on  the  submarine's  machinery  and  person- 
nel was  so  great  that  it  was  usually  necessary  to  keep  a 
submarine  in  port  for  repairs,  overhauling,  and  rest, 
two  or  three  times  as  long  as  the  average  cruise.*  It 
speaks  well  for  the  machinery  and  efficiency  of  the  sub- 
marine flotilla  that  the  operating  number  remained  as 
high  and  as  steady  as  it  did.  The  average  twenty-two 
boats  thus  operating  would  be  located  generally  as  fol- 
lows. There  were  usually  three  operating  in  the  North 
Sea,  preying  upon  the  English  and  Scandinavian 

*  In  September,  1917,  Germany  made  a  great  effort  to  send  twice  as 
many  boats  to  sea  as  usual.  The  result  was  that  half  of  them  returned 
in  a  few  days,  because  they  were  not  really  in  good  condition. 


102   :  ...:>^    SIMSADUS 

traffic;  one  of  them  would  be  a  mine-layer  en  route  to, 
or  returning  from,  a  mine-laying  cruise  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Thames  or  to  the  Firth  of  Forth  or  to  a  similar 
point;  the  other  two  would  probably  be  UB-boats. 
Two  more  submarines,  one  probably  bound  for  its 
base,  the  other  for  a  cruise,  would  be  in  the  North 
Sea;  both  of  these  would  probably  be  U-boats. 
North  of  Scotland  and  Ireland  another  two,  perhaps 
both  U-boats  or  one  a  UK-boat,  would  be  bound 
in  or  out.  There  was  usually  one  of  the  UB-type  in 
the  Irish  Sea  and  the  Bristol  Channel.  South- 
west of  the  English  Channel,  where  all  lanes  of  ship- 
ping converge,  there  were  always  at  least  three 
U-boats  and  perhaps  more.  On  July  8,  1918,  there 
were  as  many  as  six  in  this  area.  Southwest  of 
Brest  and  along  the  coast  of  France  a  U-boat  and  a 
UC-boat  might  be  operating,  the  latter  laying  mines 
outside  the  harbors  of  the  West  coast  of  France.  Off 
the  coast  of  Spain,  or  further  West,  a  UK  was  usu- 
ally outward  or  inward  bound  from  the  middle  At- 
lantic or  the  waters  about  the  Azores.  The  accom- 
panying chart  gives  a  graphic  location  of  the  daily 
positions  of  submarines  as  might  have  been  seen 
on  a  large  map  at  Admiral  Sims'  headquarters  in 
London. 

I  know  that  the  reader  is  now  wondering  how 
submarine  positions  were  known,  how  their  move- 
ments were  followed  from  day  to  day,  and  how 
the  different  types  of  submarines  were  recognized 
as  being  in  this  or  that  area.  The  answer  is, 
by  the  splendid  work  of  the  British  Admiralty  In- 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  103 

telligence  Service,  under  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Regi- 
nald Hall.  This  department  of  the  Admiralty  had 
three  sources  of  information  about  submarines. 
First,  by  radio  direction  finders,  the  meaning  of 
which  will  be  explained  in  a  moment;  secondly,  by 
an  elaborate  system  of  agents  in  Germany  and  neu- 
tral countries,  and  thirdly  by  the  cross-examination 
of  the  survivors  of  submarines  sunk. 

The  presence  and  exact  position  of  the  majority 
of  submarines  at  sea  was  learned  every  night  by 
an  elaborate  system  of  radio  stations  along  the  coast. 
It  was  the  custom  of  submarines  to  communi- 
cate with  their  headquarters  in  Germany  almost 
nightly  by  wireless.  The  messages  were  always 
in  a  highly  secret  code,  and  might,  or  might  not, 
be  eventually  deciphered  by  the  Admiralty.  The 
chief  interest  in  them  was  the  opportunity  they 
afforded  to  locate  the  submarine  which  sent  the  mes- 
sage. Every  time  a  submarine  wirelessed  to  Ger- 
many, English  radio  stations  would  pick  up  the  mes- 
sage. The  wireless  instruments  at  the  stations  were 
equipped  with  an  apparatus  known  as  a  radio-direc- 
tion-finder by  which  the  direction  or  bearing  of  the 
origin  of  the  message  could  be  determined  to  a  frac- 
tion of  a  degree.  Each  station,  upon  receipt  of  such 
a  message,  would  immediately  telegraph  to  the  Ad- 
miralty in  London  the  exact  bearing  of  its  origin 
from  that  station.  In  order  to  illustrate  how  the 
submarine's  position  was  then  determined,  let  us 
take  an  imaginary  example. 

Wireless  stations  at  Land's  End,  Milford  Haven, 


104  SIMSADUS 

and  Queenstown,  have  all  sent  telegrams  to  the 
Admiralty  stating  that  a  submarine  at  eleven  o'clock 
at  night  communicated  with  Berlin,  and  that  this 
submarine  was  in  a  position  bearing  due  West 
from  Land's  End,  Southwest  from  Milford  Haven, 
and  due  South  from  Queenstown;  these  bearings 
naturally  would  be  given  in  degrees  rather  than  in 
terms  of  West  and  Southwest.  When  this  informa- 
tion was  received  by  the  Admiralty,  the  officers 
there  on  duty  would  draw  lines  West  from  Land's 
End,  Southwest  from  Milford  Haven,  and  due 
South  from  Queenstown,  and  where  those  lines 
crossed,  there  would  be  the  submarine.  In  this  way, 
practically  every  submarine  could  be  followed  from 
day  to  day;  I  say  practically  every  submarine,  be- 
cause sometimes  they  did  not  communicate  with 
Germany  at  night.  Of  course  there  were  other  re- 
ports of  submarine  movements,  from  the  sightings 
of  submarines  at  sea,  but  many  of  these  were  false. 
The  striking  or  sinking  of  a  ship  by  a  torpedo  was  a 
positive  proof  of  a  submarine's  presence  in  a  certain 
position;  a  report  of  a  ship  being  missed  by  a  torpedo, 
or  the  sighting  of  a  periscope,  was  not.  Almost 
without  fail,  the  positions  of  submarines,  as  es- 
tablished by  the  radio-direction-finder,  were  the 
same  as  the  proofs  of  their  positions  established  by 
the  sinking  of  a  ship. 

I  remember  one  very  interesting  occasion  to  show 
the  reliability  of  the  direction  finder;  it  occurred  on 
the  night  of  October  17,  1918.  When  I  arrived  at 
the  office  the  following  morning,  I  found  a  tele- 


A  graphic  illustration  of  the  positions  of  enemy  submarines  as 
represented  on  the  daily  charts.  A  pin  with  a  flag  attached  was 
used  to  represent  the  submarine's  location,  and  each  morning 
each  pin  was  moved  according  to  the  submarine's  movements  of 
the  night  before.  From  this  map,  the  reader  will  understand  why 
Admiral  Sims  informed  the  Navy  Department  that  the  place  to 
fight  the  submarine  was  in  Europe,  and  that  anti-submarine 
vessels  in  American  waters  were  of  no  strategical  value. 


The  "tracks"  or  movements  of  submarines  during  the  firs 
to  date  daily,  and  as  each  new  position  of  each  submarine 
Each  position  is  shown  by  a  small  circle,  the  date,  and  hour 
time.  The  majority  of  the  positions  were  established  by  me 
chart  by  the  hour  and  date,  but  without  vessel's  name.  Sc 
were  rather  famous  :  notably,  those  of  the  "Mt.  Vernon," 
zance,  the  U.  S.  S.  "Chester"'  narrowly  missed  running  into 
In  the  Irish  Sea  may  'be  seen  the  location  in  which  five  Qt 
gow  out  of  convoy.  From  this  chart  my  statements  that  th 
more  about  submarine  operations  than  was  generally  sum 


o  weeks  of  September,  1918.     This  chart  was  kept  up 

as   definitely  established,   it  was   plotted   on  the  chart. 

cording  to  the  twenty-four  hour  method  of  reckoning 

of  the  radio  direction  finder;  these  are  shown  on  the 

of    the    losses,    represented    by    the    vessels'    names, 

ellington,"  "Kendel  Castle,'"  etc.     Just  south  of   Pen- 

e  U-53  on  the  night  of  September  5th,  in  a  thick  fog. 

stpwn  destroyers  lost  the  "Mesaba"  and  City  of  Glas- 

kitish   Admiralty  and   Admiral    Sims'   staff  knew   far 

d.  are  proved. 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  105 

gram  on  my  desk  stating  that  the  U.  S.  S.  "Kim- 
berly,"  a  destroyer  at  Queenstown,  during  the 
previous  night  had  located  a  submarine  off  Bantry 
Bay,  had  hunted  it  down  by  means  of  listening 
devices,  and  finally  attacked  it  with  depth  charges 
at  eight  minutes  of  twelve.  In  the  telegram,  the 
exact  position  of  the  attack  was  given.  Later  that 
morning  I  learned  from  the  Admiralty  that  the 
submarine  attacked  by  the  "  Kimberley  "  had  commu- 
nicated with  Germany  by  wireless  at  three  minutes  of 
twelve,  or  five  minutes  after  the  attack.  The  posi- 
tion of  the  attack — which  was  of  course  the  position 
of  the  submarine  at  eight  minutes  of  twelve — was 
exactly  the  same  as  the  position  of  the  submarine,  as 
established  by  the  radio  direction  finder  at  three  min- 
utes of  twelve. 

As  soon  as  the  position  of  each  submarine  had 
been  worked  out  on  the  charts,  such  information 
was  sent  to  the  different  bases  or  wirelessed  to  those 
ships  to  which  the  information  might  be  of  use.  The 
Admiralty  took  the  greatest  care  that  this  method  of 
locating  submarines  should  not  be  discovered  by  the 
enemy,  for  the  authorities  regarded  it  as  the  great- 
est secret  in  their  possession;  and  there  is  no  evidence 
to  show  that  the  Germans  ever  did  discover  it. 

The  second  manner  in  which  the  Admiralty  kept 
itself  informed  was  by  a  very  efficient  system  of  agents 
in  Germany  and  neutral  countries.  The  organiza- 
tion of  this  system  commenced  after  the  Declaration 
of  War  in  1914  (and  the  agents  themselves  were 
sent  to  Germany  and  neutral  countries),  for  previous 


io6  SIMSADUS 

to  1914  the  British  Secret  Service  was  of  little  im- 
portance. These  agents,  some  of  whom  were  English 
women,  apparently  found  many  sources  of  informa- 
tion, not  the  least  of  which  were  deserters  from  the 
German  Army  or  Navy.  As  time  went  on  Germany 
apparently  discovered  this  and  employed  men  to  play 
the  role  of  deserters,  not  only  in  order  to  catch  the 
British  agents,  but  also  to  give  these  agents  all 
sorts  of  misinformation.  Some  of  their  reports 
were  very  heterogeneous  and  erratic  and  often  the 
opposite  to  the  true  facts;  on  the  other  hand,  a 
vast  amount  of  them  were  good  sound  truths,  which 
proved  to  be  of  inestimable  value.  The  greater 
part  of  them  dealt  with  data  on  the  new  construction 
of  submarines,  assignment  of  commands  (a  very 
important  factor  in  calculating  the  submarines'  prob- 
able movements)  and  much  technical  information 
concerning  submarine  machinery  and  the  construc- 
tion of  torpedoes.  The  aid  which  these  agents  ren- 
dered the  Allied  Cause  can  never  be  too  highly  rec- 
ognized; the  submarine  campaign  was  the  vital  issue 
in  this  war  and  these  men  and  women,  at  the  risk 
*of  their  lives  as  spies,  rendered  a  great  and  patriotic 
service  in  helping  to  defeat  it. 

The  third  method  of  gaining  information  about  the 
submarine  was  by  questioning  and  cross-examining 
the  survivors  of  submarines  destroyed.  Previous 
to  1917,  in  this  country,  we  all  heard  that  the  Eng- 
lish Navy  refused  to  take  German  submarine  officers 
and  men  prisoners  when  their  boats  were  sunk.  No 
more  fabulous  story  was  ever  circulated.  The 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  107 

British  made  all  survivors  prisoners,  and  they  spared 
no  effort  rescuing  them;  their  services  as  inform- 
ants of  the  activities  of  the  submarine  flotillas  were 
valuable;  to  have  let  them  drown  would  have  been 
a  military  error.  When  survivors  of  a  sinking  sub- 
marine had  been  rescued,  they  were  immediately 
taken  to  a  detention  camp,  and  from  there,  after 
three  or  four  days  of  good  food  and  rest,  arid  enough 
whiskey  to  make  them  see  the  right  side  of  life, 
brought  up  to  London  to  be  interrogated.  Some  of 
these  men  were  very  affable  and  in  return  for  the 
kind  treatment  they  had  received,  gave  the  interro- 
gators much  valuable  information;  others,  through 
patriotism  or  hate,  would  disguise  their  statements 
very  cleverly,  mistating  facts  just  enough  to  make 
the  sifting  out  of  the  truth  very  difficult.  And  then 
there  were  others  who  would  relate  the  most  dread- 
ful yarns  imaginable;  but  such  stories  were  always 
recognized  as  false.  The  information  sought  in 
these  seances  dealt  with  the  value  of  various  forms 
of  offence  and  defence  in  the  anti-submarine  war, 
such  as  the  value  of  depth  charges,  mines,  and  nets; 
and  with  conditions  in  Germany  in  general.  As 
several  survivors  were  taken  prisoners  each  month, 
and  information  came  in  regularly  from  the  agents 
in  neutral  countries  and  Germany  itself,  the  task  of 
learning  the  trend  of  events  within  the  borders  of  the 
enemy  was  rendered  possible. 

It  will  be  seen  from  what  has  now  been  said  that 
the  Admiralty  Intelligence  Service  was  in  a  position 
to  keep  itself  informed  at  all  times.  We  heard  a  great 


io8  SIMSADUS 

deal  in  England  and  America  as  to  the  efficiency  of 
the  German  spy  system;  there  were  undoubtedly 
a  great  many  German  agents  at  large  in  this  coun- 
try, and  in  Europe.  The  German  spy  system  was 
well  organized,  but  it  was  inferior  to  the  Brit- 
ish Admiralty  Intelligence  Service.  Even  though 
the  German  system  was  organized  many  years 
previous  to  the  war  and  gained  strength  by  probing 
into  the  secrets  of,  and  plotting  against,  the  un- 
suspecting and  trusting  nature  of  the  world  at 
peace. 

In  comparing  the  information  which  the  Germans 
had  about  the  Allies,  with  the  information  the  Ad- 
miralty had  about  Germany,  it  is  easily  seen  that 
the  calm  and  practical  British  mind  was  far  better 
adapted  to  picking  up  true  facts,  than  the  bombastic 
German  mind  which  too  often  allowed  the  wish  to  act 
as  father  to  the  thought.  This  was  proven  many 
times  during  the  war,  and  the  following  is  an  ex- 
cellent example  of  the  errors  made.  On  July  19, 
1918,  the  H.  M.  S.  "  Justicia  "  was  torpedoed  and  sunk 
North  of  Ireland  by  a  German  submarine.  The 
"  Justicia  "  was  a  vessel  of  33,000  tons  and  very  similar 
to  theU.  S.  S.  "Leviathan,"  formerly  the  " Vaterland," 
in  that  both  vessels  were  among  the  largest  afloat, 
and  each  had  three  funnels.  The  German  Admiralty 
sincerely  believed  that  the  "Leviathan"  had  been 
sunk.  Now  if  the  German  Admiralty  Intelligence 
had  been  on  to  its  job,  it  would  have  known  that 
the  "Leviathan,"  since  April,  had  been  running 
only  to  Brest  and  accordingly  could  not  have  been 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  109 

anywhere  near  the  Northern  coast  of  Ireland.  It 
may  be  argued  that  to  learn  to  what  port  the  "Le- 
viathan "  was  sailing  would  be  expecting  a  great  deal  of 
any  Intelligence  Service,  but  for  such  purposes  an  In- 
telligence Service  exists.  In  this  case  the  Germans 
had  the  wrong  information,  and  wrong  information  is 
of  less  use  to  a  military  organization  than  no  informa- 
tion at  all.  The  British  Admiralty  Intelligence,  on 
the  other  hand,  to  my  recollection  anyway,  never 
had  the  wrong  and  always  had  the  right  information. 
There  are  many  other  cases  in  which  the  German 
Intelligence  Service  showed  itself  inferior  to  that  of 
the  British,  a  fact  which  gave  the  British  Navy  a 
tremendous  advantage  in  the  submarine  war.  It  is 
only  proper  to  mention  here  the  courtesy  and  trust 
shown  by  the  Admiralty  in  allowing  Admiral  Sims 
and  his  Staff  the  use  of  secret  information. 

But  to  return  to  the  discussion  of  the  operations 
of  submarines.  I  said  that  the  average  number  operat- 
ing on  any  given  day  would  be  about  twenty-two, 
not  including  those  in  the  Mediterranean  where  the 
average  would  be  about  six  or  seven.  The  average 
length  of  a  cruise,  excluding  the  cruises  of  UK-boats, 
which  would  be  about  three  months,  was  about  three 
or  four  weeks.  This  means  that  one  submarine  left 
its  base  in  Germany  and  one  returned  about  every 
day.  The  bases  of  the  submarines  were  at  Kiel, 
Bremerhaven,  Wilhelmshaven,  Brundesbuttel,  and  in 
Flanders,  at  Zeebrugge,  and  Ostend.  From  these 
bases  they  would  set  out,  pass  through  the  Dover 
Straits,  or  more  likely,  particularly  in  1918  after 


i  io  SIMSADUS 

the  Dover  Straits  had  practically  been  closed  by 
mines,  pass  North  by  way  of  Scotland,  and  out  into 
waters  West  of  the  British  Isles.  No  submarine 
officer  when  he  set  out  ever  knew  how  long  his 
cruise  would  be;  he  would  have  on  board  food  and 
fuel  enough  for  five  or  six  weeks,  but  the  chances 
were  that  he  would  not  have  to  stay  out  that 
long.  The  factor  which  determined  the  length  of 
the  cruise,  was  the  rapidity  with  which  the  tor- 
pedoes were  used.  The  number  of  torpedoes  carried, 
of  course,  was  varied  and  limited,  some  of  the  smaller 
boats  carrying  only  eight  and  the  larger  ones  sixteen 
or  twenty.  Thus  a  submarine  would  stay  at  sea 
until  all  of  its  torpedoes  had  been  spent  in  sinking 
or  injuring  vessels;  this  would  usually  take  two  or 
three  weeks,  and  the  remaining  week  or  so  of  the 
average  cruise  would  be  consumed  in  passage  to  and 
from  the  various  theatres  of  operations.  The  cruises 
of  mine-layer  submarines  were  usually  shorter  than 
those  of  the  other  types,  for  these  boats  would  pro- 
ceed to  the  point  where  the  mines  were  to  be  laid,  lay 
them  and  return  to  the  base  immediately.  Sub- 
marine commanders  usually  received  but  few  instruc- 
tions from  their  flotilla  commander  at  the  base;  the 
individual  officer  aboard  the  submarine  was  a  better 
judge  of  his  own  abilities  under  various  conditions 
than  the  Admiral  at  the  base.  The  only  orders 
usually  given  dealt  with  the  areas  of  operations, 
and  the  vicinity  in  which  the  submarine  was  to  op- 
erate; and  this  was  only  done  to  the  extent  of  in- 
suring against  the  super-concentration  in  one  area 


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SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  in 

and  the  total  absence  of  submarines  in  another.  In- 
telligence information  showed  that  the  same  com- 
manding officers,  regardless  of  the  submarine  they 
commanded,  usually  visited  the  same  area  on  each 
cruise.  This  was  natural  enough,  for  without  the 
use  of  many  of  the  former  coastal  lights,  navigation 
at  night  was  extremely  difficult,  and  the  better  ac- 
quainted an  officer  became  with  a  certain  region 
the  more  efficient  his  operations  were.  This  was 
particularly  true  of  the  officers  of  the  mine-layers. 
An  officer  had  to  know  his  ground  well  to  lay  mines 
effectively  in  the  entrance  to  harbors ;  he  was  allowed 
to  deposit  them  where  he  saw  fit,  and  naturally  he 
would  choose  a  locality  with  which  he  was  familiar. 

Quite  contrary  to  the  general  impression  of  the 
submarine  campaign,  there  is  absolutely  no  evidence 
to  show  that  U-boats  ever  had  any  bases  except 
in  the  enemy  countries.  There  was  much  fear  ex- 
pressed in  many  quarters,  upon  our  entry  into  the 
war,  that  submarines  would  establish  bases  in  Mexico, 
or  in  the  West  Indies;  but  they  never  did.  The  only 
place  which  might  have  been  used  as  a  base,  if 
there  was  any  advantage  in  having  one,  would  have 
been  the  Azores,  and  Admiral  Sims  established  a 
base  there  himself.  The  Azores,  however,  would 
probably  have  been  used  as  a  base  for  raiders, 
rather  than  for  submarines.  After  all,  what  would 
have  been  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  having 
a  base  for  submarines  anywhere  except  where  the 
services  of  a  Navy  Yard  were  available?  I  have 
shown  that  the  length  of  a  submarine's  cruise  was 


ii2  SIMSADUS 

dependent  upon  the  rapidity  with  which  the  tor- 
pedoes were  consumed,  for  more  supplies  and  fuel 
were  carried  than  usually  were  required.  If  a  sub- 
marine wanted  food  it  would  merely  have  to  stop  a 
few  sailing  vessels  and  help  itself.  The  only  use  then 
of  a  base  would  be  as  a  place  in  which  repairs  could 
be  effected  and  torpedoes  provided,  and  I  question 
whether  either  repairs  or  torpedoes  could  be  made 
along  the  Western  Coast  of  Ireland,  or  at  the  Azores, 
or  in  the  West  Indies,  or  Mexico.  It  is  true  that  occa- 
sionally a  submarine  would  put  into  a  Spanish  port 
for  minor  repairs  or  a  brief  rest,  but  if  the  Spanish 
authorities  allowed  it  to  stay  more  than  twenty-four 
hours  without  interning  it,  as  provided  in  Interna- 
tional Law,  the  British,  American,  and  French  Con- 
suls soon  saw  to  it  that  the  submarine  was  either  or- 
dered out  of  the  port,  or  interned.  It  is  also  known 
that  in  one  case  a  submarine  stopped  at  an  island 
on  the  Northwest  Coast  of  Ireland  and  that  there 
the  crew  went  ashore  and  shot  some  wild  sheep  for 
fresh  meat.  But  outside  of  this  there  are  no  cases, 
with  proofs  to  back  them,  in  which  submarines  ever 
even  tried  to  make  use  of  any  locality  as  a  base. 
The  German  submarine  bases  and  Navy  yards  had 
a  sufficiently  difficult  task  to  keep  the  submarines  in 
good  condition,  without  trusting  to  the  facilities  pro- 
vided by  a  barren  island  or  cove,  or  in  the  Naval 
genius  of  Mexico. 

Whenever  we  used  to  hear  of  an  attack  on  a  ship 
or  transport,  there  were  always  at  least  two  sub- 
marines present  and  sometimes  four  or  five  or  more. 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  113 

These  tales  were  invariably  exaggerated  and  false, 
for  it  was  not  the  policy  of  the  submarines  to  oper- 
ate together.  In  the  first  place,  one  torpedo  was 
sufficient  to  sink  almost  any  vessel;  if  a  second  sub- 
marine stood  by  and  watched  the  other  submarine 
fire  the  torpedo  and  do  the  sinking,  its  presence  was 
useless.  If  it  took  part  in  the  attack  and  fired  a  tor- 
pedo, its  efforts  were  wasted,  for  one  submarine 
would  be  very  nearly  as  sure  of  getting  its  prey  as 
two  of  them  together.  The  story  of  the  U.  S.  S. 
AL-4  on  July  10,  1918,  will  be  recalled,  in  which 
two  submarines  accidentally  became  mutually  in- 
terested in  the  AL-4  an^  before  they  had  finished, 
the  one  had  sunk  the  other.  There  are  other  cases 
on  record  in  which  the  presence  of  two  submarines 
was  only  a  hindrance  or  serious  menace  to  both 
of  them. 

Attacks  on  ships  were  of  two  kinds :  those  in  which 
the  submarine  would  stop  a  sailing  vessel  or  steam- 
ship by  gun-fire,  and  sink  her  by  placing  bombs  in  the 
hold,  and  those  in  which  the  submarine  would  fire  a 
torpedo  at  the  vessel,  submerge,  and  try  to  effect  an 
escape.  The  former  sort  became  less  numerous  as 
more  ships  were  armed,  and  after  a  few  submarines 
had  encountered  British  mystery  ships,  the  torpedo 
attack  became  prevalent.  Imagine  a  steamship  on 
the  horizon.  The  commanding  officer  of  the  waiting 
submarine  would  approach  nearer  to  the  vessel  to 
ascertain  her  course  and  speed,  which,  of  course, 
he  must  know  in  order  to  be  able  to  fire  a  torpedo 
accurately.  Dazzle  painting  or  camouflage  was  used 


ii4  SIMSADUS 

on  ships  to  make  them  less  visible.  This  applica- 
tion of  protective  coloration  was  good  in  theory,  but 
on  the  open  sea  with  the  vessel's  mast  and  hull  stand- 
ing out  above  the  horizon,  streaky  painting  of  lights 
and  shadows  had  little  effect.  There  were  cases,  I 
suppose,  in  which,  because  of  camouflage,  a  sub- 
marine officer  found  it  difficult  to  make  out  the 
exact  types  of  ship  he  was  to  attack.  For  instance 
I  remember  when  I  was  attached  to  the  U.  S.  S. 
"Leviathan,"  in  March,  1918,  that  one  of  the  de- 
stroyers, escorting  us  into  Liverpool,  appeared  to  have 
only  two  funnels,*  and  that  several  of  us  remarked 
upon  it  at  the  time.  A  few  moments  later,  the  sun 
carne  out  from  behind  a  cloud  and  we  saw  the  third 
stack.  This  destroyer  was  camouflaged,  and  under 
certain  conditions  of  light  we  had  been  deceived  in 
her  appearance.  The  submarine  Commander,  how- 
ever, did  not  care  to  definitely  make  out  the  sort 
of  ship  his  prey  was;  what  he  wanted  to  know  was 
what  course  he  should  steer  in  order  to  intercept  her, 
or  in  other  words,  in  what  direction  was  the  ship 
going.  In  order  to  determine  this,  he  would  look  at 
the  masts  and  funnel.  (If  the  ship  were  running  par- 
allel to  him,  he  could  determine  this  immediately.) 
The  closer  together  the  two  masts  and  funnel  were 
in  his  periscope  picture,  the  nearer  directly  towards 
him  the  ship  would  be  coming.  If  the  mast  on  the 
left  was  higher  than  the  one  on  the  right,  he  would 
know  that  the  left  mast  was  the  forward  mast  and 
hence  the  ship  was  approaching  him  on  a  course  to 

*  All  American  destroyers  have  either  three  or  four  funnels. 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  115 

his  left;  and  if  the  right  mast  was  the  higher  mast,  he 
would  know  that  the  ship  was  approaching  to  his 
right.  If  the  masts  and  funnels  had  a  "rake"  to 
them,  that  is  if  they  slanted  a  trifle  aft,  his  estimate 
of  the  course  of  the  ship  would  be  made  much  eas- 
ier. For  this  reason,  camouflage,  according  to  ex- 
perience and  statistics,  did  not  prove  of  value  in 
preventing  his  gaining  this  information.  It  only 
continued  to  be  applied  throughout  the  war  because 
merchant  crews  gathered  a  certain  sense  of  confi- 
dence from  having  their  ships  painted  in  this  way. 
What  did  help  out  though,  was  the  erection  of 
straight  masts  and  funnels,  all  as  short  as  possible, 
with  the  after  mast  a  little  higher  than  the  forward 
one.  This  arrangement  gave  no  information  one 
way  or  the  other  to  the  submarine  officer  as  to 
the  ship's  direction,  for  with  the  masts  short  and 
stubby,  and  practically  no  funnel  at  all,  his  chief 
source  of  information  was  gone.  With  the  intro- 
duction of  the  convoy  system,  camouflage  of  any 
sort  became  entirely  useless. 

But  to  return  to  the  attacking  submarine.  When 
the  submarine  had  ascertained  the  speed  and  course 
of  the  merchant  ship,  it  would  submerge,  periscope 
and  all,  and  by  dead  reckoning — which  means  steer- 
ing by  compass — proceed  to  a  point  very  near  from 
which  it  had  been  estimated  a  torpedo  could  be 
fired.  Submarines  had  to  be  within  one  thousand 
yards  or  less  of  a  ship  to  be  sure  of  the  torpedo  strik- 
ing its  mark.  The  captain  of  the  submarine  would 
then  bring  his  boat  within  ten  or  fifteen  feet  of  the 


ii6  SIMSADUS 

surface,  and  stick  his  periscope  up  to  see  how  mat- 
ters stood.  If  all  were  well,  that  is  if  he  were 
within  a  thousand  yards  of  his  prey,  a  torpedo 
would  be  fired  and  if  it  hit  its  mark,  he  would 
look  around  hurriedly  to  see  if  any  patrol  boats 
might  attack  him,  and  then  submerge  to  a  depth 
varying  from  30  to  200  feet,  and  try  to  make  good 
an  escape. 

After  this  attack,  some  of  the  survivors  would  re- 
late that  no  submarine  was  seen  at  any  time,  while 
others  would  tell  how  the  ship  was  attacked  by 
three  submarines,  two  of  which  were  rammed  and 
sunk.  The  former  tale  would,  of  course,  be  the  cor- 
rect one,  but  the  latter  tale  would  be  the  one  more 
popularly  told,  and  in  this  way  much  misinforma- 
tion was  spread.  There  were  many  cases  where 
ships  were  sunk  and  the  submarine  never  seen, 
even  though  destroyers  were  present.  The  most 
ideal  conditions  under  which  a  submarine  could 
attack  a  ship,  was  from  a  position  between  the  ship 
and  the  sun. 

When  a  submarine  attacked  a  convoy  under  the 
escort  of  destroyers,  the  submarine  officer's  task 
was  more  difficult.  A  convoy  was  always  zig- 
zagging, which  meant  that  the  submarine,  if  it  came 
too  close  to  the  convoy,  would  always  run  the  chance 
of  being  rammed.  To  avoid  getting  too  close  it  was 
necessary  to  keep  the  periscope  above  the  water,  and 
this  might  be  seen  by  one  of  the  watchful  destroyers. 
Often  it  was  believed  that  a  submarine,  because  of 
the  difficulties  involved  in  an  attack  upon  a  convoy, 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  117 

would  fire  a  torpedo  at  the  middle  of  the  convoy  and 
trust  to  good  fortune  that  it  would  hit  something.  As 
soon  as  a  ship  in  convoy  had  been  torpedoed,  the  ex- 
citement for  the  submarine  began.  A  torpedo  leaves 
a  wake  behind  it,  and  though  the  destroyers  did  not 
see  the  submarine  or  its  periscope,  its  general  vicinity 
could  always  be  found  by  following  the  wake  to  its 
origin,  where  depth  charges  would  be  dropped;  and 
though  these  might  not  sink  it,  the  submarine  and 
its  crew  could  expect  no  good  from  such  under  water 
explosions. 

During  the  hours  of  daylight,  and  at  night,  sub- 
marines used  to  run  alternately  on  their  Diesel  en- 
gines and  storage  batteries:  on  the  surface  the  en- 
gines were  used,  and  when  submerged,  the  batteries 
and  motors.  By  running  on  their  engines  for  a  few 
hours,  the  batteries  were  charged;  they  were  kept 
almost  fully  charged,  in  order  to  have  enough 
current  to  allow  for  a  long  submerged  run,  should 
anti-submarine  vessels  be  on  the  trail  of  the  sub- 
marine. The  crews  of  course  preferred  running 
on  the  surface  for  at  such  times  they  were  allowed 
to  go  up  on  the  conning  tower  and  smoke  and  en- 
joy the  air.  Sometimes,  when  attacked  by  anti- 
submarine vessels,  or  in  storms  when  operations  were 
impossible,  if  the  bottom  was  sandy  and  the  water 
shallow,  submarines  would  rest  there  for  several 
hours.  However,  as  the  waters  in  which  they 
could  rest  on  the  bottom  were  necessarily  shallow, 
a  seaplane  overhead  could  distinguish  the  shadow 
of  the  boat  beneath  the  waves,  and  call  anti-sub- 


ii8  SIMSADUS 

marine  craft  to  attack  it.  Resting  on  the  bottom  was 
not  generally  a  safe  practice.  The  safest  method  of 
procedure  for  a  submarine  was  to  stay  on  the  sur- 
face as  much  as  possible,  and  maintain  a  good 
watch;  in  this  way  ships  could  be  more  easily  sighted, 
and  by  submerging,  approaching  destroyers  could 
be  avoided. 

A  good  idea  of  the  life  on  the  submarine  is  gained 
by  the  following  extracts  from  the  report  of  Lieu- 
tenant Isaacs,  U.  S.  N.,  who  was  taken  prisoner  on 
the  U-QO  when  the  "President  Lincoln"  was  sunk 
on  May  3Oth,  1918. 

"The  U-90  was  built  in  1916;  it  is  about  160  ft. 
long,  and  carries  two  six-inch  guns,  one  forward  and 
one  aft  of  the  conning  tower.  The  captain  of  the  U-9O, 
Captain  Remy,  boasted  that  he  could  make  sixteen 
knots  speed  on  the  surface  and  that  he  had  demon- 
strated the  superiority  of  the  speed  of  German  sub- 
marines, as  compared  with  the  speed  of  American 
submarines,  sometime  previously  when  he  had  a 
'  run-in'  with  the  U.  S.  Submarine  AL-4-*  He  said 
tiiat  both  submarines  had  manoeuvered  to  fire  a  tor- 
pedo at  each  other  and  that  in  so  doing  both  had  sub- 
merged two  or  three  times  and  that  finally  he  was  able 
to  fire  the  torpedo  at  the  American  submarine  after 
getting  into  position,  which  he  was  able  to  do  be- 
cause of  his  superior  speed.  Just  as  he  fired  the  AL-4 
dove  and  his  torpedo  passed  a  few  feet  over  her.  Cap- 
tain Remy  never  submerged  to  a  depth  greater  than 
200  ft.,  though  he  claimed  to  be  able  to  submerge 

*  At  Berehaven. 


e 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS 


119 


300  ft.  The  last  day  out,  on  the  way  back  to  Kiel 
while  passing  through  the  Kattegat,  he  travelled  sub- 
merged for  over  ten  hours  at  a  depth  of  200  ft.  I 
doubt  if  he  could  make  more  than  eight  knots  when 
submerged.  He  carried  a  crew  of  forty-two  men  and 
officers.  One  officer,  Kapitan-Leutnant  Kahn  was 
aboard  for  the  purposes  of  instruction,  having  had  his 
request  granted  by  the  German  Admiralty  to  com- 
mand a  submarine  of  his  own.  While  I  was  at  Wil- 
helmshaven  Kapitan-Leutnant  Kahn  came  to  see  me 
in  prison  and  told  me  that  he  had  just  received  orders 
to  take  command  of  a  new  submarine. 

"Of  the  crew  of  forty-two  men,  two  were  warrant 
officers,  one  a  navigator  and  the  other  the  machinist. 
The  captain's  three  assistants  were  lieutenants,  corres- 
ponding to  our  grade  of  ensign.  One  was  a  German 
Naval  Academy  man,  who  entered  the  Navy  in  1913 ; 
he  was  a  deck  officer.  Another  was  a  Reserve  en- 
sign from  the  Merchant  Fleet,  who  spoke  English 
very  well,  having  been  in  America  and  England  in 
peace  time  on  various  steamers.  The  other  officer 
was  a  regular,  who  had  gone  to  a  special  school  for 
engineers  and  he  was  responsible  for  the  efficiency 
of  the  machinery;  he  did  not  stand  a  deck  watch. 
The  deck  watch  was  stood  by  the  navigator  and  the 
two  ensigns.  Captain  Remy  took  the  wheel  when 
ships  were  sighted  and  when  passing  through  dan- 
gerous waters.  He  had  entered  the  Navy  in  1905 
and  had  travelled  considerably,  having  been  in  Amer- 
ica in  1911  on  a  German  crusier  which  had  put  in 
at  Charleston,  S.  C,  and  into  New  York,  at  both  of 


120  SIMSADUS 

which  places  he  had  been  hospitably  entertained.  He 
liked  America  but  could  not  understand  why  America 
had  entered  the  war.  He  believed,  as  all  Germans  are 
taught  to  believe  by  Governmental  propaganda,  that 
our  entry  into  the  war  must  have  had  as  its  motive 
the  rendering  safe  of  the  millions  we  loaned  to  France 
and  England  early  in  the  war. 

"The  U-go  carried  eight  torpedoes.  On  this  cruise 
she  had  sunk  only  two  ships  of  about  2000  tons 
apiece.  Captain  Remy  said  that  they  seldom  fired 
torpedoes  at  a  range  greater  than  1000  yards  and  if 
possible  he  approached  to  within  500  yards  of  his 
prey. 

"The  submarine  rolled  a  little  in  the  Atlantic, 
though  we  had  no  very  rough  weather.  In  the  North 
Sea  the  choppy  seas  seemed  hardly  to  affect  it  and 
under  the  surface  there  was  no  sensation  of  being  in 
motion.  The  air  inside  the  submarine  when  we  were 
submerged  on  the  last  day  out  for  ten  hours  became 
very  disagreeable.  However,  several  tanks  of  oxy- 
gen were  carried  which  could  have  been  used  in  case 
<of  necessity.  The  water-tight  doors  between  the 
.different  compartments  were  kept  closed  at  all  times 
after  entering  the  North  Sea.  The  officers  and  crew 
smoked  in  the  coming  tower  or  on  deck,  but  nowhere 
else.  The  wardroom  was  about  six  feet  wide  and 
seven  feet  long  and  here  we  ate  at  a  table;  the  food 
was  kept  in  lockers  in  the  wardroom.  Here  also  they 
put  in  hammock  hooks  and  swung  a  hammock  for 
me  to  sleep  in,  alongside  two  bunks  used  by  Kahn 
and  one  of  the  other  officers.  Just  forward  of  this 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  121 

room  was  a  smaller  compartment,  known  as  the  Cap- 
tain's cabin,  in  which  he  had  his  desk  and  bunk,  with 
scarcely  room  for  either.  Forward  of  this  cabin  was 
a  sleeping  compartment  for  the  men  and  forward  of 
this  was  the  forward  torpedo  room;  I  was  never  al- 
lowed to  enter  the  torpedo  rooms.  Aft  of  the  ward- 
room on  the  starboard  side  was  a  small  cabin,  about 
four  feet  wide  and  six  feet  long,  occupied  by  the  other 
two  officers.  Across  a  passage  on  the  port  side  was 
the  radio  room  and  aft  of  this  was  the  control  room; 
here  there  were  always  two  men  on  watch.  Aft  of 
the  control  room  was  the  other  living  compartment 
for  the  men,  and  here  the  food  was  cooked  and  meals 
served.  Aft  of  this  was  the  engine  room  and  the 
after-torpedo  room.  The  men  slept  in  hammocks  and 
on  the  decks;  they  were  very  dirty  for  there  was  no 
water  with  which  to  wash.  In  the  wardroom  we  had 
enough  to  wash  our  hands  and  faces  once  every  day, 
but  that  was  all.  A  little  wine  was  carried  for  the 
officers.  The  food  consisted  chiefly  of  sausage,  which 
was  served  at  every  meal,  and  canned  bread  and  lard, 
which  they  called  marmalade.  Remy  told  me,  how- 
ever, that  the  crews  on  the  submarines  were  the  only 
people  in  Germany  who  had  an  unlimited  amount 
of  meat  and  other  foods.  We  had  practically  four 
meals  every  day:  breakfast  at  8  A.  M.,  dinner  at  noon, 
and  at  4  P.  M.  what  they  called  'kaffee';  at  8  P.  M. 
we  had  supper  but  practically  every  meal  was  the 
same.  Kaffee  at  4  P.  M.  apparently  corresponded  to 
our  tea,  but  the  sausage,  or  as  they  called  it  'wurst' 
was  placed  on  the  table  at  every  meal.  After  supper 


122 


SIMSADUS 


we  played  cards,  sometimes  bridge  and  sometimes  a 
new  game  which  I  was  taught. 

"Captain  Remy  tried  in  every  possible  way  to 
make  things  pleasant  for  me  and  whenever  I  asked 
him  an  impossible  question,  that  is  a  question  which 
he  thought  he  ought  not  to  answer,  he  invariably 
said  so,  so  that  I  have  great  confidence  that  what  he 
told  me  was  the  truth. 

"The  U-QO  and  most  of  the  German  Submarines 
were  out  usually  not  more  than  four  or  five  weeks 
and  then  in  port  about  six  or  seven  weeks.  The 
service  was  not  severe,  for  Remy  got  leave  as  often 
as  he  cared  to  have  it  and  indeed  it  was  deemed  the 
height  of  good  fortune  by  the  regular  officers  to  be 
assigned  to  a  submarine.  After  making  three  round 
trips  they  were  entitled  to  the  Iron  Cross  and  to 
leave,  which  leave  covered  the  duration  of  the  stay 
of  the  submarine  in  port.  They  received  extra  money 
and  they  got  the  best  food  in  Germany,  besides 
which  for  every  day  which  they  submerged  both 
officers  and  men  received  extra  money.  For  all  these 
reasons  the  submarine  service  was  very  popular." 

Lieutenant  Isaacs  had  many  interesting  and  har- 
rowing experiences  in  German  prison  camps.  Shortly 
after  he  had  been  taken  off  the  submarine  and 
placed  in  prison,  he  was  summoned  before  the  Com- 
mander of  the  base,  who  immediately  asked  him 
why  America  had  declared  war.  This  under  ordi- 
nary conditions  is  a  rather  difficult  question  to  an- 
swer, not  because  there  was  a  lack  of  reasons,  but 
because  in  order  to  answer  it  well,  a  certain  amount 


SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS  123 

of  thought  is  necessary.  Lieutenant  Isaacs  appar- 
ently believed  that  any  thought  on  the  matter 
would  be  wasted  and  so  informed  the  German  Ad- 
miral that  America  had  declared  war  because  the 
American  people  thought  the  German  people  so 
many  swine.  From  then  on  things  did  not  go  very 
well  with  Lieutenant  Isaacs.  He  was  transferred  to 
a  prison  camp  from  which  he  escaped,  and  was  ar- 
rested. While  en  route  to  another  prison  camp  he 
jumped  out  of  the  train  window  and  landed  on  his 
head  on  the  railroad  bed.  The  train  stopped  and 
though  he  had  regained  consciousness  from  his  fall, 
he  was  forced  to  surrender  to  the  German  soldiers 
when  they  began  shooting  at  him.  He  was  then 
kicked  all  the  way  to  the  next  town,  a  distance  of 
about  nine  miles.  He  planned  another  escape  from 
the  next  camp  and  so  was  transferred  again.  Here, 
in  making  plans  for  a  third  attempt  to  escape,  he 
found  that  Russian  prisoners  were  acting  as  inform- 
ants for  the  camp  authorities.  He  confided  in  a 
few  English  and  Americans,  and  according  to  pre- 
arranged plans,  one  night,  a  good  many  of  them 
escaped  by  shortcircuiting  the  lighting  system  of  the 
camp.  He  then  walked  for  three  nights,  hiding  dur- 
ing the  day,  to  the  Swiss  border,  and  swam  the 
Rhine.  In  Switzerland  he  reported  to  the  American 
Consul,  who  informed  Admiral  Sims  and  Isaacs  was  or- 
dered to  Paris  and  then  to  London.  He  arrived  in 
London  about  ten  days  later,  very  much  undaunted  in 
spirit  and  apparently  not  much  the  worse  for  the  treat- 
ment he  had  received  in  the  German  prison  camps. 


X 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  SUBMARINES 

ONE  phase  of  the  submarine  war,  which  was 
very  much  misunderstood  by  the  civilian,  was 
the  destruction  of  submarines.  The  many  unreliable 
stories  of  the  sinkings  of  submarines  by  merchant 
ships  and  patrol  vessels  have  given  people  the 
idea  that  submarines  were  comparatively  easy  vessels 
to  sink.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  this  war  the  sub- 
marine was  the  most  difficult  of  any  vessel  to  sink, 
and  statistics  show  that  only  one  submarine  was 
sunk  in  every  thirty-nine  attempts  to  destroy  it. 
One  reason  for  this  was  the  construction  of  the  sub- 
marine itself;  it  was  made  in  such  a  way  that  it  had 
an  outer  and  an  inner  hull,  the  space  between  which 
was  used  for  carrying  fuel.  These  fuel  tanks  served 
as  buffers  against  any  shock  or  force  with  which  the 
submarine  might  come  in  contact,  and  though  the  hull 
might  be  tortioned  slightly,  the  average  submarine 
seemed  capable  of  surviving  all  sorts  of  difficulties. 

Shortly  after  America  declared  war,  we  read  in 
the  newspapers  that  the  S.  S.  "Mongolia"  had 
destroyed  a  submarine  on  the  first  shot;  and  a 
little  later  we  read  that  the  first  troop  convoy  to 
France,  when  attacked  by  seven  submarines,  had 
managed  to  demolish  most  of  them.  On  neither 
occasion  was  a  sinking  effected.  There  were  two 

124 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  SUBMARINES        125 

things  in  encounters  with  submarines  which  led  the 
uninitiated  erroneously  to  believe  that  a  submarine 
had  been  destroyed:  one  was  a  large  cloud  of  smoke, 
which  would  be  seen  rising  from  the  water  where  the 
U-boat  had  submerged;  the  other  was  the  oil  and 
bubbles  which  would  come  to  the  surface  after  an 
attack.  Both  phenomena  are  easily  explained. 

I  have  said  that  when  a  submarine  was  on  the  sur- 
face, the  Diesel  oil  engines  were  used  as  means  of 
propulsion.  These  oil  engines  had  an  exhaust  pipe 
and  manifold  not  unlike  that  of  an  automobile. 
When  a  shell  was  fired  at  a  submarine  on  the  surface, 
it  would  immediately  submerge,  and  as  it  did  so 
cold  water  would  rush  into  the  hot  exhaust  pipe. 
In  a  moment  steam  would  be  formed  inside  the  ex- 
haust pipe,  and  as  soon  as  a  sufficiently  powerful 
pocket  of  this  had  been  generated,  the  water  would 
be  blown  out  of  the  manifold  with  great  force,  and 
with  it  would  go  all  sorts  of  carbon  gases,  causing 
a  small  geyser  of  steam,  water,  and  smoke.  Thus 
the  gunner  who  had  fired  a  shell  at  a  submarine  was 
led  to  believe  that  his  shell,  if  it  came  anywhere  near 
the  submarine,  had  damaged  it  as  proved  by  the 
smoke  and  water  jet. 

"Oil  and  bubbles"  was  taken  at  first  as  another 
proof  that  a  submarine  had  been  destroyed;  it  was  in 
reality  nothing  of  the  sort.  A  submarine  is  an  oily 
affair  anywhere,  and  when  it  submerged  it  often 
left  an  oil  patch  on  the  surface.  This  might  be  caused 
by  the  exhaust  explosion  already  mentioned,  or  by 
a  small  leak  in  a  fuel  tank;  or  it  might  be  due  to 


iz6  SIMSADUS 

the  fact  that  the  commanding  officer  had  deliber- 
ately discharged  some  oil  out  through  the  side  of  the 
submarine  to  make  the  attackers  think  that  their  work 
was  finished,  and  so  leave  it^  alone. 

There  were  three  excellent  ways  of  knowing  when 
a  submarine  had  been  sunk.  The  surest  way  and 
most  satisfactory  to  all  concerned  was  by  rescuing 
a  few  half-drowned  survivors,  who  had  managed  to 
crawl  out  of  the  submarine  through  the  conning 
tower,  or  through  the  torpedo  tubes,  when  it  was  far 
below  the  surface,  and  going  down  rapidly.  The 
capture  of  survivors  under  any  circumstances  was 
good  proof  that  a  submarine  had  been  destroyed. 
Another  method  was  by  observing  on  the  charts,  as 
kept  by  the  radio  direction  finder,  whether  a  sub- 
marine after  an  attack  continued  to  operate  or  not. 
If  a  vessel  attacked  a  submarine,  and  during  the 
following  night  that  submarine  communicated  with 
Germany  by  wireless,  there  was  excellent  proof  that 
the  submarine  had  not  been  sunk.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  a  patrol  vessel  attacked  a  submarine  and  no 
further  movements  were  observed,  it  might  be  sup- 
posed that  it  had  been  sunk.  Whether  it  had  been 
sunk  or  not  remained  to  be  seen,  and  this  intro- 
duces the  third  way,  namely,  whether  it  ever  returned 
to  its  base.  This  information  would  be  supplied 
by  the  English  secret  agents  in  Germany  and  neutral 
countries,  although  it  was  often  weeks  and  months 
before  definite  word  could  be  obtained.  For  ex- 
ample, the  U.  S.  S.  "Lydonia"  and  H.  M.  S.  "Basi- 
lisk" dropped  depth  charges  on  a  submarine  in  the 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  SUBMARINES        127 

Mediterranean  on  May  8,  1918,  and  in  submitting 
their  reports  the  commanding  officers  of  these  ves- 
sels did  not  even  claim  to  have  destroyed  it.  No 
further  movements  of  this  submarine  were  recorded, 
but  credit  for  its  destruction  was  not  awarded  until 
August,  when  the  Admiralty,  by  checking  up  all 
information  from  their  agents  and  charts  learned 
that  it  had  not  returned  to  its  base  at  Pola,  classi- 
fied it  as  "sunk." 

This  aversion  on  the  part  of  the  Admiralty  and 
later  on  the  part  of  Admiral  Sims  and  his  associates, 
to  consider  a  submarine  sunk  when  absolute  proof 
thereof  was  lacking,  was  warranted.  I  have  said 
that  the  German  Intelligence  Service  often  allowed 
the  wish  to  father  the  thought,  and  showed  how 
such  methods  were  detrimental.  In  order  to  com- 
bat the  submarine,  all  operations  had  to  be  based 
upon  a  knowledge  of  facts;  therefore,  marking  off  a 
submarine  as  sunk  before  its  destruction  was  def- 
initely proven,  was  misleading  and  not  a  good  policy. 
If  as  many  submarines  had  been  sunk  as  were 
claimed,  Germany  would  have  had  to  have  built 
about  five  thousand  of  them.  As  it  was,  the  Ad- 
miralty, knew  from  day  to  day  and  from  week  to 
week,  because  of  the  conservative  policy  in  estimat- 
ing submarine  losses,  exactly  how  many  German 
submarines  were  available  for  service  at  all  times, 
and  at  future  dates.  As  great  as  was  the  desire  on 
the  part  of  the  officials  to  classify  these  as  sunk,  a 
false  representation  of  their  destruction  would  have 
helped  nobody  but  the  Germans  themselves. 


128  SIMSADUS 

Statistics  show  that  the  most  effective  method  of 
sinking  submarines  was  by  depth  charges.  These 
explosive  weapons  were  a  new  invention  in  Naval 
Warfare,  and  were  first  used  in  the  Autumn  of  1916. 
Previous  to  that  time  the  anti-submarine  vessel  had 
had  no  offensive  weapon  against  a  submerged  sub- 
marine. The  introduction  of  the  depth  charge  al- 
tered and  improved  the  situation.  The  depth  charge 
was  similar  in  appearance  and  size  to  a  hogshead, 
and  was  filled  with  explosives.  At  one  end  of  these 
"cans,"  as  they  were  affectionately  called  by  the 
members  of  the  destroyer  Force,  there  was  a  mech- 
anism similar  to  that  of  a  time  fuse  on  a  shell.  This 
mechanism  was  so  delicate  that  at  various  depths, 
according  to  the  adjustment,  the  water  pressure 
on  it  would  cause  the  explosion.  Depth  charges 
were  carried  on  the  stern  of  the  vessel  on  an  oiled 
track  or  runway,  from  which  they  could  be  easily 
launched  into  the  water.  There  was  also  a  depth- 
charge  thrower,  known  as  the  "Y"  gun,  by  which 
they  could  be  heaved  200  yards  to  either  side  of 
the  vessel.  The  force  of  the  explosion  under  water 
was  so  great  that  it  was  absolutely  imperative  for 
the  destroyer  to  be  going  at  full  speed  when  they 
were  being  dropped,  to  avoid  being  herself  injured. 
A  depth  charge,  exploding  within  50  yards  of  a 
submarine,  would  have  the  effect  of  pushing  al- 
most a  solid  mass  (water  under  sudden  impact  acts 
practically  as  a  solid),  against  the  side  of  the  sub- 
marine, tending  to  crush  it.  Should  the  explosion 
occur  beneath  the  submarine,  it  would  find  itself 


..n 
"a 
•o 
< 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  SUBMARINES        129 

pushed  toward  the  surface,  or  tilted  up  on  end, 
all  of  which  would  probably  be  injurious  to  it.  It 
often  happened  that  the  explosion  would  injure  the 
diving  or  elevating  apparatus,  corresponding  to  a 
horizontal  rudder  on  the  submarine,  and  in  such 
cases  it  would  either  find  itself  rapidly  rising  to  the 
surface  or  rapidly  going  down. 

When  a  destroyer  sighted  a  submarine,  she  would 
steam  at  full  speed  towards  the  point  where  it  was 
seen,  or  as  near  to  such  a  position  as  could  be  de- 
termined, and  the  "cans"  would  be  dropped.  When 
they  were  first  used,  and  during  1917,  it  was  the  cus- 
tom to  drop  only  two  or  three  and  some  very  ex- 
cellent results  were  obtained;  notably  the  sinking  of 
a  submarine  by  the  "Fanning"  and  the  injuring  of 
a  submarine  by  the  "Christabel."  But  though  sub- 
marines had  been  sunk  and  injured  in  this  way,  a  few 
of  the  authorities,  and  Admiral  Sims  in  particular, 
advocated  a  change  in  tactics.  Admiral  Sims  rightly 
believed  that  the  greater  the  number  of  depth  charges 
dropped,  the  better  the  chances  of  success.  He 
also  believed  that  the  occurrence  of  many  severe 
explosions  would  tend  to  frighten  the  crew  of  a 
submarine,  and  demoralize  them.  In  March,  1918, 
he  sent  instructions  to  all  his  Forces  that  five  depth 
charges  were  to  be  dropped  in  the  future  for  every 
one  dropped  in  the  past.  This  system  proved  very 
effective,  and  although  the  destruction  of  submarines 
thereby  was  not  materially  increased,  it  undoubtedly 
wrought  havoc  with  the  personnel  of  the  submarines. 
When  a  submarine  was  attacked,  and  the  terrible 


130  SIMSADUS 

explosions  began  to  occur  all  around  it,  the  crew  at 
times  became  almost  panic  stricken;  lights  would  go 
out,  sometimes  leaks  would  occur,  all  storage  bat- 
teries be  upset,  and  in  general,  the  crew  would  ex- 
perience a  few  very  exasperating  moments,  all  of 
which  tended  towards  killing  their  "nerve"  and  in- 
creasing their  fear  of  destroyers.  In  this  way  the 
U-boats  became  more  cautious  in  revealing  them- 
selves; and  more  caution  on  the  part  of  the  sub- 
marines meant  fewer  Allied  losses. 

According  to  this  new  method,  fifteen  or  twenty, 
or  sometimes  as  many  as  thirty  depth  charges  were 
dropped  at  the  slighest  provocation.  Dropping  them 
was  easy  enough;  the  question  was  where  to  drop 
them.  A  submarine  sighted  at  a  given  point, 
would  be  able  to  move  only  a  certain  distance 
within  a  given  time;  in  other  words,  it  would  be  in- 
side a  circle,  the  size  of  which  would  be  determined 
by  the  length  of  time  intervening  between  the 
sighting  of  the  submarine  and  the  arrival  of  the 
destroyer  at  the  point  where  it  was  seen.  As  the 
speed  of  a  submerged  U-boat  was  known,  it  could 
be  calculated  within  what  area  it  must  be.  When 
the  destroyer  arrived  at  the  position  where  the  sub- 
marine was  seen,  she  would  commence  to  drop 
depth  charges  in  a  circle  having  a  radius  in  pro- 
portion to  the  time  consumed  in  describing  it. 
Thus,  if  a  destroyer  started  to  describe  a  circle 
towards  the  right,  as  she  continued  the  circle,  the 
rudder  would  be  eased,  and  the  radius  would  be  in- 
creased until  it  overlapped  at  the  point  from  which  it 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  SUBMARINES        1 3 1 

was  started.  In  dropping  these  charges  the  destroyer 
was  confronted  with  the  problem  as  to  the  depth  at 
which  they  should  be  set  to  explode.  Some  sub- 
marines submerged  to  thirty  feet  when  attacked, 
others  to  200,  and  the  destroyer's  officer  had  no 
means  of  knowing  which.  It  was  anybody's  guess. 

In  spite  of  the  best  possible  mathematical  and 
scientific  calculations  hundreds  of  depth  charges  were 
dropped  without  results,  except  for  the  usual  oil  and 
bubbles  which  meant  nothing,  and  the  nerve  rack- 
ing explosions  which  the  submarine  crews  experienced. 
As  Commander  Cook,  U.  S.  N.,  Commanding  Officer 
of  the  U.  S.  Destroyer  "Allen,"  once  said,  "You  can 
give  me  all  the  science  in  the  world,  but  when  you 
have  sighted  a  submarine  and  steamed  a  mile  to  reach 
the  point  where  it  submerged,  I  defy  you  to  know  when 
or  where  to  begin  to  drop  your  depth  charges  and 
at  what  depth  to  set  them.  The  submarine  may  be 
anywhere  inside  an  area  of  several  hundred  yards 
and  may  be  30  feet  or  200  feet  below  the  surface. 
Nevertheless  I  throw  as  many  'cans'  overboard,  as 
I  dare,  at  the  slightest  provocation;  and  though  I 
have  not  bagged  one  yet  I  have  made  things  un- 
pleasant for  many." 

The  American  forces  delivered  286  attacks  on 
submarines  or  on  suspicious  objects;  in  197  of  these, 
it  was  definitely  proved  that  a  submarine  was  pres- 
ent. The  remaining  attacks  were  carried  out  upon 
oil  slicks  on  the  water,  or  tide  rips,  or  some  other 
form  of  disturbance.  The  reports  of  attacks  were 
sent  by  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  vessels  in- 


132  SIMSADUS 

volved  to  Admiral  Sims'  office  in  London,  and,  upon 
the  receipt  of  these,  a  comparison  of  the  position  in 
which  the  attack  was  delivered  with  the  current 
charts  of  submarine  movements  was  made.  In  this 
way  it  was  known  how  effective  and  successful  the 
attacks  had  been. 

Four  submarines  were  sunk  by  the  American  forces, 
one  on  November  27,  1917,  by  the  U.  S.  S.  "Fan- 
ning" and  "Nicholson";  another  on  May  n,  1918, 
by  the  U.  S.  S.  "Lydonia,"  in  the  Mediterranean; 
a  third  on  June  18  by  the  submarine  chasers  at 
Corfu;  and  the  fourth  on  October  2,  1918,  by  the 
chasers  at  Corfu  in  their  raid  on  Durazzo  Harbor. 
A  fifth  was  possibly  sunk  by  the  U.  S.  S.  "Tucker" 
on  August  8,  1918,  a  hundred  miles  off  Brest,  and 
on  May  3ist  the  "Christabel"  attacked  the  UC-56 
and  forced  it  to  intern  at  Santander,  Spain.  It 
is  possible  and  probable  that  the  American  forces 
sank  other  submarines  also,  but  as  the  same  thing 
is  true  of  the  British,  French,  and  Italian  Forces, 
it  was  decided  that,  in  order  to  avoid  any  argu- 
ment over  the  crediting  of  these  sinkings  to  various 
nations,  it  would  be  better  to  classify  those  cases 
where  the  time  and  cause  of  destruction  were  not 
definitely  proven,  as  "means  of  sinking  unknown." 

In  17  other  attacks,  American  vessels  were  success- 
ful to  the  extent  that  in  these  encounters  submarines 

%•        »  --• 

were  slightly  or  seriously  damaged,  and  forced,  be- 
cause of  injuries,  to  return  to  their  bases  immediately. 
The  vessels  participating  in  these  attacks  were  as 
follows : 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  SUBMARINES        133 


Trippe 

July  9,  1917 
Wadsworth 

July  21,  1917 
Benham 

July  30,  1917 
McDougal 

September  9,  1917 
Noma 
Wakiva 
Kanawha 
Patterson 
Beale 
Burrows 
Allen 
Warrington 

July  13,  1917 
Wilkes 

July  26,  1917 


Nov.  28,  1917 


May  19,  1918 


Parker 

August  3,  1917 
Davis 

September  21,  1917 
Allen 

February  2,  1918 
Jenkins 

July  17,  1917 
Wadsworth  &  Trippe 

July  29,  1917 
Jacob  Jones 

September  5,  1917 

Porter 

April  28,  1918 
Sterrett 

June  I,  1918 
Sub-Chasers,  Plymouth 

July  10,  1918 


XI 


WHY  AMERICAN  TROOPSHIPS  WERE 

NOT  SUNK 

WHEN  America  declared  War  in  1917  the 
thought  immediately  occurred  to  us,  "How 
are  we  going  to  send  troops  to  France  with  submarines 
blocking  the  path?"  While  we  were  pondering  over 
this,  the  Germans  were  gloating  and  saying,  "Amer- 
icans will  never  get  to  France;  our  submarines  will 
stop  them."  The  long  and  short  of  our  wondering 
and  Germany's  gloating  was  that  our  troops  did  get 
to  France,  with  but  few  casualties.  Why  were 
there  no  serious  losses  of  transports  and  men?  To 
this  question  I  am  going  to  undertake  an  answer 
on  my  own  responsibility.  I  believe  that  the  Ger- 
mans did  not  make  a  determined  effort  to  sink  Amer- 
ican transports.  This  statement  may  seem  start- 
ling at  first,  but  a  closer  study  of  the  matter  will 
show  that  from  a  military  point  of  view  it  was  a 
better  policy  for  submarines  not  to  try  to  stop  Amer- 
can  troops  coming  to  France. 

The  original  conception  of  the  submarine  War 
involved  primarily  the  blockade  of  Great  Britain, 
and  thereby  the  subsequent  starvation  of  the  Allies 
by  sinking  British  cargo  vessels.  Sinking  American 
troops  was  not  starving  England,  and  every  time  a 
torpedo  was  fired  at  a  transport,  there  was  one  tor- 

134 


SUBMARINES  AND  TROOPSHIPS         135 

pedo  less  to  be  used  in  the  destruction  of  ships  carry- 
ing food  to  England.  The  Germans  knew  that  we 
had  limitless  numbers  of  men  whom  we  could  send  to 
France;  what  was  to  be  gained  by  sinking  a  few  of 
these  when  there  were  just  as  many  more  to  come? 
In  order  to  prevent  American  troops  landing  in  Eu- 
rope, the  submarines  would  have  had  to  devote  their 
entire  attention,  energy,  and  practically  all  their  tor- 
pedoes to  sinking  transports.  Such  a  policy  would 
not  have  been  in  accord  with  the  original  doctrine  of 
the  U-boat  campaign,  which  was,  as  stated,  to  starve 
England  by  sinking  cargo  vessels.  They  could  not 
sink  both;  their  efforts  had  to  be  concentrated  on  one 
or  on  the  other.  There  were  excellent  reasons  for  not 
concentrating  their  efforts  on  transports. 

I  have  already  shown  how  the  sinking  of  a  fast 
ship  on  a  zigzag  course,  protected  by  destroyers,  was 
an  exceedingly  difficult  task  for  a  submarine.  A  sub- 
marine, in  manoeuvering  to  get  close  enough  to  a 
fast  zigzagging  vessel  to  fire  a  torpedo  at  her,  was 
putting  itself  in  a  very  dangerous  position;  and  at 
that,  the  chances  of  a  torpedo  striking  its  mark,  be- 
cause of  the  speed  and  irregular  course  of  the  target, 
were  not  too  good.  And  after  the  torpedo  had  been 
fired,  there  were  half  a  dozen  destroyers  ready  to 
pounce  upon  the  submarine  with  depth  charges,  and 
if  it  was  not  destroyed  or  injured,  the  submarine  itself 
and  its  crew  would  spend  a  very  dangerous  and  un- 
comfortable fifteen  minutes.  In  other  words,  at- 
tacking fast  ships,  such  as  troopships,  when  well 
protected  by  destroyers,  was  almost  too  dangerous 


136  SIMSADUS 

to  the  submarine  to  be  worth  while.  The  Command- 
ing Officer  undoubtedly  appreciated  the  pleasures 
of  being  alive,  and  though  his  superior  back  in  Ger- 
many probably  did  not  care  what  his  sentiments 
were  on  this  matter,  he  nevertheless  did  not  want  to 
lose  the  use  of  the  submarine — which  meant  the 
saving  of  20,000  tons  per  month  to  the  Allies.  It 
is  only  natural  that  the  Officer  in  command  of  the 
flotillas  did  not  want  to  lose  the  use  of  a  submarine 
by  its  endeavoring  to  sink  a  transport,  when  sink- 
ing a  transport  would  be  of  little  military  value,  and 
not  in  accord  with  the  primary  doctrine  of  the  sub- 
marine campaign.  Admiral  von  Capelle,  who  was 
Chief  of  the  Submarine  Service,  undoubtedly  realized 
this,  and  apparently  did  not  order  his  submarines 
to  devote  their  efforts  towards  sinking  American 
troops.  His  good  sense  cost  him  his  position,  for  in 
July,  1918,  when  it  became  known  that  many  Ameri- 
can troops  had  reached  France,  he  was  forced  to  re- 
sign. Nevertheless,  his  successor,  Admiral  von 
Mann,  probably  realized  that  Von  Capelle  was 
right,  for  only  one  transport  was  sunk  after  the  first 
of  August. 

The  next  question  is  how  many  transports  were 
sunk,  and  do  their  losses  prove  or  disaprove  my 
theory?  Six  were  sunk,  and  two  more  were  defi- 
nitely attacked.  The  vessels  sunk  were  the  U.  S.  Army 
Transport  "Antilles,"  the  British  S.  S.  "Moldavia," 
the  H.  M.  S.  "Tuscania,"  and  the  U.  S.  S.  "Pres-, 
ident  Lincoln";  also  the  H.  M.  S.  "Justicia"  and 
the  U.  S.  S.  "Covington."  The  U.  S.  S.  "Mt.  Ver- 


SUBMARINES  AND  TROOPSHIPS          137 

non"  was  torpedoed,  but  she  made  port,  and  the 
"Olympic"  accidentally  rammed  a  submarine  which 
was  contemplating  an  attack.  The  first  four  of  these 
cases,  in  that  these  ships  resembled  cargo  vessels  in 
general  appearance,  cannot  be  regarded  in  the  same 
category  as  the  others.  Let  us  take  each  case  in- 
dividually. 

The  "Antilles"  was  sunk  in  the  Summer  of  1917, 
while  proceeding  back  to  this  country.  She  was  an 
old  coastwise  vessel  of  small  tonnage  with  but  one 
stack  and  not  much  deck  structure;  in  other  words, 
she  was  not  a  liner  in  appearance.  The  "Tuscania" 
was  torpedoed  and  sunk  off  the  North  Coast  of 
Ireland  in  February,  1918.  At  the  time  of  her  de- 
struction, she  was  lagging  behind  a  slow  merchant 
convoy  at  dusk,  and  in  her  general  appearance  she 
was  not  unlike  the  vessels  she  was  following.  In- 
variably experience  has  shown  that  the  vessel  which 
lagged  behind  has  been  the  one  selected  for  de- 
struction by  the  submarine.  The  third  case  is  that 
of  the  "Moldavia,"  which  was  sunk  in  the  English 
Channel  while  carrying  American  troops  from  Eng- 
land to  France.  This  vessel  was  originally  a  cargo 
carrier,  and  during  the  War  had  been  converted  into 
a  refrigerator  ship.  She  was  fundamentally  a  cargo 
vessel,  and  it  was  merely  a  coincidence  that  she  had 
American  troops  on  board  when  destroyed.  The 
fourth  case  was  that  of  the  "President  Lincoln," 
which  was  sunk  on  May  30, 1918,  three  hundred  miles 
West  of  Brest.  This  ship  was  an  old  German  com- 
bination cargo  and  passenger  (second  class  only)  car- 


138 


SIMSADUS 


rier;  she  had  one  stack  and  six  masts,  with  many 
hoists  and  derricks  for  loading  purposes.  To  all  ap- 
pearances she  was  a  cargo  vessel.  In  fact,  all  four 
of  these  ships  were  either  cargo  vessels  or  very  sim- 
ilar to  them,  the  only  exception  perhaps  being  the 
"Tuscania,"  but  she  was  torpedoed  at  dusk  when 
lagging  behind  a  cargo  convoy.  The  loss  of  these 
vessels,  does  not  prove  that  the  Germans  were  mak- 
ing a  determined  effort  to  sink  transports. 

Two  transports  which  could  not  be  taken  for 
cargo  vessels,  the  "Justicia"*  and  the  "Coving- 
ton,"  were  sunk,  and  two  more,  the  "Mt.  Vernon" 
and  the  "Olympic"  were  attacked.  The  reason  for 
torpedoing  these  vessels  was  probably  the  same  as 
that  for  sinking  hospital  ships.  It  is  a  well-known 
fact  that  submarines  sank  hospital  ships  in  order  to 
make  the  Allies  use  destroyers  in  escorting  them.  I 
believe  that  the  same  is  true  in  these  cases,  for  as 
long  as  but  few  transports  were  being  sunk,  the  Ger- 
mans probably  thought  that  the  Allies  might  see  fit 
to  let  them  be  unescorted.  This  would  mean  that 
an  extra  number  of  destroyers  would  be  available 
for  escorting  cargo  ships,  which  were  the  real  prey  of 
the  submarine.  By  sinking  an  occasional  transport 
or  hospital  ship,  they  could  force  the  Allies  to  supply 

*  Incidentally,  the  Press  claimed  that  the  "  Justicia"  had  been  sunk 
by  four  submarines,  which  was  not  true.  On  July  19, 1918,  on  the  North 
Coast  of  Ireland  at  dusk,  she  was  hit  by  a  torpedo  from  a  submarine, 
which  was  Northward  bound.  She  remained  afloat  all  night,  and  was 
being  towed  back  to  port  when  the  following  morning,  another  sub- 
marine Southward  bound  discovered  her  in  this  condition,  and  sank 
her. 


SUBMARINES  AND  TROOPSHIPS          139 

escorts  to  these  vessels,  and  thereby  have  less  de- 
stroyers available  to  protect  cargo  ships. 

Now  to  sum  up.  I  first  showed  that  the  sinking  of 
transports  was  not  the  real  object  of  the  submarine 
war,  and  that  attempts  at  their  destruction  in  large 
numbers  would  have  meant  the  abandonment  of  the 
real  objective  of  the  campaign,  namely,  the  starva- 
tion of  England  by  sinking  cargo  vessels.  I  then 
showed  that  because  of  the  convoy  system,  at- 
tempts to  sink  transports  were  not  worth  the  risk 
the  submarine  incurred  in  so  doing.  And  then  fi- 
nally, I  showed  that  those  eight  cases,  in  which  trans- 
ports were  sunk  or  attached,  did  not  prove  that  the 
enemy  was  making  a  determined  effort  to  sink  troop- 
ships; because,  four  of  them  were  not  transports  in 
general  appearance  and  because  the  other  four, 
though  unmistakably  transports,  were  attacked  in 
order  to  force  the  Allies  to  escort  all  troopships  very 
heavily,  and  thereby  leave  fewer  destroyers  available 
for  escort  duty  with  cargo  convoys. 

This  may  lead  the  reader  to  conclude  that  our  Navy 
did  not  do  such  a  great  deal  after  all.  Such  a  con- 
clusion would  be  far  from  true,  for  insurance  against 
Allied  defeat  lay  not  in  making  it  possible  to  trans- 
port American  soldiers  to  France,  but  in  checking 
the  submarines  sufficiently  to  allow  all  Allied  Eu- 
ropeans three  good  meals  a  day,  and  occasionally  a 
lump  of  sugar.  It  has  often  been  said  that  even  if 
the  German  army  had  overrun  France,  Germany 
would  not  have  been  victorious  so  long  as  the  Allies 
commanded  the  sea.  While  submarines  were  on  the 


140  SIMSADUS 

high-road  to  starving  England,  Germany,  though  she 
did  not  control  the  surface  of  the  seas,  possessed 
sufficient  power  under  the  surface  to  accomplish  her 
desires.  The  Allies'  salvation  and  gateway  to  success 
lay  in  feeding  their  peoples  and  armies.  The  slogan 
the  "Navy  brought  'em  over"  is  of  minor  import- 
ance. What  the  Navy  did  do  was  to  keep  the  Allies 
and  their  armies  from  starving. 


XII 

THE  END  OF  THE  SUBMARINE  CAMPAIGN 

DURING  the  Spring  and  Summer  of  1918,  the 
sinkings  by  submarines  steadily  decreased;  the 
Allied  Navies  had  the  situation  well  in  hand.  Of 
course  ships  were  sunk,  and  always  would  be,  as 
long  as  there  were  submarines  at  sea,  but  the  situa- 
tion looked  better,  and  the  anti-submarine  struggle 
promised  greater  success  than  at  any  other  previous 
date.  The  British  dockyards  were  launching  greater 
numbers  of  new  anti-submarine  vessels,  and  every 
month  brought  more  American  destroyers  to  the 
theatre  of  War.  The  construction  of  German  submar- 
ines was  going  on  as  before,  and  though  their  total  was 
gradually  increasing,  their  successes  at  sea  were  being 
steadily  checked.  Another  great  factor,  which  gave 
encouragement  to  the  Allied  Naval  Authorities,  was 
the  monthly  construction  of  American  Merchant  ton- 
nage, which,  added  to  British  new  construction,  sur- 
passed the  monthly  losses.  These  facts  produced  the 
"  handwriting  on  the  wall "  for  the  German  submarine. 
The  submarine  became  a  weapon  of  power  to  Ger- 
many shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  the  War  in  1914, 
and  grew  in  danger  as  the  War  progressed.  The 
British  Navy  kept  the  ravages  on  tonnage  low  as 
long  as  Germany  carried  on  her  submarine  War  ac- 
cording to  International  Law,  which  Germany  offi- 

141 


142  SIMSADUS 

daily  violated  in  February,  1917,  when  she  informed 
the  world  that  the  waters  East  of  the  British  Isles 
and  France  were  "blockaded." 

It  is  provided  in  International  Law  that  a  nation 
at  War  may  declare  the  enemy's  ports  blockaded,  if 
such  a  blockade  is  effective.  This  means  that  war- 
ships of  one  nation  may  prevent  the  entrance  of 
ships  to  the  ports  of  the  enemy  by  the  right  of  search 
and  seizure.  Thus  if  they  stop  an  enemy  merchant 
ship  on  the  high  seas,  that  vessel  can  be  taken 
captive  and  made  to  return  to  its  enemy's  port.  Or 
when  the  blockading  vessel  so  decides,  if  the  mer- 
chant ship  is  carrying  contraband,  the  cargo  can  be 
seized  and  the  vessel  sunk  or  captured.  In  the  case 
of  a  neutral,  the  cargo,  if  determined  contraband,  can 
be  seized  or  destroyed,  but  the  vessel  cannot  be  cap- 
tured or  sunk.  Thus,  England's  blockade  of  Ger- 
many in  this  War  was  permissible  according  to 
International  Law,  for  it  could  be  enforced  accord- 
ing to  International  Law.-  English  warships  could, 
and  did,  prevent  American  vessels  carrying  contra- 
band into  Germany,  directly  or  indirectly,  through 
neutral  countries.  British  War  vessels  would  stop 
American  vessels,  which  were  neutral,  remove  the 
contraband,  and  allow  the  vessel  to  proceed.  Eng- 
land's blockade  of  Germany  was  effective.  When 
Germany  declared  all  waters  three  hundred  miles 
East  of  England  and  France  "blockaded,"  her  dec- 
laration and  its  execution  were  illegal  because  it  could 
not  be  effectively  carried  out  according  to  Interna- 
tional Law,  Germany,  to  blockade  England,  could 


END   OF   THE    SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN    143 

only  use  submarines.  If  submarines  had  stopped 
neutral  vessels,  seized  or  destroyed  the  cargo  and 
then  allowed  the  ship  to  proceed,  their  actions  would 
have  been  legitimate;  but  as  submarines  in  Eng- 
lish waters  could  not  stop  and  search  ships  without 
encountering  British  warships,  this  was  impossible. 
Also,  if  a  submarine  had  been  able  to  stop  British 
ships  and  take  them  back  to  Germany  as  captures, 
or  after  search,  have  sunk  them,  their  actions  would 
have  been  legitimate.  But  because  submarines  could 
not,  and  did  not,  do  these  two  things,  Germany  vio- 
lated International  Law,  both  in  her  declaration  of 
a  blockade  because  it  was  not  totally  effective  and 
because  in  its  execution  her  submarines  sank  the 
vessels  of  England  and  neutral  countries  on  sight 
without  warning.  This  violation  of  International 
Law,  and  the  high-handed  disregard  with  which  Ger- 
many treated  the  vessels  of  neutrals,  brought  Amer- 
ica at  last  into  the  great  struggle. 

At  the  time  of  America's  entry  into  the  War,  Eng- 
land's tonnage  losses  through  submarines  were  greater 
than  that  nation  could  long  stand,  and  her  auxili- 
ary naval  vessels — viz.,  destroyers,  gun-boats  etc., 
were  not  sufficient  in  numbers  to  serve  with  the  Grand 
Fleet  which  had  the  German  Fleet  bottled  up  in  the 
North  Sea  and  at  the  same  time  combat  the  sub- 
marine in  all  areas.  The  American  Navy,  under  the 
command  of  Admiral  Sims,  upon  its  arrival  in  Euro- 
pean waters,  extended  a  willing  and  helping  hand  in 
a  spirit  of  unprecedented  cooperation  to  the  hard- 
pressed  British  and  other  Allied  Navies.  Thirty  de- 


144  SIMSADUS 

stroyers  joined  the  British  Forces  at  Queenstown  and 
were  employed  in  protecting  shipping  to  and  from 
England  in  the  waters  South  of  Ireland.  At  Brest, 
forty-one  destroyers,  some  yachts,  and  mine-sweep- 
ers cooperated  with  the  French  and  undertook  what- 
ever duty  arose.  At  Gibraltar,  thirty-five  American 
vessels  joined  with  the  British  vessels  in  escorting 
local  Mediterranean  convoys  and  convoys  between 
Gibraltar  and  Great  Britain.  Five  American  dread- 
naughts  joined  the  British  Fleet  in  the  North  Sea 
and  three  others  made  their  base  at  Berehaven  in  the 
role  of  an  offensive  squadron  against  possible  enemy 
raiders.  The  American  Mine  Force  in  Scotland  laid 
80%,  or  56,000  mines,  of  the  Northern  Mine  Barrage 
from  Scotland  to  Norway,  the  greatest  mining  opera- 
tion in  history.  American  chasers  operated  around 
the  Island  of  Corfu  and  maintained  a  constant 
watch  at  the  mouth  of  the  Adriatic  where  all  enemy 
submarines  in  the  Mediterranean  had  their  base. 
Another  detachment  of  chasers  was  stationed  at 
Plymouth,  and  remained  on  constant  patrol  in  the 
English  Channel.  A  third  squadron  of  chasers 
arrived  at  Queenstown,  but  the  Armistice  cut  short 
their  activities.  An  American  cruiser  was  dispatched 
to  Archangel;  seventy-three  American  cargo  ves- 
sels, manned  by  Naval  personnel,  carried  coal  from 
Cardiff,  Wales,  to  France  for  the  use  of  the  American 
Expeditionary  Force.  The  American  Naval  Avia- 
tion Service  established  twenty-nine  stations  and 
schools  along  the  Coasts  of  France,  England,  Ireland, 
and  Italy.  Thus  with  374  vessels,  which  steamed  an 


The  shaded  areas  show  the  areas  in  which  our  forces  operated;  the 
borders  of  the  shaded  parts  are  general,  and  they  do  not  mean  that 
American  forces  remained  inside  them.  The  figures  show  the  per- 
centages of  traffic,  escorted  by  American  naval  vessels.  The  lines 
running  in  all  directions  show  how  Admiral  Sims  was  in  communica- 
tion with  all  of  his  bases. 


U.S. NAVAL  PORT  OFFICES 
Liverpool 
Southampton 
Le  Havre 
Genoa 
Marseilles 
Bizerta 


A  graphic  representation  of  Admiral  Sims'  version  of  "Unity  of 

Command.''    The  joining  lines  show  the  cooperation  between  the 

high  authorities  and  the  bases. 


END   OF  THE   SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN    145 

average  of  626,0x30  miles  per  month,  with  a  comple- 
ment of  78,000  men,  the  American  Naval  Forces 
shouldered  a  good  proportion  of  the  War  against  the 
submarine.  In  the  Eastern  Atlantic,  our  destroyers 
provided  about  27%  of  the  escorts  to  convoys.* 

The  acute  stage  of  the  submarine  campaign  passed 
with  the  introduction  of  the  convoy  system  in  July, 
1917.  By  January,  1918,  it  was  made  clear  to  all, 
except  the  propaganda-nourished  German  popula- 
tion, that  the  submarine  was  not  to  bring  defeat  to 
the  Allies.  Perhaps  by  1918  the  German  Naval 
Officials  realized  that  their  submarines  could  not 
bring  their  country  victory,  but  in  order  to  defend 
themselves  for  their  acts,  which  cost  Germany  the 
price  of  active  American  participation  in  the  War, 
and  in  order  to  hamper  the  Allies  as  much  as  possible, 
the  Submarine  War  was  continued.  Great  yarns  were 
given  out  in  Germany  about  the  success  of  the  sub- 
marine campaign,  but  these  coincided  with  the  sto- 
ries of  what  the  submarines  would  do,  rather  than 
with  what  they  really  did.  But  there  is  no  denying 
that  the  submarine,  until  September,  1918,  remained 
a  strong  weapon  in  the  hands  of  Germany  and  that 
the  U-boat  war  was  pressed  with  great  virulence  until 
almost  the  very  end. 

*  The  British  Navy  provided  70%  of  the  escorts,  the  American  27%, 
and  the  French  3%.  The  actual  number  of  Allied  war  vessels  em- 
ployed in  the  War  was  over  4000;  of  these  we  furnished  but  374.  It 
will  be  well  for  the  American  people  to  recognize  in  this  way  the  great 
ability  of  Admiral  Sims.  His  Forces  were  the  fewest  in  number  of 
any  great  Power  in  this  War,  and  yet  look  at  what  he  accom- 
plished with  them. 


146  SIMSADUS 

The  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  Submarine  War 
made  itself  apparent  in  September,  1918.  During 
that  month  the  sinkings  amounted  to  only  180,000 
tons,  a  fact  occasioned  through  the  loss  of  morale  of 
the  submarine  crews,  perhaps  partially  the  result  of 
a  clever  move  by  the  British  Admiralty.  In  August, 
the  Admiralty  made  public  a  list  of  the  names  of 
150  submarine  commanders  who  had  been  lost,  and 
all  of  whose  submarines  had  been  destroyed.  This 
information  showed  the  existing  submarine  com- 
manders that  the  British  Admiralty  knew  consider- 
ably more  of  their  activities  than  was  supposed. 
How  the  British  and  Admiral  Sims  kept  themselves 
informed  of  submarine  activities,  the  Germans  never 
discovered,  for  the  Kaiser's  Intelligence  Office  never 
learned  the  secret  of  locating  submarines  by  wireless. 
When  it  became  evident  to  the  submarine  officers  and 
crews  that  their  every  movement  was  watched  by  the 
British  Admiralty,  greater  caution  on  their  part  was 
manifested,  and  the  daring  which  had  characterized 
their  operations  disappeared. 

The  proof  that  the  British  Admiralty  knew  a 
great  deal  more  about  submarine  operations  than 
was  commonly  supposed  came  to  the  German  sub- 
marine personnel  as  a  letter  does  to  a  man  inform- 
ing him  that  his  bank-account  has  been  overdrawn. 
The  men  and  officers  began  to  think,  and  soon  prob- 
ably appreciated  the  following  facts.  The  German 
Admiralty  had  said  in  February,  1917,  that  the  War 
would  be  over  by  the  Autumn.  This  statement  had 
not  come  true.  The  American  Navy  had  come  into 


The  little  dots  represent  the  Allied  vessels  sunk  by  submarines  in 
September,  1918;  five  or  six  dots  in  place  of  each  of  these  would 
represent  the  losses  of  April,  1917.  The  two  ships  sunk  off  our 
coast  (see  insert)  were  destroyed  by  the  U-117,  the  last  of  the  four 
German  submarines  to  visit  our  coasts. 


rt  c 


-^  £ 


o    .  c 
xp^  rt 


END   OF   THE    SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN    147 

the  War,  and  by  efficient  cooperation  with  the  Brit- 
ish, for  many  a  submarine  officer  had  seen  English 
and  American  destroyers  with  the  same  convoy,  had 
increased  the  difficulty  of  the  submarine's  task.  Also 
the  convoy  system  had  made  the  destruction  of  a 
ship  by  a  submarine  an  extremely  difficult  and  haz- 
ardous task.  And  every  time  they  went  to  sea 
they  had  to  encounter  a  great  danger,  the  Northern 
Mine  Barrage,  because  the  still  greater  danger,  the 
Dover  mine-fields,  had  closed  the  Straits  to  them. 
And  when  at  sea,  their  encounters  with  Allied  patrol 
craft  were  ever  growing  more  numerous.  Their 
mortal  enemy  had  sunk  over  150  submarines  and 
apparently  watched  the  activities  of  every  subma- 
rine commander  with  intelligence  and  interest.  And, 
finally,  in  spite  of  their  efforts,  the  Allied  tonnage 
losses  were  being  more  than  replaced  by  new  construc- 
tion, although  there  were  more  submarines  ready 
for  operations  than  ever  before.  To  what  hopes 
could  they  now  turn?  Or  what  could  they  accom- 
plish by  continuing  to  play  a  game  in  which  they  had 
no  hopes  and  in  which  their  comrades  in  arms,  the 
German  Armies  were  playing  a  losing  part? 

Such  sentiments  on  the  part  of  the  submarine 
crews  were  not  revealed  to  the  Allied  Naval  au- 
thorities except  by  the  actions  of  the  submarines 
themselves.  During  the  last  week  of  September  sub- 
marine operations  became  confused,  and  the  follow- 
ing of  each  submarine  difficult;  activities  seemed  to 
lack  proper  guidance.  The  sinkings  decreased  no- 
tably during  that  month,  and  by  October,  the  im- 


148  SIMSADUS 

pression  was  gathered  that  the  submarines  were 
trying  to  conceal  themselves  as  much  as  possible. 
By  the  middle  of  October,  after  the  commencement 
of  rumors  of  an  Armistice,  many  submarines  started 
for  home,  and  attacks  on  merchant  ships  became 
scarce.  By  the  end  of  October,  only  half  a  dozen 
were  still  operating.  This  sudden  collapse  of  the 
submarine  war  served  as  an  excellent  barometer  of 
the  coming  debacle. 

By  the  first  week  in  November,  the  seas  were 
practically  cleared  of  submarines.  The  efforts  of  the 
British  Naval  authorities  and  Admiral  Sims  had 
been  successful.  The  U-boat  war,  by  their  efforts, 
had  failed.  But  these  men,  in  their  hour  of  success, 
gave  way  to  no  jubilation.  They  continued  the 
anti-submarine  tactics,  as  if  the  submarines  were 
operating  as  in  past  months.  Who  knew  but  that 
Germany,  in  her  death-rattle,  might  send  her  174 
submarines,  the  greatest  number  she  had  ever  had, 
to  sea,  with  orders  to  sink  everything  afloat?  Who 
knew  but  that  this  might  be  her  last  effort,  in  her 
dying  gasp  ?  The  dying  gasp  came  a  few  days  later, 
but  in  another  form,  when  the  High  Seas  Fleet  was 
ordered  to  sea.  Mutiny  followed,  and  no  German 
warship  left  its  anchorage. 

Two  weeks  later,  the  High  Seas  Fleet  and  the  sub- 
marines surrendered.  After  an  examination  of  the 
German  warships,  it  was  learned  that  for  two  and  a 
half  years,  the  German  Navy  had  been  in  no  con- 
dition to  meet  the  British.  The  German  Naval 
authorities  had  apparently  decided,  after  the  Battle 


END   OF   THE    SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN    149 


of  Jutland,  in  June,  1916,  that  their  Navy  was  no 
match  for  the  English  Navy  in  open  combat. 
They  then  had  turned  to  the  submarine  to  fulfill  their 
ambition  for  Naval  supremacy.  In  this,  too,  they  had 
failed,  and  Germany  was  beaten  at  a  game  of  her  own 
choosing.  When  the  first  group  of  German  sub- 
marines surrendered,  Germany  unwillingly  admit- 
ted before  the  World  that  England  and  America 
ruled  not  only  the  surface  of  the  sea,  but  also  con- 
trolled what  Germany  had  seen  fit  to  stage  beneath  it. 


XIII 

THE  MAN  ON  THE  BRIDGE 
(!N  HOMAGE) 

IN  1775  John  Paul  Jones,  the  Father  of  the  Amer- 
ican Navy,  in  a  letter  to  Congress,  described  at 
length  the  requirements  of  intellect  and  character 
necessary  to  a  Naval  Officer  of  the  highest  order. 
Among  other  things  he  said:  "It  is  by  no  means 
enough  that  an  Officer  of  the  Navy  should  be  a  capa- 
ble mariner.  He  must  be  that,  of  course,  but  also  a 
great  deal  more.  He  should  be  as  well,  a  gentleman 
of  liberal  education,  refined  manners,  punctilious  cour- 
tesy, and  have  the  nicest  sense  of  personal  honor. 
He  should  also  be  conversant  with  the  uses  of  di- 
plomacy, and  capable  of  maintaining,  if  called  upon, 
a  dignified  and  judicious  correspondence  (which 
means  position) ;  because  it  often  happens  that  sud- 
den emergencies  in  Foreign  Waters  make  him  the 
diplomatic  as  well  as  the  Military  representative  of 
his  country. — These  are  the  general  qualifications, 
and  the  nearer  the  Officer  approaches  the  full  pos- 
session of  them,  the  more  likely  he  will  be  to  serve 
our  country  well,  and  win  fame  and  honor  for  him- 
self." 

The  extracts  in  this  summary  are  brief  but  satis- 
factory and  we  all  agree  that  John  Paul  Jones  had  a 
splendid  vision  of  the  duties  of  a  Naval  Officer. 

150 


THE  MAN  ON  THE  BRIDGE  151 

When  standards  of  this  sort  are  set,  it  is  not  often 
that  we  find  them  fulfilled,  for  they  are  beyond  the 
grasp  of  most  men.  Standards  and  ideals  are  human 
institutions  to  be  constantly  striven  after,  but  sel- 
dom attained.  They  owe  their  origin  to  the  accom- 
plishments and  character  of  one  man  whose  life,  or 
life's  work,  is  passed  along  as  the  goal  towards  which 
other  men  should  strive.  John  Paul  Jones  probably 
realized  that  his  version  of  the  ideal  Naval  Officer 
was  not  to  be  attained  by  many,  but  some  day  might 
be  reached  by  a  few.  Admirals  Farragut  and  Dewey 
have  lived  up  to  his  standards  in  the  past,  and  to-day 
the  same  may  be  said  of  Rear-Admiral  William  Snow- 
den  Sims. 

This  officer,  because  of  his  absence  in  Europe  for 
two  years  and  his  besetting  sin,  modesty,  is  not  so 
well  known  to  the  American  people  as  is  his  due. 
This  is  to  a  large  extent  his  own  fault,  for  his  modesty 
and  dislike  of  ceremony  have  deprived  him  of  that 
fame  which  others  less  modest  have  attained.  At 
our  Naval  offices  in  London,  there  was  a  newspaper 
man  attached  to  the  Staff  as  the  central  correspon- 
dent of  our  Forces  in  Europe.  This  Officer  saw  that 
as  much  information,  as  could  be  made  public  about 
the  American  Naval  activities  abroad  was  sent  back 
to  this  country.  Information  of  every  sort  except 
that  concerning  Admiral  Sims  was  given  out.  All 
material  for  the  American  Press  had  to  be  passed 
upon  by  the  Admiral,  and  whenever  articles  dealing 
with  himself  were  submitted  for  approval,  they  were 
rejected.  Again  and  again  this  newspaper  corre- 


152  SIMSADUS 

spondent  went  to  the  Admiral,  personally,  and  asked 
him  to  allow  stories  of  himself  to  be  sent  to  the  Amer- 
ican Press;  and  as  often  as  this  was  asked,  just  so  often 
would  Admiral  Sims  reply:  "Let's  cut  out  this  talk, 
and  get  on  with  the  War;  after  the  War  there  will  be 
lots  of  time  for  talking."  This  was  his  method  of 
doing  things,  and  it  permeated  his  whole  character. 

Very  nearly  every  Staff  Officer  in  this  War,  above 
the  rank  of  Major,  was  allowed  the  use  of  a  Staff 
automobile.  American  Generals  in  this  country  and 
in  France  and  the  General  commanding  our  troops 
in  England,  all  had  their  own  Staff  cars,  marked  with 
insignia  of  their  rank.  This  was  not  the  case  with 
Admiral  Sims.  At  his  headquarters  in  London  there 
were  196  Officers,  who  had  at  their  disposal  five  Staff 
cars  and  each  one  was  modestly  marked  "U.  S.  N." 
One  of  these  cars  was  reserved  for  the  Admiral's  use 
during  the  day,  but  if  he  was  not  going  to  use  it  for  an 
hour  or  two,  it  was  at  the  disposal  of  any  Officer.  At 
night  all  cars  were  dismissed  shortly  after  six  o'clock, 
and  the  Admiral,  as  an  ordinary  citizen,  would  walk 
or  take  a  bus  back  to  his  room  at  the  Carlton  Hotel. 

Of  course  he  was  entertained  officially  on  many 
occasions,  and  at  all  of  these  functions  he  was  usu- 
ally the  principal  speaker.  He  is  the  possessor  of  a 
ready  wit  and  is  full  of  humorous  stories  gained  by 
extensive  reading  on  all  subjects.  He  is  exceedingly 
well  informed,  and  because  his  comprehension  of 
facts  and  his  interpretations  of  cause  and  result  are 
very  keen,  he  never  fails  to  see  the  humorous  side  of 
life  and  history.  Socially  he  was  also  entertained,  but 


ADMIRAL   WILLIAM    SNOWDEN    SIMS, 

Commander  United   States   Naval   Forces   Operating  in 
European  Waters. 


THE  MAN  ON  THE  BRIDGE  153 

he  considered  generally  that  such  affairs  could  wait. 
He  limited  his  social  activities  as  much  as  possible 
to  small  dinners  in  private  houses  where  the  at- 
mosphere was  one  of  friendliness  and  congeniality 
rather  than  that  of  a  social  affair.  He  believed  that 
as  long  as  there  was  a  War  on,  the  great  task  with 
which  he  was  confronted  should  in  no  way  be  inter- 
rupted by  matters  not  pertinent  to  his  work.  He 
was  always  on  the  bridge. 

Because  of  his  "liberal  education,  refined  man- 
ners, punctilious  courtesy,  and  the  nicest  sense  of 
personal  honor,"  he  soon  was  looked  upon  as  a  dip- 
lomatic representative  of  America,  as  well  as  the  Com- 
mander of  our  Forces.  His  ability  as  a  speaker,  his 
gentle  voice  and  dignity,  all  went  to  make  him  un- 
consciously diplomatically  important.  It  will  be  re- 
called that  in  the  Spring  of  1918,  Mr.  Page,  our  Am- 
bassador to  the  Court  of  St.  James,  returned  to  this 
country  because  of  ill  health,  and  for  several  months 
thereafter  his  position  was  vacant.  In  the  Fall  of 
that  year,  talk  concerning  the  choice  of  the  new  Am- 
bassador being  prevalent,  a  Member  of  Parliament 
made  the  remark;  "As  long  as  Admiral  Sims  is 
here,  your  country  does  not  need  an  Ambassador." 
This  remark  was  to  the  point,  and  though  the  Admiral 
of  course  did  not  become  involved  in  state  affairs, 
nevertheless  to  the  layman  and  citizen  of  London, 
America  and  Admiral  Sims  were  synonymous.  His 
cooperation  and  diplomatic  conduct  in  dealings 
with  the  Admiralty  and  Chiefs  of  other  Allied  or- 
ganizations, made  a  deep  impression  on  British 


i54  SIMSADUS 

public  opinion.  The  tale  was  popularly  told  that  he 
came  to  loggerheads  with  the  Admiralty  one  day 
when,  after  the  King  had  bestowed  upon  him  the 
honorary  title  of  "Knight  Commander  of  the  most 
holy  Order  of  St.  Michael  and  St.  George,"  a  British 
officer  at  the  Admiralty  greeted  him  as  "  Sir  William." 

Admiral  Sims  did  a  great  deal  to  cement  that 
much  desired  "  Anglo-American  Unity."  I  recall  one 
day  in  January  when  our  recently  appointed  Am- 
bassador, Mr.  Davis,  was  being  entertained  at  the 
American  Luncheon  Club.  The  Right  Hon.  Mr. 
Balfour  gave  a  little  talk,  in  the  course  of  which  he 
said:  "I  know  that  the  Englishman  has  little  pecu- 
liarities all  his  own;  for  instance,  an  Englishman  al- 
ways walks  into  a  drawing  room  as  if  it  belonged  to 
him."  The  Admiral  was  the  next  speaker,  and  thus 
he  began:  "In  connection  with  what  the  Right  Hon. 
Mr.  Balfour  has  just  said,  I  have  a  few  words  to  say, 
for  the  American  also  has  little  peculiarities  of  his 
own,  for  whereas  the  Englishman  walks  into  a  room 
as  if  it  belonged  to  him,  the  American  usually  walks 
in  as  if  it  belonged  to  nobody"  Quips  such  as  these 
from  the  Admiral  at  a  time  when  ill  winds  bore  to 
European  ears  the  cry  (in  poor  taste,)  "America 
won  the  War,"  were  usual,  and  time  and  time  again, 
he  would  tactfully  crash  through  the  atmosphere 
of  formality,  and  send  everybody  home  with  a  firm 
conviction  that  if  Admiral  Sims  represented  the 
typical  American,  England  and  America  were  at 
heart  similar. 

Perhaps  the  incident  which  shows  his  great  and 


THE  MAN  ON  THE  BRIDGE  155 

sincere  spirit  most  clearly,  was  his  return  to  this 
country.  I  have  tried  to  show  the  position  he  held 
in  Europe.  He  had  come  to  England  at  a  very  criti- 
cal time.  He  had  been  received,  respected,  and 
praised  for  his  services,  and  his  position  in  London 
had  been  such  as  few  foreigners  have  attained.  He 
had  ably  commanded  our  Navy  in  European  Waters, 
and  had  sat  as  a  conspicuous  figure  in  the  Su- 
preme Allied  Naval  Council,  and  was  the  first  Al- 
lied Chief  to  establish  real  cooperation  and  unity 
of  Command.  In  view  of  this,  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment had  promoted  him  to  the  rank  of  temporary 
Admiral;  but  according  to  Naval  regulations,  an 
Admiral,  unless  his  rank  is  permanent,  becomes  a 
Rear-Admiral  when  he  relinquishes  his  Command. 
Accordingly,  Admiral  Sims  was  a  full  Admiral  up  to 
the  time  he  left  England.  As  the  "Mauretania," 
on  which  he  returned,  came  up  the  harbor,  amidst 
the  waving  of  flags,  blowing  of  whistles,  and  other 
emblems  of  welcome,  the  great  hatches  or  doors  in 
the  side  of  the  ship  swung  open,  and  there  stood  the 
man  who  had  commanded  our  Navy  so  capably,  in 
the  uniform  of  a  Rear-Admiral. 

To-day  his  rank  is  still  that  of  a  Rear-Admiral, 
The  President,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  have 
both  recommended  to  Congress  that  he  be  promoted 
to  the  rank  of  permanent  Admiral;  up  to  the  present 
writing  this  has  not  been  done.  In  Europe,  men 
who  in  this  War  played  a  lesser  part  than  Admiral 
Sims  have  been  rewarded  for  their  services  by  their 
Governments.  Rear-Admiral  Sims,  U.  S.  N.,  a 


IS6  SIMSADUS 

Naval  officer,  a  diplomat,  a  gentleman,  and  a  ser- 
vant of  his  country,  deserves  the  best  his  govern- 
ment can  give  him.  His  country  has  already  given 
him  the  affection  and  that  admiration  he  so  richly 
deserves. 


APPENDIX 


APPENDIX 

The  total  number  of  submarines  destroyed  during  the 
War  was  203 ;  this  figure  includes  eight  which  were  forced 
to  intern  because  of  injuries  received  in  encounters  with 
patrol  vessels.  The  following  table  gives  the  methods 
by  which  they  were  destroyed : 

Rammed  by  Man  of  War 4 

"  Destroyer  and  Patrol  Vessels 9 

"  Merchant  Vessels 4 

Sunk  by  gunfire — Destroyer  and  Patrol  Vessels 12 

"       "         "       Decoy  Ship  (Mystery  Ship) II 

Armed  Smack I 

"      "  Depth  Charges   from  Destroyer   &  Patrol 

Vessels 35 

"      "  Allied  mine-fields 34 

"      "  Allied  Submarines 17 

4  Allied  Submarine  cooperating  with  a  decoy 

ship 2 

"      "  Aircraft 7 

Blown  up 14 

Sunk  by  Accident 4 

"       "  Collision  with  Enemy  vessels 2 

Stranded 3 

Sunk  by  Mine-nets — moored I 

"      "       towed 8 

"       "  Mines  laid  by  Germany 5 

'  Collision  with  paravane  on  Destroyer 3 

"       "  Modified  sweep I 

"      "  Bomb I 

Interned 8 

Method  of  sinking  unidentified 17 

Total 203 

159 


160  APPENDIX 

It  will  be  noted  from  this  list  that  depth  charges  were 
the  most  effective  weapon  against  the  submarine;  also 
attention  is  called  to  the  fact  that  17  submarines  were 
sunk  by  Allied  submarines,  and  that  none  were  sunk  by 
Merchant  Ship  gunfire.  Probably  half  of  those  sunk  by 
unknown  methods  destroyed  themselves  through  internal 
explosives  or  by  getting  caught  on  the  bottom. 

If  we  classify  this  list  according  to  nationalities,  we  have : 

Sunk  by  British  Vessels  or  British  Mines 137 

"      "  U.S.  Vessels 4 

"      "  French  Vessels. 3 

"       "  Russian  Vessels 2 

Total 146 

The  remaining  boats  were  sunk  by  means  other  than 
a  deliberate  attack  by  Allied  vessels,  or  by  Allied  opera- 
tions. 

The  classification  of  this  list  according  to  the  areas  in 
which  the  submarines  were  sunk  is  interesting. 

Sunk  in  the  North  Sea 86 

"      "  Dover  Barrage 17 

"      "  English  Channel 20 

"      "Irish  Sea 7 

"     Southwest  of  Ireland 7 

"     West  of  Ireland I 

"     North  of  Ireland 5 

"     Northwest  of  Scotland I 

"     in  the  Arctic  Sea 3 

"      "    "   Baltic     " 2 

"      "    "  Atlantic 4 

"      "    "   Black  Sea 3 

"      "    "  Mediterranean 15 

"      "    "   Dardanelles I 

Interned  in  Spain 5 

"  Holland 2 

"        "  Norway I 


APPENDIX  161 

Blown  up  at  bases — Flanders 4 

"       "    "  Pola  and  Cattaro 10 

Unidentified 6 

Total 200 

It  may  seem  strange  that  17  submarines  were  destroyed 
by  unknown  means,  and  only  6  were  destroyed  in  unknown 
places.  This  is  easily  explained,  for  submarines  lying  on 
the  bottom  have  been  found  when  the  cause  of  their  de- 
struction was  unknown.  The  reader  must  not  forget  that 
practically  all  this  information  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
authorities  during  the  War.  The  accumulation  of  it  was 
of  great  importance  to  the  Allies  while  the  War  was  in 
progress,  and  its  attainment  extremely  difficult. 

SUBMARINE  LOSSES 
CHRONOLOGICAL 

North  Sea  N.— North  of  58°;  North  Sea— 58°  to  53°; 
North  Sea  S.— South  of  53°.  Channel  E.— East  of  o°; 
Channel— o°  to  3°  W.;  Channel  West— 3°  to  5°  W. 

1914 


Aug.    9 
Sept.  12 
Nov.  23 
Dec. 
Dec. 

U 
U 
U 
U 

U 

15 
13 

18 

5 
ii 

North  Sea  N. 
North  Sea 
North  Sea  N. 
North  Sea  S. 
North  Sea  S. 

1915 


(10) 


fan. 

U       7 

North  Sea 

[an. 

U     31 

Unknown 

Vlar.    4 

U       8 

Dover  Area 

Vlar.  10 

U       12 

North  Sea 

Mar.  1  8 

U     29 

North  Sea 

une    5 

U     14 

North  Sea 

une  23 

U     40 

North  Sea 

une  (ca.) 

U     37 

North  Sea 

uly     2 

UC      2 

North  Sea  S. 

uly   20 

U     23 

North  Sea  N. 

uly   24 

U     36 

Scotland  NW. 

Aug.  II 

UB    4 

North  Sea  S. 

162  APPENDIX 

Aug.  19  U     27  Irish  Chan.  Appr. 

Aug.  (ca.)  UB     i  Medit. 

(20)     Aug.  U     26  Baltic 

Sept.  15  U       6  North  Sea  N. 

Sept.  24  U     41  Chan.  Approach 

Oct.     6(ca.)UC    9  North  Sea  S. 

Nov.    4  UC    8  North  Sea 

1916  Mar.  17  UC  12  Medit.  E. 
Mar.  22  U      68  Ireland  SW. 
Mar.  (ca.)  UB  13  Unknown 
Apr.     5  UB  26  Channel 
Apr.   23  UC    3  North  Sea  S. 

(30)     Apr.  24  UB    3  North  Sea  S. 

Apr.  27  UC    5  North  Sea  S. 

May  27  U     74  North  Sea 

May  (ca.)  UB  15  Medit. 

May  (or  June)  U    10  North  Sea  S. 

July     6  UC  10  North  Sea  S. 

July     7  U     77  North  Sea 

July   14  U     51  North  Sea 

July  30  UB  44  Medit.  E. 

Aug.  21  UC    7  North  Sea  S. 

(40)      Oct.   30  UB  45  Black  Sea 

Oct.   "  UB     7  Black  Sea 

Nov.    2  U     56  Arctic 

Nov.    4  U      20  North  Sea,  Jutland 

Nov.  30  UB  19  Channel 

Nov.  UC  15  Black  Sea 

Nov.  (ca.)  UC  13  Medit. 

Dec.     4  UC  19  North  Sea  S. 

Dec.     6  UB  29  Channel  Approach 

Dec.  16  UB  46  Dardanelles 

1917  Jan.    14  UB  37  Channel 
(51)      Jan.   26  U      76  Arctic 

Feb.     8  UC  39  North  Sea 

Feb.     8  UC  46  North  Sea  S. 

Feb.   17  U     83  Ireland  SW. 

Feb.  23  UC  32  North  Sea 

Mar.  10  UC  43  North  Sea  N. 

Mar.  12  UC  18  North  Sea 

Mar.  12  U     85  Channel  W. 

Mar.  13  UB    6  Dutch  Coast  (Interned) 

(60)     Apr.     5  UC  68  North  Sea  S. 

Apr.   19  UC  30  North  Sea 


APPENDIX 


163 


May     I 

U     81 

May    9 

UC  26 

May  14 

U     59 

May  17 

UB  39 

May  20 

UC  36 

May  24 

UC  24 

June     7 

UC  29 

June  12 

UC  66 

(70) 

June  20 

U     99 

June 

UB  36 

]  uly    12 

U     69 

July   24 

UC    i 

%  uly   26 

UC  61 

July   29 

UB  23 

July   29 
July   29 

UB  27 
UB  20 

Aug.     4 

UC44 

Aug.  12 

U     44 

(80) 

Aug.  1  8 

UB  32 

Aug.  21 

UC  41 

Sept.    2 

U     28 

Sept.  10 

UC  42 

Sept.  II 

U     49 

Sept.  12 

U     45 

Sept.  17 

U     88 

Sept.  22 

UC  72 

Sept.  26 

UC33 

Sept.  27 

UC  2! 

(90) 

Sept.  28 

UC    6 

Sept.  29 

UC55 

Oct.   i-n 

U     50 

Oct.    i-n 

U     66 

Oct.   5 

UB  41 

Oct.  5-9 

U  106 

Oct.   19 

UC79 

Oct.   23 

UC  16 

Oct.  (ca.) 
Oct.  (ca.) 

UC  62 
UC  14 

(100) 

Nov.    i 

UC  63 

Nov.    3 

UC  65 

Nov.  13 

UC  51 

Nov.  17 

U     58 

Nov.  17 

UB  18 

Nov.  1  8 

UC47 

Nov.  19-22 

UC57 

Atlantic 

North  Sea  S. 

North  Sea 

Channel 

North  Sea  S. 

Medit.  E. 

Ireland  SW. 

Channel  W. 

Ireland  W. 

Unknown 

North  Sea  N. 

North  Sea  S. 

Dover  Area 

Channel  W.  (then  interned,  Co- 

runna) 
North  Sea  S. 
North  Sea  S. 
Ireland  S.  (Waterford) 
North  Sea  N. 
Channel 

North  Sea  (Tay) 
Arctic 
Ireland  S. 
Atlantic 
Ireland  N. 
Atlantic 
North  Sea  S. 
Irish  Channel 
North  Sea  S. 
North  Sea  S. 
North  Sea  N.  (Lerwick) 
North  Sea 
North  Sea 
North  Sea 
North  Sea 
North  Sea  S. 
Channel 
North  Sea 
North  Sea  S. 
North  Sea  S. 
Channel 
North  Sea  S. 
Ireland  S. 
Channel 
North  Sea 
Baltic 


164  APPENDIX 


Nov. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
(no)    Dec. 
Dec. 
Dec. 
Dec. 
Dec. 

24 

29 

2 

6 

10 

13 
14 
19 

U     48 
UB  61 
UB  81 
UC  69 
UB  75 
U     75 
UC38 
UB  56 

Dover  Area 
North  Sea  S. 
Channel 
Channel 
North  Sea 
North  Sea 
Medit.  E. 
Dover  Area 

Dec. 

25 

U     87 

Irish  Channel 

1918    Jan. 

7 

U     93 

Channel  Approach 

Jan. 

8 

UB  69 

Medit.  W. 

an. 

18 

UB  66 

Medit.  W. 

an. 

*9 

UB   22 

North  Sea 

(120)  ; 

an. 

26 

U     84 

Irish  Channel 

an. 

26 

UB  35 

Dover  Area 

an. 

26 

U  109 

Dover  Area 

an. 

28 

UB  63 

North  Sea  N. 

an. 

(ca.) 

U     95 

Unknown 

Feb. 

4 

UC  50 

Dover  Area 

Feb. 

8 

UB  38 

Dover  Area 

Feb. 

12 

U     89 

Ireland  N. 

Feb. 

25 

UB  17 

Channel 

Mar. 

10 

UB  58 

Dover  Area 

(130)    Mar. 

II 

UB  54 

North  Sea 

Mar. 

15 

U   no 

Ireland  N. 

Mar. 

23 

UC  48 

Interned,  Ferrol 

Mar. 

26 

U     61 

Irish  Channel 

Apr. 

II 

UB  33 

Dover  Area 

Apr.   17 

UB  82 

Ireland  N. 

Apr. 

21 

UB  71 

Medit.  W. 

Apr. 

22 

UB  55 

Dover  Area 

Apr. 

25 

U  104 

Irish  Channel 

Apr. 

3° 

UB  85 

Irish  Channel 

(140)    May 

2 

UB  31 

Dover  Area 

•»   yf 

May 

2 

UC  78 

Dover  Area 

May 

8 

UB  70 

Medit.  W. 

May 

8 

U     32 

Medit.  W. 

May 

9 

UB  78 

Channel 

May 

10 

UB  16 

North  Sea  S. 

May 

ii 

U  154 

Atlantic 

May 

12 

U  103 

Channel  W. 

May 

12 

UB  72 

Channel 

May 

16 

UC35 

Medit.  W. 

(150)    May 

18 

U     39 

Interned,  Cartagena 

May 

23 

UB  52 

Medit.  E. 

APPENDIX 


165 


May  24 

UC56 

May  26 

UB  74 

Mar  31 

UC75 

May  31 

UC49 

May  (ca.) 

UBii9 

June  17 

U     64 

June  20 

UC  64 

June  26 

UC  ii 

(160)    July   10 

UC77 

July   10 

UB  65 

July   19 

UBiio 

July   20 

UBi24 

July   27 

UBio7 

July  (ca.) 

UBioS 

Aug.    3 

UB53 

Aug.  13 

UB3o 

Aug.  14 

UB  57 

Aug.  28 

UC  70 

(170)   Aug.  29 

UBio9 

Aug.  (ca.) 

UB  12 

Sept.    9 

U     92 

Sept.  10 

UB  83 

Sept.  16 

UBio3 

Sept.  19 

UBio4 

Sept.  25 

U   156 

Sept.  29 

UBii5 

Sept. 

U    102 

Sept. 

UBii3 

(180)    Sept. 

UBi27 

Oct.     4 

UB  68 

Oct.    16 

UB  90 

Oct.   19 

UBi23 

Oct.   28 

U     78 

Oct.   28 

UBii6 

Oct. 
Oct. 

*U     47 
*U     65 

Oct. 

*U     72 

Oct. 

*U     73 

(190)    Oct. 

*UB  10 

Oct. 

*UB  40 

Oct. 

*UB  48 

Oct. 

*UB  59 

Oct. 

*UBi29 

Oct. 

*UC    4 

Oct. 

*UC  25 

Oct. 

*UC34 

Interned,  Santander 
Channel 
North  Sea 
North  Sea 
Unknown 
Medit.  W. 
Dover  Area 
North  Sea  S. 
Dover  Area 
Ireland  SW. 
North  Sea 
Ireland  N. 
North  Sea  S. " 
Unknown 
Medit.  E. 
North  Sea 
North  Sea  S.  > 
North  Sea 
Dover  Area 
North  Sea  S. 
North  Sea  N. 
North  Sea  N. 
Dover  Area 
North  Sea  N. 
North  Sea  N. 
North  Sea  N. 
prob.  North  Sea  N. 
prob.  North  Sea 
prob.  North  Sea  N. 
Medit.  E. 
North  Sea 
North  Sea  N. 
North  Sea 
North  Sea  N. 
Medit. 
Medit. 
Medit. 
Medit. 
North  Sea  S. 
North  Sea  S. 
Medit. 
North  Sea  S. 
Medit. 
North  Sea  S. 
Medit. 
Medit. 


i66 


APPENDIX 


Oct. 

Oct. 
(200)    Nov.    9 


*UC  53    Medit. 
*UC  54    Medit. 
U     34    Medit.  W. 


Losses  after  signing  of  Armistice 

Nov.  ii          U  157     Interned,  Norway 
Nov.  21  U     97    North  Sea 

Nov.  21  UC  74     Interned,  Barcelona 

*  Destroyed  by  the  Germans  on  evacuation  of  Flanders  and 

the  Adriatic. 


LIST  OF  GERMAN  SUBMARINES  SUNK 


Commander's  Name 

Rank 

Name  of 
Sub. 

Place 

Date  of 

Sinking 

Albrecht,  Kurt 

Dead 

K-i 

Albrecht,  Werner 

" 

0-L 

UC-53 

Amberger,  Gustav 

P.W. 

K-L 

UB-S8 

5o:58N  oi:i4E 

Mar.  10, 

1918 

Amberger,  Wilhelm 

Dead 

O-L 

UB-io8 

Arnold,  Alfred 

P.W. 

0-L 

Bachmann,  Gunther 

Dead 

0-L 

UB-38 

5o:56N  oi:25W 

Feb.     8, 

1918 

Barten,  Wilhelm 

" 

0-L 

Bauck,  W. 

" 

K-L 

U-89 

Feb. 

1918 

Bauer,  Casar 

N 

K-L 

Bender,  Waldemar  Escaped, 

K-L 

U-69 

North  Sea  (N) 

July   12, 

1917 

returned  to 

Germany 

Berekhelm,  Egewolf 

Freiherr  von 

Dead 

K-L 

Berger,  Gerardt 

* 

K-L 

U-so 

Near  German 

Oct. 

1917 

Coast 

Bermis,  Kurt 
Branchied,  Albert 

N 
M 

K-L 
0-L 

U-I04 
UB-I7 

Si:S9W  o6:26W 
Channel 

April  26, 
Feb.   25, 

1918 
1918 

Braun,  Charles 

" 

0-L 

Brever,  Herbert 

P.W. 

O-L 

Buck,  Gustav 

Dead 

K-L 

Degetau,  Hans 

M 

0-L 

U-68 

Mar.  22, 

Dieckmann,  Victor 

ft 

K-L 

U-62 

Ditfurth,  Benno  von 

ft 

0-L 

UB-32 

North  Sea 

Sept.  17, 

Edling,  Karl 

" 

K-L 

U-48 

Goodwins 

Nov.  24, 

1917 

Ehrentraut,  Otto 

" 

0-L 

UC-39 

54:o3N  00:02 

Feb.     8, 

1918 

Eltester,  Max 

* 

K-L 

Feddersen,  Adolf 

L- 

UC-I4 

Fircks,  Wilhelm 

Frieherr  von 

Dead 

K-L 

Fischer,  Karl-Hanno 

" 

L- 

Frohner,  Eherhardt 

t( 

L- 

Furbringer,  Gerhardt 

P.W. 

K-L 

Furbringer,  Werner 

P.W. 

K-L 

UB-iio 

Galster,  Hans 

Dead 

0-L 

UC-si 

Dec. 

1917 

Gebeschus,  Rudolf 
Gercke,  Herman 

it 

K 

K-L 
K-L 

UB-63 
U-IS4 

56:17  O2:25W 
In  Atlantic 

Tan.   28, 
May  n, 

1918 
1918 

Azores 


APPENDIX 


167 


Commander's  Name 

Rank 

Name  of 
Sub. 

Place 

Date  of 

Sinking 

Gerlach,  Helmut 

« 

K-L 

U-93 

49:59  o$:i2W 

Jan. 

7, 

I9l8 

Gerth,  George 

P.W. 

K-L 

UC-6I 

Wissant  Shoal 

July 

26, 

1917 

near  Gris  Nez 

Glimpf,  Herman 

Dead 

0-L 

UB-20 

North  Hinder 

July  29, 

1917 

Graeff,  Ernst 

P.W. 

K-L 

Gregor,  Fritz 

Dead 

O-L 

UB-33 

Channel 

April 

14, 

I9l8 

Gross,  Karl 

it 

0-L 

UC-2 

Off  Yarmouth 

July 

2 

I9IS 

Gunther,  Paul 

ft 

0-L 

UB-37 

5o:o7N  oi:47W 

Jan. 

14,' 

1917 

Guntzel,  Ludwig 

t 

K-L 

Gunzel,  Erich 

1 

K-L 

U-7S 

Dec. 

I? 

Haag,  George 

i 

L- 

Mar. 

I9l6 

Hansen,  Klaus 

' 

K-L 

Hartman,  Richard 
Hecht,  Erich 

! 

K-L 
0-L 

U-49 
UB-S4 

46:i7N  I4:42W 
Channel 

Sept. 
Mar. 

ii! 

1917 
I9l8 

Heinke,  Curt 

• 

0-L 

Heller,  Bruno 

« 

0-L 

Hennig,  Heinrich  von  P.  W. 

K-L 

Heydebreck,  Karsten 
V.                                Dead 

O-L 

UC-63 

$i-23N  02-ooE 

Nov. 

i, 

1917 

Hirzel,  Alfred 

« 

0-L 

Hoppe,  Bruno 

" 

K-L 

Hufnagel,  Hans 
Kesserlingk,  Harold 

V.     " 

K-L 
0-L 

U-io6 
UB-36 

North  Sea 
North  Sea 

Oct. 

June, 

10, 

1917 
1917 

Kiel,  Wilhelm 

" 

O-L 

UC-i8 

54t38N  oo-ccN 

Mar. 

12, 

1917 

Kiesewetter,  Wilhelm  Interned 

K-L 

UC-S6 

Santander 

May 

26, 

I9l8 

Klatt,  Alfred 

Dead 

O-L 

UC-38 

Medit.  38:32N 

Dec. 

14, 

1917 

2o:uE 

Kolbe,  Walther 

" 

0-L 

UC-I03 

40  miles  South 

May 

II, 

I9l8 

of  Lizard  Point 

Konig,  Gerog 

" 

K-L 

Korsch,  Hans  Paul 

" 

0-L 

UC-35 

Sardinia 

May 

16, 

I9l8 

Kratzsch 

" 

K-L 

Krech,  Gunther 

P.W. 

K-L 

UB-85 

N.  Channel 

April 

3°, 

I9l8 

Kreysern,  Gunther 

Dead 

0-L 

UC-3 

52:24N  O2:24E 

April 

I9l6 

Kroll,  Karl 

N 

K-K 

U-no 

55:49N  o8:o6W 

Mar. 

15, 

I9l8 

Kustner,  Heinrich 

M 

0-L 

UB-39 

5o:o5N  oi:25W 

May 

i?» 

1917 

Lafrenze,  Claus  P. 

P.W. 

K-L 

UC-65 

So:28N  oo:i7E 

Nov. 

3, 

1917 

Launburg,  Otto 

P.W. 

0-L 

UB-52 

Adriatic 

May 

23, 

I9l8 

Lammer,  Johannes 

Dead 

K-L 

Lepsius,  Rienhald 

M 

0-L 

Lilienstern,  Ruhler 
Lorenze,  Hellmuth 

It 

Interned 

0-L 
0-L 

UC-ss 
UC-48 

6o:ooN  oi:ooW 
5o:22N  oi:47W 

Sept. 
Mar. 

29, 

23, 

1917 
I9l8 

Lorenze,  Herman 

Dead 

K-L 

Lowe,  Werner 

0-L 

UB-58 

co:58N  oi:i4E 

Mar. 

10, 

I9l8 

Luhe,  Vicco  von  der 

P.W. 

0-L 

UB-i6 

North  Sea 

May 

10, 

I9l8 

Menzel,  Bernhard 

Dead 

0-L 

Metz,  Artur 

M 

O-L 

Metzger,  Heinrich 
Mey,  Karl 

Interned 
Dead 

K-L 
0-L 

U-39 

Carthagena 

May 

1  8, 

I9l8 

Mildenstein,  Christian      " 

0-L 

UC-i 

July, 

J9I7 

Moecke,  Fritz 

" 

O-L 

Mohrbutter,  Urich 

P.W. 

0-L 

Moraht  Robert 

P.W. 

K-L 

U-64 

Bizerta,  Medit. 

June 

21, 

I9l8 

Muhlan,  Helmut 

P.W. 

K-L 

Muhle,  Gerhardt 

Dead 

K-L 

i68 


APPENDIX 


Commander's  Name 

Rank 

Name  of 
Sub. 

Place 

Date  of 

Sinking 

Muller,  Hans  Albrecht      " 
Neumann,  Friedrich      P.  W. 
Niemer,  Hans            Interned 
Niemeyer,  Georg            Dead 
Nitzsche,  Alfred 

0-L 
O-L 
0-L 
0-L 
0-L 

UB-5 
UB-23 

July 

26, 

1917 

Noodt,  Erich 

P.W. 

O-L 

Petz,  Willy 

Dead 

K-L 

U-85 

49:52N 

03-.20W 

Mar. 

12, 

1917 

Platsch,  Erich 

* 

0-L 

Pohle,  Richard 

" 

K-L 

Prinz,  A  thai  win 

" 

K-L 

Pustkuchen,  Herbert 

tt 

0-L 

UC-66 

49:56N 

o5:ioW 

June 

12, 

1917 

Reichenback,  Gottfried     " 

0-L 

UC-6 

Sept. 

28, 

1917 

Reimarus,  Georg 
Remy,  Johannes 

tt 

tt 

0-L 
K-L 

UC-2I 

5i:3oN 

oi:34E 

Sept. 

20, 

1917 

Roehr,  Walter 
Rosenow,  Ernest 
Rumpel,  Walther 

" 

K-L 
K-L 
K-L 

U-84 
UC-29 

S5-S3N 
5i:47N 

05  :44W 
1  1  :4oW 

Jan, 
June 

7> 

1918 
1917 

Rucker,  Claus 
Saltzwedel,  Rudolf 

" 

K-L 
0-L 

U-IQ3 
UB-8i 

30J27N 

oi-38E 
00:53 

Jan. 
Dec. 

26, 
2, 

1918 
1917 

Sebelin,  Erwin 

" 

K-L 

Seuffer,  Rudolf 

w 

K-L 

UC-50 

5o:47N 

oozcpE 

Feb. 

4, 

1918 

Schmettow,  Graf  von 

u 

K-L 

UC-26 

5i:3N  : 

E'4.oE 

May 

9, 

1917 

Schmidt,  Georg 

tt 

Schmidt,  Siegfried 

tt 

O-L 

U-45 

55-48N  . 

7:ioW 

Sept. 

12, 

1917 

Schmidt,  Walther  G.  Interned 
Schmitz,  Max                 Dead 

0-L 
0-L 

UC-56 
UC-62 

Santander 

May 

5» 

1918 

Schmitz,  Walther 

P.W. 

0-L 

UC-7S 

OfFTyne 

May 

3r> 

1918 

Schneider,  Rudolf 
Schultz,  Theodor 

Dead 

K-L 
0-L 

U-87 
UB-6i 

S2:56N 

05:o7W 

Dec. 
Dec. 

27, 

1917 
1917 

Schurmann,  Paul 

" 

0-L 

UC-4 

Oct. 

15, 

1917 

Schwartz,  Ferdinand 

tt 

0-L 

UB-64 

Schweinitz  und  Krain 

Graf  von 

" 

K-L 

Schwieger 

" 

K-L 

U-88 

49'42N 

!3:i8W 

Sept. 

14, 

1917 

Sittenfield,  Erich 

tt 

K-L 

U-4S 

55:48N 

7:3oW 

Sept. 

12, 

1917 

Smith,  Wilhelm 

P.W. 

O-L 

Soergel,  Hans 

Dead 

0-L 

Sprenger 

P.W. 

K-L 

UC-34 

Steckelberg,  Oscar    Interned 

O-L 

UB-6 

Dutch  Coast 

Mar. 

I3» 

1917 

Stein  Zu  Lausnitz 

Freiherr  von 

Dead 

0-L 

UB-27 

52:47N 

02:2dE 

July 

29, 

1917 

SteindofF,  Ernest 

n 

O-L 

UB-74 

5  miles  S.  Port- 

May 

26, 

1918 

land  Bill 

Stenzler,  Heinrich 
Stosberg,  Arthur 

P.W. 

O-L 
0-L 

UB-78 
UB-78 

Off  Cherbourg 

May 

9, 

1918 

Stoss,  Alfred 

P.W. 

K-L 

Stoter,  Karl 
Stuhr,  Fritz 

Dead 
it 

0-L 
K-L 

UB-35 
U-io 

5i:°6N 

oi:38E 

Jan. 
May 

26, 

1918 
1916 

Suchodoletz,  Ferdi- 

nand V. 

" 

K-L 

Tebbenjohannes,  Kurt 
Trager,  Friedrich 

P.W. 
Dead 

K-L 
0-L 

UC-44 

TIB-?! 

26  miles 

6:59W 
SSW 

Aug. 
May 

4» 

12, 

1917 
1918 

Utke,  Kurt 


P.W.    O-L 


Portland  Bill 
UC-II     E.  Harwich          June  26,  1918 


APPENDIX 


169 


Commander's  Name 

Rank 

Name  of 
Sub. 

Place 

Date  of 

Sinking 

Valentiner,  Hans            Dead 
Voigt,  Ernest 
Wachendorff,  Seigfried 

0-L 
0-L 
0-L 

U-I56 
or  U-I57 
UC-72 

5o:s8N  oi:28E    Dec. 
Stranded  in 
Dover  Sept.  or  Oct. 

1917 
1917 

Wacker,  Karl 

0-L 

UB-22 

Jan. 

1918 

Wagenfuhr,  Paul 
Walther,  Franz 

0-L 
O-L 

U-44 
UB-7S 

58-5  iN  4-4oE 

Aug.  12, 

1917 

Weddigan,  Otto 
Wegener,  Bernhard 

K-L 
K-L 

Weisbach,  Erwin 

K-L 

U-32 

Mediterranean 

May     i, 

1918 

Weisbach,  Raimund      P.  W. 
Wendlandt,  Hans  H.     P.  W. 

K-L 
0-L 

U-8i 
UC-38 

SiN  I3W 
Medit.  38:32N 

May     i, 
Dec.  14, 

1917 
1917 

Wenninger,  Ralph         P.  W. 

K-L 

UB-ss 

Channel  E. 

April  22, 

1918 

Wigankow,  Gunther      Dead 

0-L 

Wilcke,  Erich 

K-L 

Wilhelms,  Ernest               " 

K-L 

Willich,  Kurt 

K-L 

UC-24 

Off  Cattaro 

May  24, 

1917 

Wutsdorff,  Hans  Osker     " 

K-L 

Zerboni,  di  Sposetti 

Werner  von 

K-L 

UC-I6 

Oct. 

1917 

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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


